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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VS.

ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; ZOVIO, INC., FORMERLY KNOWN AS BRIDGEPOINT
EDUCATION, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND DOES 1
THROUGH 50, INCLUSIVE

DATES OF PROCEEDINGS

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1 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; WEDNESDAY; DECEMBER 15, 2021;
2 9:17 A.M.

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4 ---oOo---

5 THE COURT: Let the record reflect that we're
6 under a mask mandate now, so everyone will be required
7 to wear a mask, which you all did. And thank you very
8 much.

9 The presiding judge has declared that if a
10 judge is in plexiglas, which I am, that therefore, I
11 don't have to wear a mask unless I want to wear a mask.
12 For the record, I choose not to wear a mask.

13 I'm going to make a specific finding, though,
14 that for my trials -- and each judge is different -- for
15 my trials, I make a specific finding that for any type
16 of appellate review, that I have a very good record,
17 that only counsel who is speaking to the Court may
18 remove their mask if they choose.

19 There was an issue in another department where
20 a counsel couldn't hear properly and somebody brought an
21 issue that it could possibly be an appellate issue. So
22 my ruling is that when speaking to the Court, if you
23 want to remove your mask, you may, only that counsel
24 speaking directly to the Court.

25 And for the record, I'm more than 6 feet away
26 from you, okay?

27 Are we ready?

28 MS. KALANITHI: Yes, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: I like that. So with that being
2 said, we will now have the People's -- one second -- the
3 People's closing statement -- argument.

4 Give me just one second.

5 (The Court and the clerk confer off the
6 record.)

7 THE COURT: I'm good.

8 MS. KALANITHI: Your Honor, we do have a hard
9 copy and electronic version.

10 THE COURT: Bring it up.

11 Appearance and begin, Counsel.

12 MS. KALANITHI: Good morning, Your Honor.
13 Emily Kalanithi for the People.

14 THE COURT: Good morning.

15 MS. KALANITHI: Good morning.

16 May I begin?

17 THE COURT: One moment.

18 (Pause.)

19 THE COURT: You may, Counsel.

20 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

21 Over the last six weeks, this Court has heard
22 from over 30 witnesses. Some were defendants'
23 telemarketers, admissions counselors, who explained how
24 they lied because they feared missing their quotas and
25 losing their jobs. Many were the students whose dreams
26 and finances defendants destroyed, and still others were
27 defendants' executives who, at every turn, allowed and
28 encouraged the misrepresentations because for them, it

1 was all about the numbers.

2 we thank this Court for your time and careful
3 attention to all of the evidence. The People submit
4 that it overwhelmingly justifies full relief against
5 defendants for their deceptive business practices over
6 the last 12 years.

7 The Court heard testimony from nine consumers
8 about the false and misleading statements made to them
9 by their trusted Ashford admissions counselors, and they
10 weren't misled about a one-off product or service that
11 they bought. They were misled about the education that
12 they hoped to invest in for their futures.

13 These nine students had experiences that
14 exemplified the many thousands of other students across
15 the country who were misled by defendants.

16 As former Ashford president, Dr. Richard
17 Pattenau, testified, Ashford students had complex and
18 difficult lives, and the students who testified in this
19 trial took time out of their busy, complex lives -- some
20 traveling from as far as North Carolina and
21 Pennsylvania -- all with the goal of shedding a light on
22 defendants' deception and with the hope that other
23 students wouldn't be lied to and ultimately harmed in
24 the way they were.

25 I'll begin by discussing the evidence showing
26 admissions counselors' misrepresentations to hundreds of
27 thousands of students over the phone in violation of the
28 UCL and FAL. Defendants' misrepresentations to students

1 are not about getting minor details wrong, as defendants
2 assert.

3 The People have shown that in call after call,
4 defendants' admissions counselors made statements to
5 students about issues that were most important to them
6 because they deeply affected their futures and their
7 finances in four main issue areas: Their ability to
8 pursue certain licensed careers, like teaching, nursing,
9 social work, and substance abuse counseling; their
10 ability to get financial aid and avoid out-of-pocket
11 costs; the time it would take to complete their Ashford
12 degree; and how much they would have to spend doing so.

13 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm muting --

14 THE CLERK: It's muted, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: Just making sure.

16 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you.

17 THE COURT: There's a number of people that
18 are listening. That's the reason why. So they're
19 muted.

20 Let's go.

21 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

22 And lastly, their ability to apply
23 previously-earned college credits towards an Ashford
24 degree and transfer their Ashford credits to other
25 colleges.

26 Next, I'll discuss several arguments the
27 defendants have made to try to undermine the People's
28 case. For example, that students should have known not

1 to trust their admissions counselors based on the fine
2 print and various disclaimers and disclosures that
3 admissions counselors were never expressly -- and that
4 admissions counselors were never expressly authorized to
5 lie.

6 And in this section, I'll try to address the
7 issue that Your Honor highlighted yesterday regarding
8 agency and authorization.

9 Defendants' arguments fail based on the law,
10 the facts, and simple common sense. In fact,
11 defendants' witnesses largely agree that based on the
12 paper training defendants generated, admissions
13 counselors should not have been making the deceptive
14 statements to students.

15 But, at the same time defendants generated
16 this paper training, they created a company culture
17 where the key performance indicator was the number of
18 students signing up and paying for Ashford each day, a
19 culture where admissions counselors feared they would
20 lose their jobs, and whatever false or misleading
21 statements admissions counselors needed to get students
22 on the hook were overlooked and, in many cases, directly
23 encouraged by managers and supervisors, as long as the
24 admissions counselors' numbers remained high.

25 Next, I'll move on to discuss the evidence of
26 what defendants knew. The evidence shows that
27 defendants were well aware of the deception emanating
28 from their San Diego headquarters, from the scorecards

1 being generated by their own Compliance Department, by
2 the reports of the mystery shopping firm they had
3 retained, and by the statements of their own departing
4 employees in exit surveys.

5 But despite having more than ample knowledge,
6 defendants failed to stop further deception or to remedy
7 the misleading statements made to students, because to
8 do so would hurt defendants' bottom line.

9 Defendants further illegally padded their
10 bottom line by charging students unlawful debt
11 collection fees in violation of California law. And
12 I'll discuss that next.

13 And finally -- finally, I'll discuss relief.
14 I will address Your Honor's questions from yesterday
15 regarding the \$25 million in restitution and the penalty
16 breakdown before, during, and after the Iowa monitor
17 period.

18 Because of defendants' serious, pervasive, and
19 willful violations of California's UCL and FAL, the
20 People are seeking penalties of \$75 million, as well as
21 \$25 million in restitution for harmed students.

22 Further, defendants' misconduct has not
23 ceased. Zovio is providing the same enrollment and
24 marketing services for the newly-named University of
25 Arizona Global Campus, what defendants' witness Pat
26 Ogden called the same institution under a different
27 name. And Zovio's historically ineffectual Compliance
28 Department will continue to exercise oversight over the

1 Zovio admissions counselors enrolling students in UAGC.

2 There's every reason to believe that the
3 misrepresentations to students are continuing and will
4 continue unless this Court issues an injunction, as
5 requested by the People.

6 So first, the law. To prove a cause of action
7 under California's consumer protection statutes, the UCL
8 and FAL, it's necessary only to show that members of the
9 public are likely to be deceived. The UCL and FAL
10 prohibit both untrue statements and statements that may
11 contain some truth, but are still likely to deceive. So
12 the same standard likely to deceive a reasonable
13 consumer applies in both instances.

14 Further, the UCL and FAL apply to single acts
15 of misconduct. Contrary to defendants' argument, the
16 People need not prove that there was an established
17 pattern or practice of misconduct in order to prove
18 liability. Nevertheless, the overwhelming evidence
19 shows that such a pattern and practice of misconduct
20 existed here.

21 The evidence of misrepresentations on the four
22 issue areas identified here comes from four main
23 sources: The testimony of former Ashford students, the
24 testimony of former Ashford admissions counselors,
25 defendants' documents and witnesses, and the testimony
26 of the People's expert, Dr. Jerry Lucido. Drawing on
27 his 40 years of experience leading college admissions
28 departments, Dr. Lucido reviewed a random sample of 561

1 calls to identify misrepresentations.

2 And first, the evidence shows that defendants
3 falsely promised students they could use an Ashford
4 degree to become teachers as testified to by former
5 students Alison Tomko and Crystal Embry. These
6 misrepresentations have life-altering consequences
7 because Ashford degrees do not, in fact, qualify
8 graduates for teaching positions that require licensure
9 or certification.

10 So first, the truth. As explained by
11 Dr. Lucido, the vast majority of teaching positions
12 require teacher licensure. This includes jobs at public
13 schools, which in California comprise 85 percent of
14 teaching positions, and many private schools, which may
15 require or prefer licensure.

16 To obtain licensure, aspiring teachers must
17 attend a state-approved teaching program. The problem
18 is that, as defendants admitted in response to a request
19 for admission, not a single online Ashford degree has
20 ever been state approved for teaching.

21 As a result, aspiring teachers who enroll at
22 Ashford, believing that it's more than just a bachelor's
23 degree, must invest significant additional time and
24 money in a real state-approved teaching program after
25 leaving Ashford.

26 Had they known the truth, these students could
27 have attended a blended two-in-one program earning their
28 bachelor's degree and their teacher license in just four

1 years.

2 Many prospective Ashford students hoped to
3 find work as teachers, and admissions counselor said
4 what it took to get them enrolled with no regard for
5 whether enrolling and ultimately graduating from Ashford
6 would advance students' goals to teach.

7 The Court heard testimony from former
8 admissions counselor Molly Mckinley who explained that
9 she never received training on the educational
10 requirements for licensure, even though she spoke to
11 aspiring teachers nearly every other day on the phone.

12 As shown here, Ms. Mckinley tried to give
13 aspiring teachers the impression that they would be,
14 quote, "ready to go," unquote, once they earned an
15 Ashford degree when, in fact, because Ashford is not
16 state-approved, its graduates would need to attend a
17 totally separate state-approved program before stepping
18 into a classroom as a licensed teacher.

19 And how did Ms. Mckinley learn these
20 techniques? From the successful admissions counselors
21 on her team, that is, admissions counselors who enrolled
22 the most students that her supervisors encouraged her to
23 emulate to get her numbers up, all part of the
24 on-the-job training that continued after admissions
25 counselors finished the initial two-week paper training.

26 Vice president of financial aid and student
27 success services, Kyle Curran, confirmed that this
28 on-the-job training was all part of how admissions

1 counselors were trained.

2 AS Dr. Lucido testified, these kind of
3 statements that "you're ready to go" convey that
4 Ashford's degrees have the kind of state approval that
5 allow students to move directly to student teaching or
6 state teaching exams when they do not.

7 And now let's look at the lie in practice.
8 Ms. Tomko, an aspiring public school librarian, enrolled
9 at Ashford because her admissions counselor told her
10 falsely that Ashford was part of an interstate agreement
11 that meant her Ashford degree would carry over to
12 Pennsylvania as long as she completed her student
13 teaching and passed Pennsylvania's state teaching exam.

14 Ms. Tomko took handwritten notes during her
15 preenrollment phone call with an admissions counselor
16 shown here, recording the admissions counselor's false
17 statement that Ashford was part of such an interstate
18 agreement. Only after graduating did Ms. Tomko learn
19 that she would need to complete an additional 60 to 90
20 credits before she could even begin her student teaching
21 necessary to become a certified public school librarian
22 or teacher.

23 Because Ms. Tomko could not afford the time or
24 money to complete so many additional credits, she never
25 became certified, eventually lost the job she had at a
26 private school, and now works as a phlebotomist, a job
27 that does not even require a bachelor's degree.

28 And the evidence has shown that defendants'

1 misrepresentations to students about careers were not
2 limited to teaching. Indeed, defendants also misled
3 students about their ability to use an Ashford degree to
4 pursue careers in nursing, drug and alcohol counseling,
5 and social work, which the People collectively refer to
6 as the "helping careers."

7 So again, first the truth. Unfortunately for
8 those students misled into enrolling at Ashford, by law,
9 the helping careers require attending an approved
10 program and obtaining licensure and certification.

11 As Dr. Lucido explained, affirmatively
12 describing Ashford as "perfect" or "geared for" students
13 who applied to the helping careers is deceptive because
14 Ashford's program lacked -- Ashford's programs lacked
15 the programmatic accreditation required for licensure.

16 Ashford's student inquiry department, the
17 first point of contact for a potential Ashford student,
18 was a key component of defendants' deception when it
19 came to careers.

20 As former student inquiry coordinator Lee
21 Bennett testified, students would frequently mention
22 their interest in one of the helping careers when he was
23 on the phone with them, including nursing and drug and
24 alcohol counseling.

25 Student inquiry coordinators were not trained
26 in what was required for these careers or whether
27 Ashford programs met those requirements. Instead,
28 Mr. Bennett testified that they were trained to transfer

1 them to the, quote, "perfect admissions counselor for
2 their needs"; in the case of a substance -- in the case
3 of substance abuse counseling, to an admissions
4 counselor who would talk about Ashford's health and
5 human services department, "someone who would close the
6 sale."

7 And what happened after they were transferred?
8 well, the, quote, unquote, "perfect Ashford admissions
9 counselor" themselves did not know the educational
10 requirements for the helping careers. Instead, as
11 former admissions counselor Molly McKinley testified,
12 when she was asked: "when you spoke to prospective
13 students about nursing in that fashion, what was the
14 impression you were trying to give them?"

15 "ANSWER: That they could go to Ashford, get
16 whatever degree we were pushing at that time for nurses
17 or people who wanted to be nurses, and then that would
18 be it, that they would be set from that moment after
19 getting the degree with us."

20 Defendants' deception about the helping
21 careers was made clear to the Court through testimony
22 from students like Pamela Roberts and Roberta Perez.

23 Pamela Roberts, shown here, testified that she
24 was inspired to help people and become a certified
25 substance abuse counselor because she had personally
26 benefited from counseling at a substance abuse treatment
27 center when she was a teenager.

28 But a week before graduation, Ms. Roberts

1 learned that her Ashford degree did not meet any of the
2 requirements to become a certified substance abuse
3 counselor. Ms. Roberts had put in four years of work
4 toward a degree, sacrificed time with her family and
5 attending AA meetings, only to be left with over \$60,000
6 in student loan debt.

7 The Court also heard testimony from
8 Ms. Roberta Perez, whose story also illustrates the
9 tragic consequences of defendants' lies about the
10 helping careers. Ms. Perez, a single mother who has
11 worked for many years as a supervisor at a manufacturing
12 plant, testified that she hoped to use an Ashford degree
13 to get a new career and help people by becoming a
14 therapist. It seemed that by enrolling at Ashford,
15 Ms. Perez was on track to do just that.

16 She testified that her admissions counselor
17 told her with her master's in psychology from Ashford,
18 she could get a wide variety of different occupations in
19 psychology, in the psychology field: Counseling, social
20 work, therapy, human services field.

21 Unfortunately, Ms. Perez fared no better than
22 Ms. Roberts. After graduating with \$40,000 in student
23 loans, Ms. Perez learned the devastating truth about how
24 useless her Ashford degree was. The state licensing
25 agency for marriage and family therapists delivered the
26 news in the letter shown here.

27 Ms. Perez's Ashford degree was not approved
28 for licensure, and she would need to complete an

1 entirely new degree before she could even begin her
2 practice hours. Earning an Ashford degree had put
3 Ms. Perez in a financial hole over \$40,000 in student
4 loan debt and brought her not one step closer to
5 achieving her career goal.

6 Defendants also routinely made
7 misrepresentations about financial aid. As Dr. Lucido
8 testified, financial aid information is of critical
9 importance to prospective students because it informs
10 the students how much and how they will pay for their
11 degree.

12 For many, a college education will be the
13 single largest financial commitment of their lives.
14 Accurate financial aid information is especially
15 important to low income, nontraditional college
16 students, like those who attended Ashford.

17 So first, the truth. Without a financial aid
18 award letter in hand, an admissions counselor cannot
19 know how much and what type of financial aid a student
20 will receive.

21 As shown by defendants' own data between 2009
22 and 2019, one-third of Ashford students did not receive
23 their final financial aid award letter until more than
24 three weeks after enrolling. That's after they've
25 already passed the Ashford Promise period, the
26 three-week period during which a student could drop out
27 of their first class at Ashford at no charge.

28 Zovio's vice president of financial aid, Kyle

1 Curran, testified in 2017 that for new students who did
2 receive financial aid packages that year, 41 percent did
3 not receive their packages until more than 28 days after
4 starting class. Again, that's well after the Ashford
5 Promise period had ended.

6 However, under pressure to enroll students,
7 admissions counselors told them what they needed to
8 close the sale. They gave false assurances about the
9 amount and type of aid they would receive.

10 Student Loren Evans specifically asked her
11 admissions counselor about whether she would have any
12 out-of-pocket expenses while she was enrolled. She
13 testified, "I asked her if there would be any
14 out-of-pocket expenses on my end before I graduated. I
15 was very adamant about that because I was working part
16 time at the time and trying to support my children and
17 myself."

18 And what did her admissions counselor say in
19 response? Ms. Evans testified that "She assured me
20 there would not be any until after I graduated and that
21 it would be covered with student loans and grants."

22 It wasn't until Ms. Evans was close to
23 graduating, long after the Ashford Promise period had
24 ended, that she realized her admissions counselor's
25 assurances were untrue. Financial aid did not cover her
26 full cost of attendance and she owed a balance to
27 Ashford that she could not afford, forcing her to
28 withdraw.

1 Ms. Evans was left with a sizable student loan
2 debt and no degree. And as her testimony shows, these
3 financial aid misrepresentations not only cost students
4 money and time, but because of lifetime financial aid
5 limits, their chance to finish a college degree.

6 As with financial aid, at the time of
7 enrollment, admissions counselors cannot know how much
8 debt a student will take on, what a student's loan
9 payments will be, or the student's ability to make those
10 payments based on their income at the time. In fact,
11 defendants' paper training instructed admissions
12 counselors not to tell students about how much future
13 student loan debt they would incur.

14 But let's look at this lie in practice. In
15 one of the calls Dr. Lucido identified as deceptive, an
16 admissions counselor speaks to a father of five who is
17 unemployed. He's speaking about enrolling at Ashford.
18 And here you see the admissions counselor downplaying
19 the student's future debt by telling him that his
20 payment might be like \$50 a month or it might be like
21 75.

22 As Dr. Lucido explained, students' loan
23 payments can easily reach several hundred dollars a
24 month, a big difference for many of the students that
25 Ashford serves.

26 Additionally, defendants' admissions
27 counselors regularly misrepresented federal financial
28 aid rules. For example, Dr. Lucido identified calls

1 where admissions counselors told students that federal
2 financial aid is competitive, when, in fact, it is not;
3 that the government subsidizes interest on all loans
4 while the student is in school, when, in fact, that only
5 applies to subsidized loans; and admissions counselors
6 told students that Pell Grants are given to any actively
7 enrolled student, when, in fact, Pell Grants are
8 restricted to students with financial need.

9 Defendants' admissions counselors also misled
10 students regarding the financial costs of doubling up on
11 classes. The truth is that doubling up can leave
12 students with out-of-pocket costs of over \$1,000 per
13 Ashford class because financial aid is limited by year.

14 Kyle Curran, the vice president of financial
15 aid and student success services, confirmed in his
16 testimony that admissions counselors should tell
17 students if they double up, they will have to pay for it
18 out of pocket. However, admissions counselors
19 frequently offered students the option of doubling up
20 without mentioning the costs associated with doing so.

21 For instance, Molly McKinley, former
22 admissions counselor, testified that "a lot of people
23 would voice concern about how long a program may take.
24 So, you know, it was very common to say, 'Oh, well,
25 there are ways to speed up your graduation or speed up
26 to get your graduation date, such as doubling up on
27 classes.'"

28 Another way in which defendants' admissions

1 counselors misled students on the issue of financial aid
2 was by understating the costs of attendance. Defendants
3 understated the costs of attendance in several ways,
4 including by not mentioning the costs of books and fees,
5 quoting costs lower than the cost figures in the
6 academic catalog, and by stating the cost per academic
7 year without clarifying that it takes five academic
8 years to finish Ashford, not four.

9 And let's look at this lie in practice. As
10 Ms. Tomko's notes reflect, her admissions counselor
11 quoted her a price for academic year without explaining
12 that to complete her degree, it would take five academic
13 years. This misleading practice meant that Ms. Tomko
14 had to pay 25 percent more for her degree than she
15 expected.

16 Defendants' admissions counselors also
17 misrepresented the pace of completing an Ashford degree
18 by wrongly characterizing their bachelor's degree
19 programs as accelerated and akin to a traditional
20 four-year program. In fact, Ashford bachelor's degrees
21 are anything but accelerated.

22 As Dr. Lucido explained, Ashford students have
23 to spend significantly more time, more weeks in class
24 every year, a full 50 weeks per year in order to achieve
25 a bachelor's degree in four years. If Ashford students
26 took summers off, like traditional students, it would
27 take them five years, not four, to graduate. However,
28 admissions counselors regularly misrepresented the time

1 it would take to complete a degree.

2 In 2015, when associate vice president of
3 compliance, Alice Parenti, asked her staff to explain
4 the inaccurate information about the university the
5 counselors were giving to students, the examples Jeanne
6 Chappell gave her included, "We offer one class every
7 five weeks, so it's an accelerated program, and you'll
8 graduate faster."

9 Finally, the evidence also shows that
10 defendants misled students about their ability to
11 transfer credits in and out of Ashford. In fact,
12 admissions counselors routinely gave false assurances
13 that students' prior credit or life experience would
14 transfer before the student received a transfer credit
15 evaluation from the responsible department, the
16 university registrar.

17 As explained by Dr. Lucido and several
18 students, transfer credits mattered because they can
19 reduce the time and cost of a degree.

20 Shown here, Ms. Embry clearly testified that
21 she wanted her prior credits to apply to her Ashford
22 degree because that would make it a shorter amount of
23 time for her to be in school, speeding up her graduation
24 and setting her on a path to a new job more quickly.

25 The truth is that defendants' admissions
26 counselors should not promise or imply that students'
27 credits will transfer, as defendants' paper training say
28 This Not That documents make clear. The registrar, not

1 admissions, is responsible for pre-evaluations and
2 official evaluations of students' prior credits. The
3 registrar, not admissions, decides whether to award
4 nontraditional credits. However, former admissions
5 counselors testified that they routinely offered false
6 assurances that students' prior credits would transfer.

7 Former admissions counselor Eric Dean
8 testified that he tried to give students the faulty
9 impression that their credits would transfer, just like
10 his or other unnamed students' had.

11 Molly Mckinley explained the scheme which she
12 learned as part of her on-the-job training. She said,
13 "It was all about positivity on the phone, so if
14 somebody was worried about credits transferring, you
15 would just sell it as though they were going to
16 transfer, but then you would sort of sneak it in and say
17 quieter to them, 'but you've got to check with the
18 registrar.'"

19 Defendants have argued that we must consider
20 the context of the calls, but a review of the template
21 e-mails sent by admissions counselor Molly Mckinley
22 demonstrates that the false and misleading statements
23 only continued in writing.

24 Using a template shared by successful
25 admissions counselors and approved by her manager,
26 Ms. Mckinley falsely told students that Ashford's
27 regional accreditation would allow credits to transfer
28 out to any other schools.

1 Making matters even worse, admissions
2 counselors' false assurances of credits transferring
3 into Ashford went uncorrected until after the Ashford
4 Promise period expired when students were financially
5 liable for their classes.

6 In fact, students do not receive official
7 transfer credit evaluations until at least four weeks
8 after enrollment at Ashford; in other words, after the
9 three-week Ashford Promise period has expired and
10 students are on the hook for costs.

11 And let's look at this lie in practice.
12 Jessica Ohland testified that before she even enrolled,
13 and long before she received an official transfer credit
14 evaluation from Ashford's registrar, her admissions
15 counselor was very adamant, said "I could see half of my
16 credits transfer from the junior college to Ashford."
17 She goes on, "You know, worst-case scenario, am I going
18 to see less credits transfer in?" And she was very
19 adamant that, "No, no matter what, you'll see half of
20 your credit transferred in."

21 Such misleading assurances about transfer
22 credits caused students to underestimate the cost and
23 time to earn their degrees.

24 Ms. Ohland's -- in Ms. Ohland's case, she
25 learned only after completing her first class that the
26 registrar's official transfer credit determination left
27 her with approximately 14 fewer credits than what her
28 admissions counselor had so adamantly promised her.

1 Earning those additional 14 credits increased the length
2 of Ms. Ohland's degree and increased her costs by
3 approximately \$6,000.

4 Moreover, not only do admissions counselors
5 have no reliable basis to promise or imply that prior
6 credits will transfer into Ashford, but as Dr. Lucido
7 explained, defendants have no basis to tell students
8 that their Ashford credits will transfer out and apply
9 to a degree elsewhere. That's because defendants do not
10 know the transfer rules of other institutions.

11 Indeed, the testimony of student Renee Winot
12 and Ms. Evans made clear that transferring credits out
13 of Ashford is far from guaranteed. None of Ms. Winot's
14 Ashford credits transferred out, and less than half of
15 Ms. Evan's credits transferred out.

16 The nine students the Court heard from during
17 the trial are just examples of the hundreds of thousands
18 more students the defendants misled about an Ashford
19 education, as shown by the analysis of Dr. Jerry Lucido.

20 Dr. Lucido reviewed a sample of 561 admissions
21 calls, which were provided to him by the People's
22 statistician Dr. Bernard Siskin. Dr. Siskin selected a
23 random sample of 2,234 phone calls. Then he used
24 objective data coded by the firm Epiq and -- to separate
25 that sample into two groups. First, admissions calls
26 where substantive topics like cost or transfer credits
27 were discussed, and second, all of the other calls,
28 which he assumed, in defendants' favor, did not contain

1 any misrepresentations.

2 When Dr. Lucido reviewed those 561 calls, he
3 found that there were 126 with misrepresentations in the
4 four issue areas we just went through, 126 calls filling
5 nearly 4,000 pages' worth of transcripts.

6 That means that whenever defendants'
7 admissions counselors discussed the important topics of
8 licensure careers, financial aid and cost, transfer
9 credits, and the pace of a degree program, they misled
10 students at least one-fifth of the time.

11 In stark contrast to Dr. Lucido's
12 expertise-driven, detailed, and fully-transparent call
13 analysis, Dr. Wind's call analysis, defendants' expert,
14 was an exercise in the blind leading the blind.

15 First, Dr. Wind himself brought no experience
16 in college admissions, financial aid, transfer credits,
17 career certification issues, or the pace of
18 undergraduate degree programs to the endeavor.

19 Second, the Protiviti coders he directed had
20 no experience in those areas either, even though those
21 were the very areas they were charged with identifying
22 misrepresentations in. This call illustrates why their
23 lack of expertise was fatal to the call review.

24 Here, the representatives stated the
25 government pays interest on students loans while a
26 students is in school.

27 Dr. Lucido explained that this is a false
28 statement because the government does not pay interest

1 on unsubsidized federal loans.

2 Dr. Wind, by contrast, didn't even know the
3 difference between federal subsidized and unsubsidized
4 loans.

5 Dr. Wind also failed to provide his coders
6 with other truthful information that was essential to
7 identifying misrepresentations, such as the costs of
8 attending Ashford. Without that information, it's
9 impossible to identify the lie in this phone call.

10 By contrast, Dr. Lucido showed his work to
11 support each and every misrepresentation he identified,
12 which in this case was the admissions counselor's
13 understatement of the cost of an Ashford master's degree
14 in accountancy by over \$8,000.

15 Finally, Dr. Wind applied a legally
16 fallacious, implausibly-cramped concept of deception to
17 his call review. In his view, even the most blatant of
18 falsehoods can be canceled out by a variety of nebulous
19 equivocations.

20 For example, he testified that if an
21 admissions counselor told a student that a degree from
22 Ashford was all they would need to become a teacher, but
23 also stated that the student should check with their
24 state licensing board for details, his opinion is that
25 there has been no deception.

26 Even though Ashford transformed into the
27 University of Arizona Global Campus in December of last
28 year, the false and misleading statements made by

1 Zovio's admissions counselors to prospective students
2 continue.

3 As defendants' witnesses testified Zovio
4 continues to provide for UAGC the recruiting and
5 enrollment services that are at the heart of this case,
6 with Zovio also continuing to exercise oversight over
7 its own in-house admissions counselors.

8 Earlier this year, following the sale of
9 Ashford to UAGC, defendants' director of risk and
10 corporate compliance, Emiko Abe, raised concerns that
11 high or excessive pressure could indicate predatory
12 enrollment practices or lead to employees breaking rules
13 to maintain their jobs.

14 Defendant's HR manager responded, "I
15 understand that pressure could lead to noncompliant
16 behaviors, but I don't think we will ever eliminate
17 pressure and stress in the Enrollment Department."

18 And, in fact, Dr. Lucido identified those very
19 noncompliant behaviors in nearly half of the calls he
20 reviewed from 2020. With Zovio continuing to provide
21 enrollment and marketing services to UAGC, in return for
22 15.5 to 19.5 of UAGC's tuition revenue for the next
23 seven to 15 years, all incentives are lined up for these
24 noncompliant behaviors to flourish.

25 MS. KALANITHI: May I have a moment,
26 Your Honor? Thank you.

27 I'm sorry, Your Honor. We just have a battery
28 issue.

1 THE COURT: Take your time. It's okay.

2 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you.

3 (Pause.)

4 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

5 In response to the overwhelming evidence the
6 defendants' Admissions Department deceived many
7 thousands of students over the phone, and the evidence
8 of the harm that the students suffered as a result,
9 defendants use overly narrow definitions of
10 misrepresentations to claim that there was no deception
11 here because no student was ever told, for instance, "I
12 guarantee that you will get a Pell Grant" or because
13 fine print in one document that the student may have had
14 access to contradicts the lies defendants' admissions
15 counselors told.

16 Defendants also argue that they can't be
17 liable because no admissions counselor was ever told by
18 their supervisor, "I authorize you to lie."

19 As we'll see, these contrived interpretations
20 of the standards for deceptive conduct and
21 authorizations fail.

22 So first, disclaimers and disclosures.
23 Defendants' witnesses, including former Ashford
24 president, Dr. Richard Pattenaude, and Steve Nettles,
25 the head of defendants' Office of Institutional
26 Effectiveness, agree that students should be able to
27 trust their Ashford admissions counselors.

28 In fact, Dr. Pattenaude testified that because

1 Ashford enrolled nontraditional students, there's a
2 heightened need for accurate advising. Yet, defendants
3 will argue that students who are misled by their
4 admissions counselors should have read fine-print
5 disclaimers and researched further on their own to
6 uncover the truth about Ashford and its degrees.

7 For example, they will argue that student Pam
8 Roberts, whose admissions counselor told her she would
9 have, quote, "no problem becoming a certified substance
10 abuse counselor," end quote, with her Ashford applied
11 behavioral science degree, that she should have known to
12 go to page 238 of a 411-page catalog to locate the
13 italicized print in the middle of the page to find out
14 that what her admissions counselor told her about that
15 degree was not, in fact, true.

16 Defendants' attempt to blame students for not
17 reading the fine print or doing their own research is
18 wholly at odds with the law and with the evidence.

19 So first, the law. A false or misleading
20 statement, such as those testified about by students and
21 identified by Dr. Lucido, violates the UCL and FAL,
22 period. It cannot be cured by disclosures elsewhere.

23 Consumers, such as Ashford students, are
24 entitled to trust and believe what they are told in
25 advertising by their admissions counselors over the
26 phone and are not required to investigate the merits
27 further.

28 And, in fact, defendants' admissions

1 counselors rushed students through the admissions
2 process, brushing past any disclosures or disclaimers,
3 knowing full well that students were unlikely to read
4 the fine print.

5 Former admissions counselor Eric Dean
6 testified that when his supervisor trained him and his
7 fellow admissions counselors how to go over the
8 enrollment agreements' terms and fee section with
9 students -- that's the section notifying the students
10 about the Ashford academic catalog -- she instructed
11 them, "Spit it out to them." That is, Mr. Dean
12 testified, get it out as fast as you can so we don't
13 have to be stuck on that section of the online
14 application.

15 And as for the catalog, Mr. Dean testified it
16 was his job to get them through it "as fast as I can"
17 with the understanding that it's 200 pages and it's rare
18 they'll read it.

19 And while defendants characterize their
20 disclosures as unavoidable, Dr. Lucido also identified
21 more than a dozen calls from his random sample where
22 Ashford admissions representatives encouraged students
23 to avoid the fine print in Ashford catalogs, with
24 statements like "There's no need to do that." "We don't
25 need to do that now because it's a pretty big file."
26 "You don't have to." "It's not required. I wouldn't."
27 Student Renee Winot testified that her admissions
28 counselor said, "I can give you all the information.

1 You don't need to really read it."

2 And in practice, the evidence in this case
3 showed that students didn't do any further
4 investigations of what they were told by their
5 admissions counselors.

6 Student Crystal Embry testified that she did
7 not read all of the enrollment agreement, a practice
8 that anyone who's ever signed mortgage papers or bought
9 a car can relate to. She said, "I just filled out what
10 I needed to fill out."

11 What's more, even if a student did read the
12 disclaimer full of legalese, there's no reason to think
13 that he or she would understand it or believe it over
14 the friendly Ashford admissions counselors that they had
15 talked to over the phone.

16 The admissions counselors were trained to
17 build rapport with the students, to overcome their
18 objections, and get them through the enrollment process
19 as quickly as possible.

20 Now, similarly, defendants will argue that
21 regardless of what students were told by their
22 admissions counselors about financial aid, students
23 should have known the truth based on the EFIP tool, the
24 tool defendants started using in 2016, only after being
25 required to in a settlement with the Consumer Financial
26 Protection Bureau.

27 But as Jim Smith, Ashford's senior vice
28 president of finance, testified, the EFIP tool estimates

1 the cost of completing a bachelor's degree at Ashford
2 University in four academic years, even though for a
3 students coming in without transfer credits, it takes
4 five academic years of costs to do so, understating the
5 costs of attendance by one year.

6 Further, as Mr. Smith admitted, the EFIP tool
7 doesn't inform students about all of the things that
8 might impact what they'll have to pay for an Ashford
9 education: Issues that have affected students in this
10 case, such as the costs of doubling up, costs associated
11 with failing a class, lifetime limits to receiving Pell
12 Grants or federal student loans, and any comparison
13 between the costs of attending Ashford versus other
14 schools.

15 The law and facts are clear: Fine print
16 disclaimers and disclosures do not allow defendants to
17 shift the blame to the very students they misled.

18 Now, similarly, defendants will argue that no
19 admissions counselors testified they were told to lie,
20 but of course, defendants are again using their
21 overly-narrow and legally-unsupported definition of what
22 it means to authorize lying.

23 I'd like to address one of the issues Your
24 Honor highlighted yesterday which related to agency or
25 more specifically whether defendants can be held
26 directly liable for the deceptive acts of their
27 admissions counselors. Under the law and the facts, the
28 answer is clearly yes.

1 So here's the rule. A corporation may be
2 liable for the acts of its employees under general
3 agency principles. Indeed in Ford Dealers, a case
4 counsel pointed to yesterday, the California Supreme
5 Court established that persons can be found liable for
6 misleading advertising and unfair business practices
7 under normal agency theory; that is, under agency
8 theory, the right to control is sufficient for
9 liability, even if defendant doesn't exercise that
10 right.

11 The Court has heard ample evidence that
12 defendants had the ability to train, discipline their
13 counselors, and the fact the defendants failed to do so
14 effectively to prevent deception is not legally
15 relevant.

16 As the Court stated in JTH Tax, even if
17 defendants prohibit false representations and when
18 informed of them take steps to prevent false
19 representation, they are still liable.

20 The only exception to this rule is the one
21 described in dicta in Ford Dealers, and that exception
22 is not at all applicable here.

23 The California Supreme Court said that a
24 company might, might be able to defend an action
25 predicated on misrepresentations by its employees by
26 demonstrating that it made every effort to discourage
27 misrepresentations, had no knowledge of salespeople's
28 misleading statements, and, when so informed, refused to

1 accept the benefits of any sales based on
2 misrepresentation and took action to prevent a
3 recurrence. All three of those would need to apply.

4 The Court in JTH Tax described these as
5 unusual circumstances that would negate the presumption
6 of control. And not one of these three unusual
7 circumstances is met here, let alone all three.

8 As the evidence shows and as I will discuss,
9 defendants did not discourage misrepresentations. In
10 fact, the evidence showed that they created a culture
11 that encouraged them.

12 And we will see that defendants had
13 significant knowledge of their admissions counselors'
14 misleading statements from multiple sources, like their
15 compliance scorecards and the Norton Norris mystery
16 shopping reports, and defendants readily accepted the
17 benefits of the sales, the tuition revenue flowing in
18 the door from the misled students.

19 So let me first discuss the evidence showing
20 how defendants created a culture that encouraged
21 misrepresentations. From the top levels of Ashford and
22 Zovio management on down, the primary directive was for
23 admissions counselors to enroll as many students as
24 possible by any means necessary.

25 Dr. Richard Pattenaude, Ashford's former
26 president and the ultimate supervisor of admissions,
27 testified that the Admissions Department created lowest
28 performer lists that they used to make termination

1 decisions, termination decisions like firing the bottom
2 10 percent of admissions counselors, as Alice Parenti
3 and Jenn Stewart testified was done.

4 And what was the Admissions Department like as
5 a result? According to e-mails that Dr. Pattenauade
6 received from Tremier Johnson, Ashford's associate vice
7 president of diversity and inclusion, and Bill Ness,
8 then the senior vice president of admissions, it was a
9 place that motivated by fear, fear resulting from
10 admissions counselors getting fired, including for their
11 low enrollment numbers.

12 Yet in spite of this dire assessment of the
13 Admissions Department, Dr. Pattenauade cannot recall any
14 changes made as a result of receiving these e-mails.

15 The testimony of three former Ashford
16 admissions counselors -- Eric Dean, Wesley Adkins, and
17 Molly McKinley -- shows that they experienced the same
18 fear culture described in the e-mails Dr. Pattenauade
19 received.

20 The admissions counselors were not there to
21 advise students on their best educational options. They
22 were there to close the sale. And if they didn't, they
23 risked being fired.

24 For example, Eric Dean testified, "It was a
25 numbers game. We needed to enroll a certain amount in
26 order to feel safe at our job."

27 Wesley Adkins testified, "I don't think we
28 were there to advise them on what was best for them. We

1 were there less for advising them and more for trying to
2 just close -- close them as a sale and get them to
3 enroll."

4 when Ms. Mckinley was asked why she was afraid
5 that she would lose her job, she responded "because my
6 enrollment numbers were not good."

7 The testimony of these three admissions
8 counselors is not unique. In fact, the exit surveys
9 defendants conducted of their departing admissions
10 counselors paint the same picture of a culture where
11 admissions employees worry constantly about losing their
12 jobs and where ethics went out the window in favor of
13 meeting numbers.

14 Exit surveys from 2011 and 2012 include
15 comments from former employees, such as "The only
16 objective is to enroll as many students as possible."
17 "Employees fear for their jobs every day if they are not
18 enrolling enough students." "There are no values here."

19 And the problem is that the boiler room
20 mentality is still alive and well. If an employee is
21 enrolling a student a day, they are not held accountable
22 if they are doing it by means that are not ethical.

23 And what about later surveys? One comment in
24 the 2017-2019 exit survey reads, "For years I had to
25 worry about my job security. I witnessed a lot of
26 committed, passionate, and hardworking people go simply
27 because they had a bad month or did not meet their
28 numbers. The stress is beyond measure."

1 And while defendants might argue that these
2 are cherry-picked, there are dozens and dozens more such
3 comments in the lengthy collection of exit survey
4 responses. Yet rather than addressing the fear that was
5 abundant in the Admissions Department, defendants
6 continued pressuring their admissions counselors to
7 achieve enrollment numbers.

8 And with the threat of losing their jobs ever
9 present, how did admissions counselors go about doing
10 that? With tactics that they learned from their
11 supervisors and the successful admissions counselors
12 they worked with: First build rapport with students,
13 act like you knew them, understood their problems, would
14 be their friend, and quickly try to get past any reason
15 the student might give for not enrolling in Ashford,
16 otherwise known as "overcoming objections."

17 On the left is an objections or rebuttal
18 script that Eric Dean's supervisor gave him. If a
19 student said they didn't have time or money for college,
20 the admissions counselor was instructed to move past
21 that concern by accentuating the positive and asking how
22 much time and/or money do you have set aside for school?
23 This strategy of overcoming student objections was not
24 only discussed and developed by lower-level Admissions
25 Department employees, it was developed and encouraged by
26 the highest management at Zovio.

27 In the e-mail on the right, Zovio's vice
28 president of financial aid and student success services,

1 Kyle Curran, discussed with Andrew Clark, Zovio's
2 founder and CEO, how to overcome the reasons students
3 might have wanted to stop attending Ashford at the
4 beginning of the COVID pandemic, reasons such as,
5 because their kids are home and they can't focus on
6 school; students saying they are sick so not allowed to
7 go to work and can't focus on school; students working
8 in health care, working too many hours, can't handle
9 school too.

10 with this "students last" company culture
11 being established from the top, it's no wonder that
12 admissions counselors felt it was acceptable and even
13 encouraged by management to mislead students in order to
14 keep enrollment numbers high.

15 Throughout this litigation and trial,
16 defendants have repeatedly argued that the People have
17 lacked the boots-on-the-ground evidence that defendants
18 intended to present. But to the contrary, defendants
19 have decidedly chosen not to present boots-on-the-ground
20 evidence in this trial.

21 Instead, defendants have elected to offer, for
22 the most part, the testimony of high-level executives
23 like the former presidents of Ashford, Dr. Pattenaude
24 and Dr. Swenson, and subject matter witnesses who have
25 little to no experience with the day-to-day of the
26 Admissions Department.

27 Instead these witnesses have given essentially
28 an executive summary about the good intentions of the

1 school to ensure that students succeed and the quality
2 of the education and the written disclosures that were
3 made to students, separate and apart from what was said
4 to them over the phone.

5 But these are all irrelevant to the matter at
6 issue in this trial; that is, what admissions counselors
7 said to students. As to this issue, the testimony of
8 defendants' witnesses has repeatedly demonstrated that
9 they had little direct responsibility or oversight over
10 the day-to-day operations of the admissions floor.

11 For example, defendants offered the testimony
12 of Dr. Richard Pattenau, Ashford's former president,
13 who could not recall being made aware of a single
14 instance of noncompliance in the Admissions Department
15 as president.

16 Defendants offered the testimony of Jim Smith
17 in finance, who provided no testimony regarding
18 defendants' admissions practices.

19 Defendants offered the testimony of Dr. Tony
20 Farrell in the College of Education, who did not
21 regularly interacting with the Admissions Department,
22 was never asked to weigh in on whether a statement made
23 by an admissions counselor to a student was misleading,
24 and who testified it was beyond the scope of his role as
25 dean to take any action relating to complaints made by
26 students about the Admissions Department.

27 Defendants offered the testimony of Ms. Pat
28 Ogden, who testified about Ashford's accreditation

1 process. Her testimony regarding the Admissions
2 Department was limited to testifying about the WASC
3 documentation, about a one-page marketing review, and a
4 single 50-call review that WASC conducted of admissions
5 phone calls over the entire more than a decade of time
6 it was reviewing and accrediting Ashford.

7 Defendants offered the testimony of Stephen
8 Nettles in the Office of Institutional Effectiveness.
9 He testified about student satisfaction through
10 defendants' surveys. But even the alumni and Net
11 Promotor Score surveys he discussed were not relevant to
12 admissions practices as they did not seek any
13 information about students' experiences with admissions.

14 For example, as he testified, the Net Promotor
15 Score survey purposefully did not ask about admissions
16 as it was only intended to gather information about
17 student experiences with services after they had
18 enrolled.

19 Notably missing from defendants' witnesses was
20 the testimony of Bridgepoint/Zovio founder and, until
21 March of this year, CEO, Andrew Clark.

22 Of all of their witnesses, defendants offer
23 only the testimony of three witnesses regarding the
24 Admissions Department, all of whom worked primarily in
25 other departments.

26 For example, Kyle Curran testified about his
27 time at Zovio from October 2017 through 2019, and though
28 he testified about admissions practices, he worked only

1 in financial aid services and academic advising during
2 that time, not the Admissions Department.

3 And while Matt Hallisy and Alice Parenti also
4 testified about admissions, they were only in the
5 Admissions Department until February -- February 2010
6 and 2013 respectively, before they moved into
7 compliance.

8 In contrast, the People offered the testimony
9 of 13 witnesses who could provide testimony directly
10 related to what occurred on the admissions floor, the
11 boots on the ground, four of defendants' admissions
12 counselors and student inquiry representatives and nine
13 student witnesses.

14 This testimony has shown unquestionably that
15 admissions counselors, feeling pressure to meet their
16 enrollment numbers in order to keep their jobs, made
17 misrepresentations to students in the four areas at
18 issue in this case.

19 The high-pressure culture that permeated
20 defendants' operations led to systemic
21 misrepresentations to prospective students, and the
22 evidence shows that defendants were well aware of these
23 misrepresentations from at least three sources: One,
24 their own internal ombuds report; two, the reports of a
25 mystery shopping firm they retained to review admissions
26 calls; and three, their own internal compliance
27 scorecards. Yet the evidence also shows that time and
28 time again, defendants failed to act on this knowledge

1 to remedy the misrepresentations that occurred or to
2 prevent future misrepresentations.

3 This report was from defendants' internal
4 office of the ombudsman, and it was circulated to dozens
5 of defendants' employees in the summer of 2010,
6 including Alice Parenti, who was then the divisional
7 vice president of the Admissions Department.

8 Based on conversations with admissions
9 counselors and a review of complaints from students, the
10 ombudsman reported that students were being told
11 incorrect and/or improper information, including
12 information about teaching, financial aid, and transfer
13 credits, misrepresentations remarkably similar to those
14 testified about by former Ashford students and
15 identified by Dr. Lucido; namely, telling potential
16 students that "we offer fully certified teaching
17 degrees, guaranteeing as to FA, financial aid, amounts
18 that would be received, or credits that will be
19 transferred.

20 Despite the ombudsman clearly sounding the
21 alarm about misrepresentations from inside defendants'
22 admissions office, Ms. Parenti testified that she could
23 not recall any steps defendants took to address the
24 ombudsman's concern.

25 Defendants' mystery shopper, Norton Norris,
26 provided yet more evidence in the form of monthly
27 reports to defendants about the scope of the false and
28 misleading statements being made by their admissions

1 counselors, particularly about financial aid and
2 transfer credits from 2012 to 2014.

3 So what do the mystery shopper documents show?
4 Here are just two examples, but there are literally
5 hundreds more entries like this.

6 Regarding transfer credits, in March 2012, the
7 shopper asks if Ashford credits will transfer out to
8 another school? The admissions counselor says,
9 "Absolutely, because we are regionally accredited. If
10 you transfer to a state school with the same program, it
11 shouldn't be a problem."

12 Norton Norris correctly identifies this as an
13 untrue and unethical call. Defendants admit it
14 themselves. It's the first item on their Say This Not
15 That policy documents for transfer credits.

16 Two years later, Norton Norris's January 2014
17 mystery shopper report shows admissions counselors
18 continuing to make untruthful or unethical statements
19 about transfer credits, such as he said that "One of the
20 great things about being a regionally accredited school
21 is that the credits are highly transferable."

22 And now let's zoom out to look at what
23 patterns these Norton Norris reports reveal. Defendants
24 will point to some favorable testimony Mr. Norton gave
25 and say it exonerates them. The problem for defendants
26 is that the actual reports, what Mr. Norris called --
27 what Mr. Norton called the "industry gold standard,"
28 contradict his rosy memories.

1 This March 2012 mystery shopping report shows
2 the mystery shopper scores for each call scored that
3 month. And let's see what happens when we add
4 color-coding, pink for a score of 1, meaning untruthful
5 or unethical, and yellow for a score of 2, meaning
6 incomplete or potentially misleading.

7 The slide speaks for itself. Out of 29
8 mystery shopper calls in March 2012, only one was fully
9 compliant. As you can see, the remaining 28 had at
10 least one statement rated either incomplete or
11 potentially misleading or untruthful and unethical.

12 Defendants say while there might have been
13 misrepresentations, they were certainly isolated. These
14 are not isolated instances of misrepresentations.

15 And the March 2012 report was no fluke. This
16 is from the January 2014 report, two years later. If we
17 apply color-coding, this is what we see. It's the same
18 story. This here is the pattern and practice of
19 misconduct.

20 In January 2014, not a single mystery shopper
21 call out of the 34 scored was fully compliant. 29 of
22 the 32 calls had at least two categories that scored as
23 incomplete or potentially misleading, or worse.

24 Remarkably, Alice Parenti testified that these
25 reports were consistent with defendants' zero tolerance
26 approach to compliance. But as always, defendants'
27 action or lack of action speaks louder than their
28 rhetoric.

1 As Mr. Norton testified, defendants elected to
2 stop receiving the reports in 2014 rather than fix the
3 problems they revealed. Rather than heeding the alarm
4 bells, defendants failed to take corrective action to
5 prevent or remedy the situation going forward.

6 Defendants' own compliance leaders condoned
7 the misrepresentations that were happening left and
8 right, day in and day out.

9 Through the testimony of associate director of
10 compliance, Matt Hallisy, we saw an Issue Resolution
11 Committee meeting log that detailed dozens of admissions
12 counselors with repeated compliance infractions.

13 And just weeks after that log was sent out,
14 one of Mr. Hallisy's reports, compliance manager Bill
15 Saltmarsh, urged him to do something radically different
16 to stop this seemingly endless cycle. Mr. Hallisy
17 testified that he saw no need for such change.

18 And defendants didn't just ignore the alarms
19 in their Issue Resolution Committee logs and
20 Mr. Saltmarsh's e-mail, the compliance scorecards were
21 full of alarms too, no matter how you slice them or dice
22 them.

23 The People's expert, forensic accountant Greg
24 Regan, performed a detailed analysis of thousands of
25 compliance scorecards. Specifically, he found that from
26 2010 to 2020, the Compliance Department identified
27 admissions counselors making at least one noncompliant
28 statement to prospective students in 25 percent of all

1 calls.

2 And focusing on the issues relevant to this
3 case, admissions counselors made at least one relevant
4 noncompliant statement in over 20 percent of calls.

5 And as with the ombuds report and with the
6 Norton Norris reports, although the issues were detected
7 by the Compliance Department, defendants failed to
8 remedy or prevent more misrepresentations from
9 occurring.

10 Defendants knew that the misrepresentations
11 were occurring, but let noncompliant admissions
12 counselors keep talking to prospective students.

13 Mr. Regan's analysis shows the depth of the
14 repeat offender problem the defendants allowed to
15 continue. 979 admissions counselors made at least 10
16 relevant noncompliant calls detected by compliance. 16
17 admissions counselors made at least 50 relevant
18 noncompliant calls.

19 This drastically, as a reminder,
20 underestimates the extent of admissions counselors'
21 noncompliant calls because defendants monitor less than
22 one percent of admissions calls.

23 As admissions counselor Eric Dean testified,
24 compliance listened to, quote, "very few out of the
25 probably thousands of calls" he made in a month.

26 worse, Mr. Regan's analysis shows that
27 defendants promoted admissions counselors with habitual
28 noncompliance and continued employing admissions

1 managers who oversaw extensive noncompliance.

2 Specifically, defendants promoted 87
3 admissions counselors, even though they made relevant
4 noncompliant statements in at least half of their
5 monitored calls. And Mr. Regan's analysis shows that
6 admissions managers stayed in management, even though
7 their teams of admissions counselors regularly made
8 noncompliant calls.

9 131 admissions managers, supervised admissions
10 counselors who made relevant noncompliant statements in
11 at least half of their calls, yet 94 continued to manage
12 for multiple years.

13 19 admissions managers supervised teams of
14 admissions counselors that made at least 100 relevant
15 noncompliant calls in a single year, yet 17 of them
16 continued to manage for multiple years.

17 As with the previous slide, this drastically
18 underestimates the extent of admissions counselors'
19 noncompliance because defendants monitored less than
20 1 percent of calls.

21 So we have the ombuds report, the Norton
22 Norris reports of mystery shopping, and defendants'
23 internal compliance scorecards, all leading to the same
24 conclusion: Defendants knew about the
25 misrepresentations that were rampant in the Admissions
26 Department, and yet over and over again, they turned a
27 blind- and self-interested eye, refusing to make changes
28 that would prevent future students from being misled.

1 And through December 2013, defendants went a
2 step beyond misleading their prospective students and
3 saddling them with unjustified debt, they also engaged
4 in predatory debt collection practices by threatening,
5 then assessing, and ultimately collecting a patently
6 illegal debt collection fee.

7 The Court has heard relatively less testimony
8 about the People's debt collection claims as compared to
9 defendants' phone calls with prospective students, and
10 that's because the parties largely agree about the debt
11 collection facts and entered their fact stipulation into
12 evidence.

13 So let me summarize the allegations.

14 As Your Honor knows, the unlawful prong of the
15 UCL makes violations of other laws independently
16 actionable under the UCL. And here, the UCL borrows
17 from two California laws, the Rosenthal Act and the rule
18 of Bondanza, which prohibit someone who is owed money
19 from threatening to or actually passing along the cost
20 of collecting the debt to the person who owes the money.

21 And through 2013, defendants did just that,
22 when they threatened to, and in thousands of cases
23 actually did, pass the cost of collections on to former
24 students in debt to Ashford. The cost of collections
25 fee the defendants imposed was no trifling sum. It
26 typically amounted to one-third of a student's balance,
27 an illegally high fee.

28 Let's briefly review the applicable law.

1 First, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
2 Practices Act prohibits debt collectors from collecting
3 or attempting to collect from a debtor any part of the
4 fee incurred by the debt collector in the collection of
5 consumer debt.

6 Rosenthal clearly applies to defendants
7 because they collected education debts owed to Ashford
8 in the ordinary course of business, a fact established
9 in the testimony of defendants' collections manager
10 Scott Moore and in the party's debt collection
11 stipulation.

12 Therefore, as debt collectors under the
13 statute, defendants were prohibited from recovering debt
14 collection fees from consumers. They were also
15 prohibited from threatening to charge such a fee
16 pursuant to Rosenthal. Unfortunately, the facts show
17 that they did both.

18 Second, and in addition to Rosenthal, the
19 California Supreme Court has expressly held that a cost
20 of collection fee of one-third of the balance of a debt,
21 the amount defendants typically imposed, is an unfair
22 and unlawful practice under the UCL. It did so in a
23 case called Bondanza.

24 And now turning to the facts.

25 As defendants stipulated through 2013, they
26 had a policy requiring their third-party debt collection
27 agencies to add a fee to student balances in an amount
28 sufficient to compensate defendants for those agency's

1 commissions, typically one-third of the student's
2 balance.

3 Defendants, therefore, violated both --
4 violated both Rosenthal and the rule of Bondanza.
5 Mr. Moore agreed in his testimony, "Typically the cost
6 of collection fee meant the former student's balance
7 grew by one-third."

8 Mr. Moore testified that a typical balance was
9 \$1500. That means defendants typically added \$500 to
10 student accounts. And as Your Honor has heard in
11 testimony, many of defendants' former students would not
12 have been able to afford that kind of upcharge.

13 So how many UCL violations did defendants
14 commit relating to the cost of collection fee?
15 Unfortunately, this illegal conduct was rampant during
16 the relevant time frame.

17 As established through some combination of the
18 parties' stipulation regarding debt collection,
19 defendants interrogatory responses, and Mr. Moore's
20 testimony, defendants unlawfully threatened 16,401
21 California students with this fee.

22 They then unlawfully directed their collection
23 agencies to assess cost of collections fees on 12,064 of
24 those California students. Of those students, 4,401
25 subsequently made at least one payment toward the debt
26 balance and 472 California students paid the whole debt
27 plus the entire unlawful cost of collection fee.

28 Finally, defendants admit in the parties'

1 stipulation that they never returned the illegal cost of
2 collection fees paid by thousands of former California
3 students.

4 Although defendants wish to rely on the
5 summary conclusions of Mr. Thomas Perrelli, the Iowa
6 monitor, the People have shown why Mr. Perrelli's
7 three-year monitorship cannot exonerate defendants in
8 this case, which covers 12 years.

9 Mr. Perrelli validated the most fundamental
10 aspects of the People's analysis. He confirmed that the
11 single most effective tool for assessing the extent of
12 defendants' misrepresentations was to scrutinize their
13 calls, not their catalogs, not their enrollment
14 agreements, not how they trained admissions counselors
15 on paper.

16 Mr. Perrelli also confirmed the fundamental
17 false advertising principles that even true statements
18 can be misleading, that unfounded promises are
19 misleading, and that disclaimers on some future piece of
20 paper cannot excuse a prior oral misrepresentation.

21 where Mr. Perrelli went astray was in the lack
22 of rigor in his call review. He relied on junior
23 associates as the primary call reviewers and missed
24 various critical misrepresentations that the People have
25 proven in this case, such as those about social work and
26 substance abuse counseling, and the misleading use of
27 Ashford's academic year costs.

28 He wasn't guided by any professional

1 statistical expertise and never quantified the rate of
2 misrepresentations he found, except in one instance, in
3 his entire three-year tenure. And in that instance, he
4 reported in 2016 that approximately 4 percent of the
5 randomly-sampled calls that the administrator reviewed
6 were clearly noncompliant, an additional 7 percent were
7 of questionable compliance.

8 But he also acknowledged that a random sample
9 of defendants' calls would result in many calls where no
10 topics of interest were discussed, as well as calls from
11 departments other than the Admissions Department.
12 That's why the People assert the 22 percent rate of
13 misrepresentations in relevant calls found by Dr. Lucido
14 is a more meaningful measure of defendants' wrongdoing.

15 At the end of the day, Mr. Perrelli's ultimate
16 conclusion the defendants did not engage in a pattern or
17 practice of misrepresentations is just not credible.
18 His conclusions don't square with his own reporting.

19 The defendants were willing to tolerate too
20 many repeat offenses by their admissions counselors, and
21 the defendants repeatedly chose to scrimp on compliance
22 measures, such as how long they would retain call
23 recordings and what technology they would use to monitor
24 and search those recordings.

25 His ultimate conclusion also doesn't square
26 with what statistician Dr. Bernard Siskin quantified,
27 was that given the marginal drops in defendants'
28 misrepresentation rates from before and after

1 Mr. Perrelli's tenure, we cannot conclude that his
2 monitorship had a statistically-significant effect.

3 A private settlement administrator like
4 Mr. Perrelli can only do so much. This Court has the
5 ability to effectuate relief that Mr. Perrelli never
6 could. It can impose penalties, injunctive relief, and
7 restitution, and the evidence supports the use of all
8 three remedies.

9 So first, penalties. Under the UCL and FAL,
10 any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to
11 engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil
12 penalty.

13 Based on all of the evidence in this case, the
14 People are requesting that the Court issue a penalty
15 award of \$75 million, which is amply supported by the
16 evidence the People have presented on the number of
17 violations during the statutory period, as well as the
18 various penalty factors laid out in the UCL and FAL.

19 Defendants lied to hundreds of thousands of
20 students, students who led difficult, complex lives,
21 many of whom were low income and who sought a college
22 degree in the hope that it would open doors for them to
23 become a teacher, like Ms. Tomko hoped she would, or a
24 substance abuse counselor, like Ms. Roberts, or a
25 therapist, like Ms. Perez.

26 Those doors slammed shut when defendants'
27 misrepresentations came to light, misrepresentations
28 about what jobs the students could get after their years

1 of education or how much money they would have to pay
2 for their education. And it's not just years of their
3 lives and career dreams that the students lost.

4 Students paid lots and lots of money to defendants.

5 The People's expert, Dr. Stephanie Cellini, a
6 labor economist who specializes in higher-education
7 economics, testified that the average net cost of
8 attendance for Ashford in 2018 -- and that's not
9 including opportunity costs and that's not including
10 Pell Grants -- was \$18,761 per year. The median student
11 loan debt for Ashford students in 2018 was \$34,375.

12 And at the same time, defendants lined their
13 pockets with money from the federal government. In
14 2017-2018, defendants got 88 percent of their revenue
15 from federal sources, Title IV and the GI bill. Adding
16 up the federal revenue reported in defendants' 10-K's,
17 we find that since 2009, defendants have received over
18 \$6 billion from federal sources.

19 Defendants' misconduct was serious. The harm
20 to students was grievous. A \$75 million penalty award
21 is more than justified here.

22 The People's request for \$75 million in
23 penalties is also more than supported by the number of
24 violations committed by defendants.

25 As I mentioned earlier, Dr. Lucido testified
26 that of the 561 calls he reviewed, he identified 126
27 with at least one misrepresentation. That's 22 percent
28 of calls. Dr. Lucido's conclusion is bolstered by

1 Mr. Regan's study of the scorecards generated by
2 defendants' own Compliance Department. And as you'll
3 recall, focusing on issues relevant to this case,
4 Mr. Regan found that admissions counselors made at least
5 one relevant noncompliant statement in over 20 percent
6 of monitored calls.

7 So using Dr. Lucido's results and the fact
8 that they were based on a random sample mirroring the
9 full population, Dr. Siskin could reliably estimate how
10 many calls with misrepresentations exist in that
11 starting population.

12 As a reminder to this Court, that starting
13 population was limited to California calls from the
14 period of January 2013 to April 2020. Within that
15 population alone, Dr. Siskin estimated that over 88,000
16 calls contained misrepresentations.

17 Your Honor asked yesterday for a breakdown of
18 the violation counts by time period, so pre-Iowa
19 monitorship, during the Iowa monitorship, and after.
20 And we'd like to walk the Court through this chart
21 showing that information.

22 Of the 126 calls with misrepresentations that
23 Dr. Lucido identified, 29 of them were from before the
24 monitorship, 71 were from during the monitorship, and 26
25 of them were from after the monitorship.

26 And because Dr. Siskin's random sample
27 amounted to drawing one out of every 704 of the starting
28 population of defendants' phone calls, we can multiply

1 the number of misleading calls from each period by 704
2 to determine the total number of California calls with
3 misrepresentations for their period. So that gets us to
4 20,424 misleading calls from the period January 2013
5 through May '14, that's the period before the Iowa
6 monitorship for which we have call recordings; 50,004
7 misleading calls from the period May 2014 through
8 May 2017, that's during the Iowa monitorship; and 18,311
9 misleading calls from the period May 2017 through
10 April 2020; that's after the Iowa monitorship.

11 Your Honor will recall that since defendants
12 did not produce any calls for the period March 2009
13 through December 2012, Dr. Siskin did a
14 backwards-looking projection to estimate the total
15 number of misleading California calls during that
16 earlier period, and his estimate for that period was
17 46,386 misleading calls.

18 As Dr. Siskin also explained, we have evidence
19 that 10.87 percent of defendants' students lived in
20 California. Therefore, we can determine that for the
21 March 2000 -- for March 2009 through the end of 2012,
22 defendants made a total of 426,734 misleading calls to
23 their students nationwide; for the period January 2013
24 through May 2014, they made 187,893 misleading calls;
25 for the period May 2014 through May 2017, that's during
26 Mr. Perrelli's monitorship, they made 460,018 misleading
27 calls; for the period May 2017 through April 2020, they
28 made 168,454 misleading calls. So in grand total, that

1 comes out to 1,243,099 misleading calls.

2 The People's request for \$75 million in
3 penalties comes out to less than \$100 per violation for
4 these misleading calls, and once you take into account
5 defendants' thousands of debt collection violations, the
6 per dollar penalty amount is even lower.

7 To put the People's penalty request into
8 perspective, it amounts to only 1 percent of defendants'
9 revenues over the statutory period in this case. It's
10 also less than twice the \$54 million the defendants paid
11 to Global Campus with the expectation of earning it back
12 over the course of their contract.

13 For all those reasons, a \$75 million penalty
14 award is more than justified.

15 A \$75 million penalty award is also justified
16 by the fact that defendants' misconduct was persistent,
17 long-lasting, and willful.

18 From the start of the statutory period in 2009
19 until this year, defendants have known full well about
20 the vast number of students being misled by their
21 Admissions Department. They knew from the exit surveys
22 of departing employees, from the report of their
23 ombudsman in 2010, which identified lies to students
24 about teaching careers, financial aid, and transfer
25 credits. They knew from the 2012 and 2014 mystery
26 shopping reports from Norton Norris, which identified
27 yet more lies about financial aid and transfer credits.
28 And they knew from their own internal compliance

1 scorecards.

2 Yet despite over a decade of notice of the
3 problems, defendants failed to do anything to prevent or
4 remedy misrepresentations to students on these key
5 issues, preferring instead to circle the wagons and
6 focus on maximizing enrollment numbers to boost their
7 bottom line.

8 On the last penalty factor, defendants'
9 assets, liabilities, and net worth, Zovio's public
10 filings show that it has tens of million dollars in cash
11 on hand, as well as significant additional assets.

12 Further, Zovio offloaded significant sums of
13 cash from its balance sheet over the last year,
14 \$54 million to UAGC and \$3 million to its departing CEO,
15 Andrew Clark.

16 A penalty award of \$75 million is wholly
17 appropriate here.

18 In addition to penalties, the People seek an
19 injunction to stop current and future misconduct by
20 Zovio. Courts have extraordinarily broad remedial power
21 to fashion appropriate injunctive relief under the UCL.
22 And courts may base an injunction, not just on
23 continuing harm, but the threat of future harm, which
24 here is very real.

25 As laid out above, Zovio is continuing to
26 provide enrollment and marketing services for UAGC.
27 Zovio has been promised a cut of UAGC's future revenues,
28 so it has every incentive to encourage its admissions

1 counselors to mislead students to get them to enroll at
2 UAGC.

3 And the evidence in this case, Dr. Lucido's
4 analysis of admissions calls from 2020, and Mr. Regan's
5 analysis of scorecard violations from 2020 shows there's
6 every reason to believe those misrepresentations are
7 continuing to occur.

8 So to stop Zovio's bait-and-switch recruiting
9 tactics, the People seek an injunction.

10 The People will lay out in greater detail in
11 their post-trial brief their proposed injunctive terms
12 which follow from the injunctive terms provided to
13 defendants during discovery.

14 But based on the evidence in this case, those
15 injunctive terms will include the following: Zovio
16 should be prohibited from misleading prospective
17 students regarding the four key issue areas that this
18 case is about: Careers, cost of attendance and
19 financial aid, pace and time to completion, and transfer
20 credits.

21 For example, if cost of attendance per
22 academic year is discussed, the admissions counselor
23 must notify the student that it takes five academic
24 years of costs to earn a bachelor's degree.

25 But as we've seen from the evidence in this
26 case, prohibiting misleading statements is necessary,
27 but not sufficient to eliminate misconduct. Zovio
28 currently saves their calls for 30 days. Students often

1 do not learn that they were misled until they're nearly
2 ready to graduate or even after they've graduated.
3 Accordingly, Zovio should be required to retain
4 recordings of and data from their Admissions Department
5 calls, including those from the student inquiry unit,
6 for at least five years.

7 For students who actually end up enrolling in
8 school, Zovio should be required to produce all
9 recordings of the student's admissions calls to the
10 student upon request as well as to law enforcement.
11 This will ensure that the evidence of Zovio's misconduct
12 remains available.

13 Zovio's current call retention policy makes it
14 all too easy to deny student complaints by pointing to
15 the fine print and maintaining willful ignorance of what
16 was said on the phone.

17 Finally, the People seek \$25 million in
18 restitution for the many students who've been harmed by
19 defendants' pervasive misrepresentations.

20 As with injunctive relief, when it comes to
21 restitution, courts have broad discretion to fashion an
22 order restoring money to victims that was lost due to
23 violations of the UCL and FAL. And further, the People
24 need not show individual -- individualized proof of
25 deception, reliance, or injury by the student victims in
26 order to be awarded restitution.

27 Defendants have argued that any restitution a
28 student receives should be limited or decreased by the

1 value of what they received from Ashford, but price paid
2 minus value is not the exclusive way to measure
3 restitution and would be improper here.

4 As the People have laid out in discovery
5 responses, the amount of restitution any given student
6 receives should be calculated based on the type of
7 misrepresentation.

8 Here, the People are proposing restitution for
9 three categories of misrepresentations. First, victims
10 of career misrepresentations, like Ms. Embry and
11 Ms. Tomko, would receive a full refund of the amount
12 paid. Victims of cost or financial aid
13 misrepresentations, like Ms. Embry and Ms. Winot, would
14 receive the difference between the price promised and
15 the price paid. Victims of transfer credit
16 misrepresentations, like Ms. Ohland, would receive the
17 value of credits promised but not received.

18 And Your Honor asked specifically about the
19 \$25 million request for restitution, so I'd like to
20 spend a few minutes explaining that.

21 If full restitution could be provided to all
22 students harmed by Ashford's misrepresentations, that
23 amount would be hundreds of millions of dollars given
24 the breadth of defendants' wrongdoing. Defendants have
25 made misrepresentations to hundreds of thousands of
26 consumers nationwide, causing consumers like those the
27 Court heard from to incur tens of thousands of dollars
28 in debt.

1 The People provided the \$25 million number as
2 its best conservative estimate of a reasonable pool for
3 restitution based on what we know about the number of
4 deceived students and based on how we proposed
5 calculating restitution for the three types of
6 misrepresentations as I just went over, as well as for
7 debt collection.

8 Ashford enrolled hundreds of thousands of
9 students during the statutory period, but because it's
10 impossible to know ahead of time how many students
11 enrolled at Ashford after being misled about their
12 career options or financial aid or transfer credits, the
13 People's request for \$25 million provides defendants
14 with some cap, some finality, even though the law does
15 not require the People to do so.

16 The People further propose a streamlined
17 claims administration process, which is an efficient and
18 well-established method for identifying victims and
19 awarding restitution in a law enforcement action.

20 Because restitution is an equitable remedy
21 within the Court's discretion, the Court may, in fact,
22 set the estimate differently based on the evidence,
23 different than the 25 million.

24 And while the \$25 million will not restore all
25 harmed students, it could, for example, provide
26 restitution for 500 students, like Alison Tomko, who
27 herself paid \$50,000 for an Ashford degree that, despite
28 what she was told by her admissions counselor, was not

1 approved for teaching in her state. Or 2,500 students,
2 like Loren Evans, who found out that contrary to what
3 her admissions counselor told her when she enrolled, she
4 would have to pay \$10,000 out of pocket to complete her
5 Ashford degree. Or 4,166 students like Jessica Ohland
6 who had to pay Ashford \$6,000 to cover the credits she
7 believed would transfer into Ashford based on what her
8 admissions counselor falsely told her.

9 The People's post-trial brief will lay out in
10 greater detail how they propose administering
11 restitution claims, but in brief, the People will
12 propose that the claims process be overseen by a claims
13 administrator and that as part of that process, students
14 who enrolled at Ashford will receive a notice and the
15 opportunity to submit a claim.

16 Now, defendants may argue that any restitution
17 needs to be reduced by the value of the education the
18 students received, but the only quantifiable evidence in
19 the record regarding the value of an education at
20 Ashford comes from Dr. Stephanie Cellini, and it's a
21 negative value.

22 Dr. Cellini's analysis based on 2018 data
23 shows that after 40 years of earnings, employed
24 bachelor's degree graduates from Ashford's College of
25 Education will sustain average losses of about \$15,634
26 on average. Those losses are even greater for
27 unemployed graduates and students who leave Ashford
28 before getting any degree, a majority of Ashford

1 students based on its 25 percent graduation rate in
2 2018.

3 Defendants have not introduced any concrete,
4 quantifiable estimate of the value of their education to
5 students to counter this, preferring instead to assert
6 high-level rhetoric about the supposed value of
7 friendships Ashford students might have gained or
8 mentorship opportunities they might have had and the
9 convenience of online education.

10 But even if defendants had been able to prove
11 and quantify these benefits, which they did not, their
12 vague value assertions are fatally flawed because they
13 do not take into account the cost an Ashford student
14 pays, a necessary component of any assessment of
15 economic value.

16 Defendants' motto is that they change lives.
17 The evidence from former Ashford students who were
18 misled, from former admissions counselors who testified
19 about the misrepresentations that they regret making to
20 prospective students, the analysis of the People's
21 experts like Dr. Jerry Lucido, and defendants' own
22 documents and witnesses, all of that evidence shows that
23 Ashford did change lives, for the worse.

24 As a result of defendants' deception and
25 illegal conduct, many thousands of students were
26 grievously harmed, unable to pursue their career goals,
27 and saddled with debt that will further limit their
28 career and educational options.

1 Because of defendants' serious, pervasive, and
2 willful violations of California's UCL and FAL, the
3 People respectfully request \$75 million in penalties,
4 \$25 million in restitution, and an injunction to prevent
5 Zovio's future misconduct.

6 Thank you, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Thank you. Just a few questions,
8 a few questions to make sure the Court is clear in your
9 argument. Thank you for answering my questions,
10 Counsel. I appreciate that.

11 Just to be clear for the record, when you say
12 "post-trial brief," is there an assumption there?

13 MS. KALANITHI: There is an assumption we
14 would like to bring up with the Court possibly today
15 what Your Honor is envisioning.

16 THE COURT: I thought I was reading your mind
17 when you said there was an assumption. But what is
18 your -- what is your assumption there? How do you get
19 to a post-trial brief?

20 MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, we -- we do not agree
21 that there should be a post-trial brief.

22 THE COURT: I understand. But when she said
23 that, I want to make -- I'm assuming I'm reading her
24 mind. I don't want to read her mind.

25 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

26 THE COURT: So when you say, "Judge, when you
27 get our post-trial brief," explain that to the Court,
28 because I think I know what you mean, but I want to be

1 very sure.

2 MS. KALANITHI: So, Your Honor, we had
3 proposed to defendants -- and counsel is correct, we
4 have no agreement -- that after -- following the trial,
5 the parties exchange briefing, including proposed
6 statements of decision, that we would file with the
7 Court.

8 THE COURT: Oh, there's got to be statements
9 of decision. There will be no question about that. But
10 you specified -- is that where you're going to -- okay.
11 For everybody, I will want a statement of decision from
12 both of you.

13 Is that what you're going to include, this
14 extra -- is that what you're -- I'm trying to get the
15 point there, I guess. So the post-trial briefing --
16 let's make it clear. "The post-trial briefing, Judge,
17 that will be our statement of decision, Your Honor"? Is
18 that correct?

19 MS. KALANITHI: Correct, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: I've got it. You've answered that
21 question. Hold on. Thank you.

22 Go back to -- put up slide 86. Counsel, never
23 take this as prejudging. Never. But for me to fully
24 understand, I say to both sides, "Let's go." I
25 understand. When I've done major class-action lawsuits,
26 I use a claims settlement administrator. Very
27 effective. Very easy in a class -- big -- huge
28 class-action, which I've done before. It's math.

1 what's the money? How many claimants? How many people
2 were in the class? There's your number.

3 when I look at this, Counsel -- maybe you were
4 going to explain this -- who's going to do this? who's
5 going to decide how much money -- do you understand what
6 I'm saying? who does that? Is it the claims
7 administrator? The parties you're going to get involved
8 in all this to go through that analysis? Can the
9 analysis be challenged? Because I'm in another big case
10 where that's a major issue that is being litigated.

11 what's the People's theory there?

12 MS. KALANITHI: Certainly, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: It's more process. Do you
14 understand what I'm saying?

15 MS. KALANITHI: I do. So it's the People's
16 position that for these three particular types of
17 misrepresentations for which we would seek restitution
18 for students, that for each of those, there's a formula
19 that can be applied that is supported by the law for
20 each of those types of misrepresentations.

21 And so the claims administrator would be
22 applying that formula, depending on the type of
23 misrepresentation that the student claimed in the
24 restitution process.

25 So, for instance, if a student was a victim of
26 career misrepresentations, it would receive a -- the
27 students would receive a full refund of the amount paid.

28 THE COURT: Just -- thank you. That helped

1 explain it. But to be clear then, it would be the
2 claims administrator that would be making the
3 determination of where the person submitting the claim
4 would fall? would that be a fair statement?

5 MS. KALANITHI: Among the three
6 misrepresentations?

7 THE COURT: Yes.

8 MS. KALANITHI: The student would be detailing
9 that in the claims form.

10 THE COURT: Yes.

11 MS. KALANITHI: And then -- can I have a
12 moment to confer with my colleagues?

13 THE COURT: Absolutely.

14 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: Take a minute.

16 (Attorneys confer.)

17 MS. KALANITHI: So to answer Your Honor's
18 question, yes, the claims administrator would determine
19 based on what was submitted by the student in the claims
20 form which -- which of these categories the student fell
21 in.

22 Defendants would have the opportunity to
23 challenge, for instance, you know, if the student had
24 never been enrolled at Ashford; if the student, in fact,
25 had not, you know -- knowing the student's payment
26 history, could challenge the amount the student had paid
27 over the course of their education.

28 THE COURT: You've explained the Attorney

1 General's position very well, Counsel.

2 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Yeh, we're going
4 to start in 15 minutes.

5 MR. YEH: Yes, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: When we get to 12:00 o'clock, what
7 I would like you to do -- or have somebody nudge you at
8 12:00 o'clock -- go until that section is done. In
9 other words, "Judge, I want to finish." Do you
10 understand? So if you need to go ten more minutes, go
11 ten more minutes. So it will be easier for me to follow
12 too. And then we'll take a break for one hour, and then
13 we'll come back and finish.

14 Everybody good?

15 MS. KALANITHI: Yes, Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: 15 minutes.

17 (Recess.)

18 THE COURT: We shall now hear the defendants'
19 closing arguments.

20 Counsel.

21 MR. YEH: Good morning, Your Honor. May it
22 please the Court, I am Jack Yeh of Sidley Austin on
23 behalf of myself and our entire team and our clients.
24 We're here to present our closing argument.

25 And first, before I start, I want to say on
26 behalf of all of us, thank you to this Court. You've
27 dedicated a tremendous amount of time and resources to
28 this trial, which has not gone unnoticed. I just want

1 to say thank you to you and your staff and those who are
2 behind the scenes, as well as our court reporter, for
3 enduring the length of this trial. So thank you.

4 Your Honor asked us yesterday to consider
5 giving you specific focus on three questions. And in
6 this slide here, I leave it blank because I just wanted
7 to talk about those three questions first and give you a
8 bit of an overview as to where we're going to go with
9 this argument.

10 You asked us to talk about the argument on
11 agency liability and on restitution. Where did the 25
12 million figure come from, and on penalties, the
13 breakdown of pre-Iowa, Iowa, and post-Iowa time frames.

14 In response to Your Honor's guidance from
15 yesterday's argument on the motion for judgment, we'll
16 explain for the Court how the evidence in the record to
17 which the Attorney General is bound is overwhelming and
18 conclusively and irrefutably establishing the elements
19 of a secondary liability exception articulated in the
20 California Supreme Court's decision in Ford Dealers.

21 Indeed, the Attorney General acknowledged that
22 exception is articulated by the California Supreme
23 Court, and we will show you how we made every effort to
24 discourage misrepresentations, had no knowledge of
25 misleading statements before they were made, and when
26 informed of misrepresentations, we took serious action
27 to prevent it from happening again.

28 Specifically, every single witness in this

1 case testified that Zovio and Ashford did everything in
2 its power to prevent, detect, and remedy any potential
3 misrepresentation to prospective students. The business
4 incentives were aligned with preventing misled students
5 from enrolling. The business processes were robust and
6 designed specifically to accomplish that goal.

7 Executives, managers, employees, current and
8 former, all agreed it was the core policy of the company
9 to not lie to students. The Compliance Department's
10 training, monitoring, and discipline processes were
11 97 percent effective in accomplishing that goal.

12 This is the exact case the California Supreme
13 Court had in mind when articulating the exception to
14 corporate liability in this kind of case. This is not a
15 case to split the baby or compromise on violations. It
16 is the perfect case for this Court and, when up on
17 appeal, the Court of Appeal to affirm the factors in
18 Ford Dealers.

19 As to restitution, where does that number come
20 from? The answer is simple. Out of thin air. Out of
21 thin air. The \$25 million is untethered to any specific
22 evidence in the record. There is no evidentiary link
23 whatsoever to any testimony by any student or any
24 testimony by any expert. Fluid recovery and claims
25 processes are not allowed in California under the UCL or
26 False Advertising Law. They've already had their claims
27 process.

28 when they filed this lawsuit, they held a

1 press conference, and they invited 695,000 students to
2 come file complaints. They got 614 and provided no
3 evidence as to any one of those 614 as to what they paid
4 or the value they received.

5 This is not a class action. This case does
6 not proceed under the constitutional protections of
7 class action. And not a single class-action case has
8 ever proved that such -- I'm sorry. Not a single
9 nonclass-action case has ever approved of such a
10 post-trial claims process where the constitutional
11 protections included and required in a class action are
12 absent.

13 Let me say it again. The AG is limited to the
14 evidence in the record regarding what a student paid and
15 the value they received and the difference of that
16 restitution. There is no such evidence in this case,
17 and it is an unsustainable evidentiary record upon which
18 restitution could be ordered.

19 with respect to penalties, you asked for a
20 breakdown of the requested penalties framed around the
21 Iowa AVC periods, before, during, after. We have shown
22 the Court there is no basis for any penalties whatsoever
23 to be assessed because there's no evidentiary basis upon
24 which they can be assessed.

25 Dr. Lucido's call analysis, which is the
26 linchpin of their case, is unreliable evidence which
27 cannot be relied upon at all because of -- because of
28 its process integrity flaws, as well as its substantive

1 evaluation flaws, nor can it be extrapolated to
2 astronomical levels for the very same reasons.

3 Even if this Court were to accept Lucido's
4 opinion of 126 calls, those calls break down into small
5 bunches, 29 -- if I remember correctly -- 28, small
6 portion at the end.

7 Those figures over time further illustrate why
8 civil penalties should not be assessed because the good
9 faith efforts of the defendants are a factual and legal
10 bar to the assessment of any material penalty for the
11 isolated incidents identified by the Attorney General in
12 this case.

13 Quite simply, Your Honor, it is an
14 unsustainable evidentiary record upon which penalties
15 could be ordered in this case.

16 Those are the short answers to your questions
17 from yesterday. And with the Court's permission, I'd
18 like to explain in detail how those answers are
19 irrefutably supported by the evidence, to which the
20 Attorney General is bound, that has been presented in
21 this case.

22 The first question I always ask in every case
23 to a Court or to a jury is "Why are we here? Why have
24 we dedicated these resources and this much attention to
25 this case?" The answer to that, the Attorney General
26 told you why in their opening statement on November 8th.
27 Counsel said to you, "This case is about a school that
28 has made billions of dollars by lying to its

1 students" -- lying to its students -- "That school is
2 Ashford University and its parent company Zovio, Inc."

3 They not only said it in the opening
4 statement, you heard it today. You heard the word "lie"
5 nearly a dozen times. You heard the word "truth." You
6 heard the word "regularly, pattern and practice,
7 rampant, blind eye, bait and switch."

8 That is the case that they've presented, that
9 is the case that they have framed, and that is the case
10 they pled in their complaint in 2017; that Ashford's
11 misrepresentations were not the actions of rogue
12 employees; Ashford systematically made false or
13 misleading statements; each defendant was acting within
14 the course and scope of the agency relationship with
15 each of the other defendants and with the permission and
16 ratification of each of the other defendants; these
17 representations were systematic; they were developed and
18 refined by Ashford through consumer testing.

19 That's the case that they told you they were
20 going to prove, and that is not the case they presented.
21 The case they told you they were going to prove is a
22 case of corporate incentives forcing admissions
23 counselors to place profits over students, to
24 systematically engage in a pattern and practice of lying
25 to students from 2009 to 2020. And as a result, the
26 Attorney General believes that the defendants have
27 liability under the Unfair Competition Law 17200 and the
28 False Advertising Law 17500.

1 Now, Your Honor, in 2017, these kinds of
2 allegations -- how do I say this -- appeal to a
3 then-existing skepticism of online education. Today
4 every university in the country is an online university
5 in one way, shape, or form. So just simply disparaging
6 the industry isn't enough to win, not only in a court of
7 law, but also in the court of public opinion.

8 So that's why the Attorney General believes
9 that it needs to say something more, do something more,
10 allege something more, shout something more, because
11 they know that's also the legal standard they're going
12 to have to prove given the Ford Dealers exception for
13 corporate liability, and that's what they need to do to
14 win the court of public opinion.

15 That is why the Attorney General told you at
16 the beginning of this trial they would show you that
17 Zovio and Ashford were companies basically running amok
18 with no oversight, no compass, no conscience, and they
19 recklessly told you that the university was a sham and
20 provided an education of no value and the Compliance
21 Department and all of its employees were a sham. We
22 have proven each and every one of those claims to be
23 100 percent demonstrably untrue.

24 Let's talk about the law. Let's talk about
25 what this case -- I just told you what the case is.
26 This case is about their -- the financial aid, cost of
27 attendance, transfer credits, time to complete the
28 degree, licensure and career goals. Those are the main

1 categories.

2 But let's talk about what this case is not.

3 This case is not an individual consumer case.
4 It is not a case by any one of those students against
5 Ashford or Zovio. We're not litigating their claims.

6 It is not a negligent hiring or firing case.
7 We are not litigating whether or not Ashford or Zovio
8 should have hired a specific admissions counselor or
9 should have fired them.

10 This is not an employment hostile work
11 environment case. We are not litigating the legality of
12 the work environment and whether pressure creates a
13 hostile work environment or a boiler room atmosphere.

14 This is not a disparate impact case. We are
15 not litigating whether or not the practices of the
16 company have had a disparate impact on a protected
17 class.

18 This is not a class action. Though it's being
19 argued like one, it is not a class action.

20 And this is not a disciplinary proceeding
21 against any specific individual, against any of the
22 admissions counselors that they've called us in to tell
23 you that they misled students.

24 And also importantly, Your Honor, this is not
25 a regulatory case where they get to challenge the
26 practices of the company in trying to do the right thing
27 as being insufficient, as something more should be done.
28 They should -- that should be done in front of

1 regulators. This is not the right forum for that.

2 So that's what this case is not.

3 Let's go to what this case actually involves
4 on the law.

5 This case involves untrue or misleading
6 statements in advertising under the False Advertising
7 Law. This case is about unfair, deceptive, untrue, or
8 misleading statements under the UCL Section 17200. And
9 under those laws, an untrue statement is one that is
10 literally false.

11 A deceptive or misleading statement is a
12 literally true statement that is likely to deceive a
13 significant portion of reasonable consumers when
14 analyzed in context, not just a single statement in
15 isolation.

16 The case law supports that standard under
17 Procter & Gamble, Emery, Roll. You've seen those cases,
18 and you're very well familiar with them.

19 That's what this case is about.

20 This case is also about corporate liability,
21 secondary liability. The Attorney General has told you
22 that the simple right to control employees and have
23 oversight over your employees is case dispositive.
24 That's it. You just need to stop right there. So long
25 as they're an employee, it's over. The entire
26 corporation gets to be held liable.

27 well, the California Supreme Court had the
28 foresight to address this issue in Ford Dealers. And

1 you can see in the cases that found liability for
2 corporate defendants, those were cases where the
3 employee misrepresentations were authorized or approved
4 by the company.

5 In Conway, that was the case. In Liberty Tax,
6 that was the case, where the franchisor required the
7 franchisee submitted advertising for approval and did,
8 in fact, approve the false advertising and controlled
9 the other aspects of advertising.

10 Those are the cases where corporate liability
11 is appropriate under the agency theory. But the
12 California Supreme Court was very specific in
13 articulating the exception to that rule, and the
14 elements of that exception, as demonstrated in Footnote
15 8 in Ford Dealers, 32 Cal 3d 347, at 361, Footnote 8,
16 arguing that the defendant -- a corporation is not
17 liable for acts of its employees if the defendant made
18 every effort to discourage misrepresentations, had no
19 knowledge of representatives' misleading statements, and
20 when informed of the misrepresentations, refused
21 benefits and took action to prevent them in the future.

22 That's the standard for the exception, and,
23 Your Honor, we have shown that to be the case many times
24 over in this case.

25 To illustrate how that plays out in the cases,
26 you see in Conway the facts were that the
27 misrepresentations were authorized, approved,
28 controlled, and trained to deceive.

1 In Liberty Tax, authorized, approved, and
2 controlled.

3 In Johnson & Johnson you found authorized,
4 approved, controlled, and trained to deceive.

5 In the Ford Dealers exception, the three
6 elements are that the company discouraged it, had no
7 knowledge of when the statements were made until after
8 the fact, corrected the problems.

9 And that's what we've demonstrated each and
10 every step of the way for Zovio and for Ashford.

11 Now, I don't want to confuse the exception to
12 corporate liability with good faith because good faith
13 is different. Good faith is an affirmative defense to
14 penalties. While there's a factual overlap between the
15 two, they are two different separate legal issues. And
16 I'll come back to that when we get to the remedies.

17 But a defendant's good faith or bad faith is
18 relevant to the evaluation of the fine assessed against
19 the defendant. That's the Tobacco case. Equitable
20 considerations may guide the Court in fashioning the
21 appropriate remedy in a UCL action. That's the standard
22 for good faith. And you can see how there's incredible
23 factual overlap in this case in that respect.

24 When you take the law into consideration and
25 you take the allegations in this case and you take
26 what's been told to you by counsel in opening statement
27 and in closing argument, what this case boils down to
28 and what this case is about are three things: Corporate

1 conduct, context, and informed decisions.

2 Corporate conduct: Was there any systematic
3 behavior throughout the organization that authorized,
4 required or encouraged admissions counselors to lie to
5 students to lure them into enrolling in Ashford?

6 What's the context of that? The student's
7 journey is essential and even critical to assess whether
8 students are likely to be deceived. That's the standard
9 under the law, whether students are likely to be
10 deceived. And the case law says you have to examine
11 context to make that determination, especially if the
12 statements that are being made are literally true. If
13 there's an omission or if there's information that isn't
14 provided, you have to take context.

15 And every time counsel told you this morning
16 of an example of a lie, when she told you the truth, the
17 truth was, "well, the admissions counselor didn't also
18 say..." That's an omission. That is not literal
19 falsehood. These are misrepresentations by omission.

20 And finally, this is a case about informed
21 decisions. Were students actually lied to? Were
22 students actually lied to? Did mistakes happen? We've
23 never said, "Your Honor, mistakes -- mistakes didn't
24 happen."

25 In fact, you've heard a lot of testimony about
26 the nature of human beings in an organization this
27 large, that's the nature of organizations. Mistakes do
28 happen.

1 But was there an intent to mislead so that
2 somebody relies on it to your benefit? That simply has
3 not been proven with the evidence in this record, nor
4 does it exist outside this record.

5 So let's talk about corporate conduct, and
6 let's talk about who the corporations are.

7 Corporations in this case, entities, are
8 Bridgepoint Education, now known as Zovio, and Ashford
9 University. You're familiar with them.

10 Who is Ashford? Dr. Pattenaude, who has been
11 in higher education for decades, explained to you that
12 Ashford's mission is to take a risk on students who have
13 struggled because of life gets in the way, jobs get in
14 the way, they're not ready. It's a place where you're
15 committed to transforming people's lives with education
16 and working primarily with nontraditional students,
17 older students, and making a difference in people's
18 lives, giving them an opportunity to achieve their
19 dreams and goals. That's what Ashford is.

20 We heard Dr. Swenson tell you yesterday that
21 Ashford's mission was affordability, access to a
22 population that's underserved, quality education that
23 focused on student learning and meeting their needs, and
24 giving people whose access to higher education is often
25 restricted because of their circumstances.

26 The mission is to provide accessible,
27 affordable, innovative, high-quality learning
28 opportunities and degree programs that meet their needs.

1 That's who Ashford is.

2 And the evidence has shown, Your Honor, that
3 the corporate conduct of these defendants was completely
4 above board, was always intended to do the right thing.
5 From the corporate perspective, there was no systematic
6 deception, no pattern or practice of misrepresentations,
7 no boiler room atmosphere.

8 We -- we put the slide up for you in opening
9 statement and we told you this is what we're going to
10 prove, and this is, in fact, what we've showed you for
11 the past six weeks. Ashford never authorized or
12 ratified any deceptive practice, and we implemented in
13 good faith a robust and effective compliance program
14 that prevented, detected, and remedied noncompliant
15 conduct, and Ashford made unavoidable disclosures as
16 required by law, the Iowa AVC and the CFPB settlement.
17 That's the corporate conduct that we showed this Court.
18 That is the evidence in the record. That is the
19 evidence the Attorney General is bound by.

20 Quite simply, Your Honor, what we showed you
21 was that there was a complete failure of proof of any
22 systematic or authorized misbehavior. In fact, what we
23 affirmatively demonstrated to you was that the corporate
24 interest of both companies are aligned with preventing
25 misstatements to students.

26 The reason is really simple. As
27 Dr. Pattenaude explained to you, you can't make
28 misleading statements, you can't make false statements,

1 it's detrimental to the operation of the institution to
2 be breaking rules because you can lose accreditation,
3 and without accreditation, students would lose access to
4 federal funding for tuition.

5 Your Honor, that's the ball game.

6 If, in fact, this was systematic, to lie to
7 students, this company wouldn't last more than a few
8 months. They wouldn't be able to operate. There could
9 be no profit because they wouldn't be able to generate
10 any type of consumer trust.

11 You lie to a student, you're gone. It's part
12 of the culture. Dr. Pattenauade told you. You don't lie
13 to students, and retention was important for
14 profitability.

15 The longer a student stayed, Your Honor, the
16 more profitable they were to the organization. Tricking
17 students to enroll when they didn't fit resulted in
18 students that didn't pay. That's not a profitable
19 business model. The business model is for them to stay
20 and graduate. That's the only time it becomes
21 profitable.

22 And as Dr. Pattenauade told you, the old saying
23 in higher education, "It's less expensive to keep a
24 student than to go find a new one." "If we're good,
25 we'll get these students through or at least far enough
26 along, and it's a financial loser to have students drop
27 out." Those are the business incentives.

28 Dr. Swenson also told you, "My experience is

1 that in any organization, there are tensions, and those
2 tensions can be destructive or they can be creative."

3 And Dr. Swenson did whatever he could to make
4 that a creative tension, and he never questions Zovio's
5 honesty in pursuing the good of the students just as
6 they were. He never observed any conflict in the
7 business operations, as well as the educational
8 opportunities.

9 As Dr. Pattenaude told you, Ashford just
10 happened to be a university inside a business, but it's
11 just like any other university that educates students.

12 You also heard from not just the executives,
13 you heard from managers. Alice Parenti told you that
14 Ashford never authorized a misrepresentation or
15 misleading statement. She trained admissions
16 counselors -- never trained admissions counselors to
17 mislead students.

18 Matt Hallisy told you he was never trained to
19 lie or mislead prospective students. And, in fact, it
20 was the opposite in Ashford's robust admissions
21 training.

22 Mark Johnson testified yesterday, explained to
23 you during his time here, he didn't believe that there
24 was any systematic really anything of this kind. "I
25 know that's a broad statement. We had things that were
26 one-offs. I'm confident we didn't have leaders training
27 employees in doing the wrong thing."

28 And I've got to tell you, Mr. Johnson was, I

1 thought, incredibly credible at acknowledging when
2 mistakes happened. He's not going to say they didn't
3 happen. He's not going to say that isolated incidents
4 don't happen. But on a systematic level, a pattern and
5 practice, that just simply didn't exist.

6 Jeanne Chappell told you that Ashford never
7 tolerated, condoned, authorized, or instructed
8 admissions counselors to mislead students.

9 And even one of the witnesses called by the
10 Attorney General told you, to her knowledge, any kind of
11 misrepresentations were one-off situations.

12 Those are the facts as presented in the case.
13 That's the evidence the Attorney General is bound by.

14 Even -- even their own witnesses, former
15 employees, admitted to you that they never lied. "I
16 don't think I lied to a student as far as I'm
17 concerned."

18 Mr. Dean also admitted to you that no one at
19 Ashford ever told him to lie to a prospective student.

20 Molly McKinley told you she was never told to
21 lie by Ashford management in order to increase her
22 enrollment numbers.

23 I'll talk about her in a little bit.

24 But she acknowledged to you, her management
25 and the policies in the company never instructed her to
26 lie to students. She felt a pressure to do that? We'll
27 talk about those pressures and how she owned those
28 pressures.

1 wesley Adkins admitted that he was trained not
2 to guarantee students they were getting financial aid or
3 tell students that we had a program that we didn't have.

4 And Lee Bennett -- and by the way, Lee
5 Bennett, he's at the front of this journey. He's a
6 screener. He has no influence in the actual
7 decision-making of actual prospective students. He
8 finds out where they want to go and he directs traffic.
9 He's not even an admissions counselor. But even he will
10 tell -- he told you the Compliance Department would send
11 you e-mails saying that this conversation was monitored.
12 He was trained not to lie to people.

13 Over and over and over again at every level,
14 executives, management, employees, every level has
15 admitted and expressed to you affirmatively there was no
16 systematic effort to encourage people to lie,
17 misrepresent, or mislead.

18 This is a strange case, Your Honor. It's a
19 strange case because in every case, there's always a bad
20 guy. There's always someone, right? There's always a
21 person. And the Attorney General here, they enjoy the
22 benefit of what I call a "presumptive or optical white
23 hat," right, because they're the Attorney General.

24 But let's not forget the Attorney General in
25 this case is a civil litigant. They have the same
26 burden of proof just like any other private litigant.
27 The fact that they are the Attorney General's Office
28 doesn't change their burden of proof and doesn't change

1 what they have to do in this court of law.

2 But who is the bad guy in this case? Their
3 answer to that question has and always has been, "The
4 organization is the bad guy." So that's why this case
5 is unique. There's no any specific individual, any
6 president of the company, like Liberty Tax, who said,
7 "Send me the advertisements. I'll approve them all."

8 They can't point to any specific human being
9 who is the bad actor who acted in a way that forms the
10 basis for the Court to give them what they want in this
11 case, not a single person at the top of that.

12 The AG points generally at the organization
13 and asserts that because, well, Ashford and Zovio had in
14 place this Compliance Department and processes that
15 caught our employees making mistakes that we should now
16 be punished to the tune of a hundred million dollars for
17 not achieving perfection.

18 That's their claim, taking our own data, our
19 own processes, our own efforts to catch mistakes and
20 saying, "You didn't get to 100 percent. The cost is a
21 hundred million dollars."

22 It's hard to say that no good deed goes
23 unpunished, Your Honor, and I've avoided that phrase
24 this entire case, but it's the poster child for that
25 phrase.

26 Remember what Mark Johnson told you in his
27 testimony, that the -- that he's -- he and the company's
28 cognizant that the organization is made up of

1 individuals of human beings, and yet despite having four
2 years of discovery, five full weeks of testimony in this
3 case, they still cannot identify a single human being
4 that authorized, approved, ratified admissions
5 counselors to lie to students.

6 They can't. And even if they could, in some
7 tangential way, they've never called any of those people
8 in. They never testified. And they can't prove it
9 because such an action would have been contrary to every
10 single piece of training, every written policy of the
11 company, the entire philosophy of the entire company.

12 Because if somebody did that and the company
13 found out about it, they'd be fired. That's what you
14 heard. That is the evidence that the Attorney General
15 is bound to in this case.

16 Let's talk about the human beings in this
17 case. You heard testimony from Dr. Tony Farrell from
18 the School of Education, and he explained to you how
19 Ashford designed a rigorous curriculum through a process
20 that was extensive.

21 It was designed by faculty, vetted by senior
22 leadership, submitted to the board of directors,
23 reviewed and approved by regulators, like WASC and the
24 California BPPE, the U.S. Department of Education, and
25 then students enroll in that program. He's an educator.
26 There's no question about it.

27 And the way that the organization vets a fit
28 for students is critical to the organization's ability

1 to succeed, not only for them, but more importantly for
2 the students. That's why the company measured student
3 performance and learning outcomes to improve their own
4 curriculum.

5 This is a learning organization, Your Honor,
6 as Dr. Wind described to you. It constantly seeks data
7 to affirmatively change and grow and evolve. That is
8 the hallmark of a corporation who is trying to do the
9 right thing. And you saw it in the curriculum. You saw
10 it in the testimony over and over.

11 And you heard what Ashford offers. It offers
12 flexibility, accessibility, and support to
13 nontraditional students who wouldn't otherwise have
14 access to an ivory tower, who wouldn't otherwise have
15 the ability to get an education and improve themselves
16 and be a role model for their children, if it wasn't for
17 what Ashford provided.

18 But Ashford didn't do it on its own. It
19 wasn't out there on its own. You heard Mr. Johnson and
20 Dr. Pattenau and Pat Ogden and witness after witness
21 explain to you that this is a heavily-regulated company,
22 that operations like any university are subject to
23 layers of regulatory oversight, at the federal level
24 with the Department of Education, at the regional level
25 with WASC and HLC, at the state level with the
26 California BPPE, and similar regulators in other states.

27 It's heavily-regulated. There's not a single
28 thing that the organization does with respect to

1 students' enrollment that doesn't get examined and
2 investigated by these regulators. And as part of that,
3 that's -- I mean, that's not all.

4 The company's created its own internal
5 regulator to monitor whether or not it's doing the right
6 thing. It created a vast compliance program and hired
7 experts to not only design and create a robust system of
8 checks and balances, but also to implement them over
9 time and to help the organization grow and to learn from
10 the data it acquires and it tracks and evolve over time,
11 the hallmark of an organization that's doing the right
12 thing.

13 Back to the Compliance Department. It was
14 externally regulated, as well as internally regulated.
15 And you heard Matt Hallisy, who the Attorney General
16 called to the stand, talk about the Department of
17 Education's misrepresentation regulations that were
18 promulgated in 2010.

19 This is just before the incentive compensation
20 rules were issued by the D.O.E. as well. Those were the
21 rules that eliminated the ability of any university to
22 pay -- pay their admissions counselors for enrollment.

23 And these regulations were taken so seriously
24 that the company formed their own cross-functional,
25 high-level group of multidisciplinary subject matter
26 experts to look at those regulations and implement them
27 on an internal basis. It was given the highest of
28 priorities at every step of the way as soon as the

1 regulations were issued.

2 So this is not a corporation that's just out
3 there doing their own thing, making it up as they go.
4 They have to follow rules, and really serious rules
5 which have really serious consequences if you break
6 them, because if you break them, you could lose it all.
7 And you heard that from every single witness over and
8 over.

9 The regional regulators at WASC had boots on
10 the ground. They came to investigate as well. And you
11 heard testimony from Pat Ogden and Dr. Pattenau de as to
12 their interactions with the regulators. You heard them
13 tell you what they had to demonstrate for compliance.
14 You heard them tell you what the company had to share
15 with WASC at all levels to be found compliant under all
16 the standards of accreditation, which were extensive.

17 And Ms. Ogden also told you that she had to
18 demonstrate to the regulators that the university
19 follows appropriate actions and federal requirements for
20 recruiting students, specifically, the kinds of claims
21 and allegations in this case.

22 So the application and visitation and
23 interaction process is extensive at the regulatory
24 level, particularly on the regional level.

25 And you also heard Ms. Ogden tell you that
26 every step of the way, the regulators concluded that the
27 institution follows federal requirements on recruiting
28 students, about the overall cost of the degree, about

1 the employment of graduates, topics in this case. The
2 organization has to prove that over and over again to
3 regulators.

4 The same is true on addressing student
5 complaints. They had to prove that to WASC over and
6 over again.

7 The California BPPE also has a state level of
8 oversight, as well as other states doing the same thing.
9 These rules -- these rules are mandatory for the
10 organization, and they follow them to a T, because it's
11 in their business interest to do -- to do so.

12 That's why they also created the Ashford
13 compliance program. The purpose of that program and the
14 ethics and compliance area of that program was to
15 prevent, detect, and remedy any noncompliant behavior.

16 And as you heard over and over again, and
17 particularly as Mark Johnson described to you, that when
18 he designed the program after he had served for decades
19 in compliance roles at major corporations around the
20 world, that he learned that there are three pillars to
21 an effective ethics and compliance program: Having
22 standards, values, policies, procedures, and training,
23 prevention; monitoring, evaluating and auditing,
24 detecting, investigating; and then remedying it, doing
25 something about it so it doesn't happen again.

26 Training is intended to prevent. The call
27 monitoring was intended to detect. The discipline
28 procedures were intended to remedy, not just remedy the

1 behavior of the admissions counselors, but also student
2 outreach when the circumstances warranted.

3 You heard testimony about the compliance
4 program and the types of monitoring that were used to
5 detect, the different levels of monitoring, the phone
6 call monitoring methods, the random sampling, speech
7 analytics, focused monitoring investigations, mystery
8 shopper, exceptionally detailed processes handled by
9 compliance specialists, who their singular job was to
10 detect noncompliant behavior. That's their purpose in
11 the organization.

12 And you also heard that the purpose and their
13 entire function was independent of the admissions
14 counselors and the Admissions Department. They were
15 separate departments. So the incentives were aligned
16 for the Admissions Department to be compliant because
17 they saw the compliance group as someone who could help
18 them abide by the law.

19 And much more important than just abide by the
20 law, Your Honor, it's to help the organization protect
21 the students, because the standards of compliance are
22 extremely broad and they're taught to every admissions
23 counselor in training.

24 In a nutshell, you heard Jeanne Chappell tell
25 you that all of the training they do, all the training
26 they're involved in, is intended to prevent -- to
27 prevent noncompliance. That's why they support the
28 training.

1 You heard Alice Parenti telling you that
2 training was exceptionally intense. It went over the
3 entire student lifecycle, okay? And that lifecycle
4 isn't just talking to admissions counselors. That
5 training is throughout the entire organization. Any
6 student-facing employee went through training, the
7 policies, procedures in compliance.

8 Matt Hallisy told you the training never
9 really stopped. They trained and retrained.

10 Mark Johnson told you the goal was to train
11 and retrain. There wasn't just an introductory
12 training. It was programatic training, refresher
13 training, over and over. Mark Johnson also told you
14 that there were modules on each of the areas under the
15 guiding principles of success that would be important as
16 well as the Do's and Don't's or Say This Not That.

17 So that training happened not just in the
18 classroom, but also on the job. It continued the entire
19 time.

20 what was being trained? what were the
21 standards of the Compliance Department? This is one of
22 the most critical points in this case, Your Honor,
23 because it is a point that is constantly ignored and
24 overlooked by the Attorney General in their presentation
25 in this case.

26 The breadth of what is being trained, the
27 breadth of the standards encompass not just false and
28 misleading statements, which are prohibited by law, not

1 just statements that are regulated that shouldn't be
2 said, like FERPA, not just illegal statements with
3 respect to other legal requirements, but also standards
4 of professionalism, stylistic statements, best
5 practices.

6 what does a company want to be? How do we
7 wants our employees to communicate? Should they use
8 certain words in their communication style? Should it
9 be more formal? Should it be more informal? Should you
10 articulate a -- an abbreviation? Should you acknowledge
11 the student? Did you do enough to -- to explain a
12 specific -- a specific acronym to them, what that meant?
13 These are exceptionally broad standards.

14 so the standards of compliance are so, so
15 broad that it's intended -- it's intended to be broad so
16 that admissions counselors can be trained over and over
17 again. That's how an organization learns, is making
18 standards broader so that they can learn areas where
19 they can improve. That's why it's so broad.

20 It's not just false, misleading, deceptive
21 statements that are -- that are noncompliant statements.
22 It is a critical point in this case. And you heard
23 testimony from several witnesses that explained to you
24 when they evaluated the -- the noncompliant scorecards,
25 that the biggest area of concerns are documentation and
26 FERPA -- that's the -- that's the HIPAA requirement
27 basically for education -- and is there the right
28 documentation? Those are issues completely unrelated to

1 the allegations in this complaint, Your Honor.

2 Quite simply, a noncompliant statement is not
3 necessarily a lie. It is not necessarily misleading.
4 It is not necessarily deceptive. You have to do a lot
5 more investigation if you want to know which
6 noncompliant statements are a lie or which are
7 misleading or which might be deceptive. You have to do
8 a lot more investigation. And we'll talk about that as
9 well.

10 The discipline and corrective action arm of
11 the compliance program was extensive and very, very
12 serious. As you heard testimony from Jeanne Chappell
13 and Mark Johnson and Matt Hallisy tell you, that they --
14 corrective action and discipline process had multiple
15 levels, from coaching all the way down to termination.

16 But very importantly, Your Honor, they also
17 told you that that was not necessary -- not necessarily
18 a linear progressive type of discipline. You could be
19 fired at any time, even if it's your first offense, if
20 the offense is serious enough to warrant termination.

21 And as Mark Johnson explained to you in
22 reviewing the trends of misadvisements, noncompliant
23 statements, most of the noncompliant statements are at
24 the top of that funnel. They're in the business
25 practices, they're in the stylistic, they're in the
26 professionalism, things that warrant a coaching or a
27 teaching of some sort, things that don't warrant
28 firings.

1 And when Mr. Regan tells you, "well, there are
2 a lot of noncompliant behaviors. They didn't fire
3 enough," these are human beings we're talking about.
4 They have livelihoods. They have families as well.
5 Should they be fired for mispronouncing an acronym, for
6 being a little too informal in a conversation?
7 That's -- we're mixing apples and oranges when we talk
8 about the issues in this case, Your Honor.

9 And I want to be very disciplined about how we
10 talk about the evidence that the Attorney General is
11 bound to in this case, because the presentation you
12 heard this morning confuses a lot of those issues and
13 combines them for convenience, but the evidence they're
14 bound to needs to be examined in a very disciplined
15 manner.

16 I think it's probably an appropriate time to
17 stop here.

18 THE COURT: We'll stop right now then.

19 And Counsel, if it's all right to you, I would
20 like to start in one hour. Is that agreed?

21 MS. KALANITHI: Yes, Your Honor.

22 MR. YEH: Yes, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT: One hour. Thank you.

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Lunch Recess

27

* * * *

28

1 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; WEDNESDAY; DECEMBER 15, 2021;

2 1:02 P.M.

3 ---oOo---

4 THE COURT: Back on the record.

5 Mr. Yeh, whenever you're ready, sir.

6 MR. YEH: Thank you, Your Honor.

7 Before we took a lunch break, Your Honor, we
8 were talking about the disciplinary process, and you
9 heard a lot of testimony about this, about the differing
10 levels and the nonlinear path to -- to various levels of
11 discipline.

12 One thing I want to highlight for the Court is
13 that what you heard in the description of the
14 disciplinary process was not only the different levels
15 of discipline, but also how it was communicated to the
16 admissions counselors.

17 They received written and verbal communication
18 about it through their managers, and they had an
19 opportunity to respond to it. It's an interactive
20 process, like most employment processes are.

21 So if an admissions counselor is in a position
22 to receive some kind of coaching, some kind of warning,
23 some kind of suspension, they have an opportunity to be
24 heard too at that time, and they have an opportunity to
25 tell the Compliance Department why they did what they
26 did.

27 Don't forget that key component of that
28 process, because I'll come back to it as we talk about

1 some of these witnesses.

2 So not only did the Compliance Department
3 train to prevent, monitor to detect, discipline to
4 remedy, it also tracked its own effectiveness. And you
5 heard testimony from multiple witnesses, and we're
6 looking at Exhibit 942 at page 14 about tracking the
7 effectiveness of the Compliance Department.

8 You heard from Jeanne Chappell that the
9 performance of the Compliance Department dramatically
10 improved from 2012 through 2019 from 75 percent in 2012
11 all the way up to 94.7 percent in 2018. And you heard
12 Mark Johnson talk about that it reached almost 97,
13 98 percent at one point during his tenure.

14 It's never 100 percent. It can never be
15 100 percent because human beings make mistakes, and the
16 system is designed to expand the scope of the kinds of
17 mistakes that are monitored so that the organization can
18 constantly improve.

19 Another key component in terms of the
20 workforce, remember, the workforce isn't static, it's
21 dynamic. There's attrition in every corporation, in
22 every job. New people roll in. Old people roll out.
23 New people have to be trained. They may not be trained
24 as well as people who have been there, you know, for ten
25 years, so there are mistakes that get made. That's why
26 you can never reach 100 percent.

27 And just because you're not at 100 percent, it
28 doesn't mean that those mistakes are authorized or

1 condoned or ratified. It just means that the amount of
2 mistakes are being controlled to a point from an
3 industry standard. You heard Mark Johnson tell you that
4 in other industries, 93 percent is the target.

5 So this Compliance Department tracking itself
6 understood that it was on the right path, that Mark
7 Johnson had built a compliance system that was
8 effective, and that could be operated going forward with
9 or without him.

10 That effectiveness is critical, Your Honor,
11 because you don't just have to take Ashford's word for
12 it, you don't just have to take Zovio's word for it.
13 That Compliance Department was independently
14 investigated by different independent sources.

15 Thomas Perrelli, the Iowa AVC settlement
16 administrator, he investigated. He had boots on the
17 ground. He had teams of people pay surprise visits to
18 the admissions counseling floor.

19 As Mr. Johnson told you, they had access to
20 personnel, to documents, to data, to calls and
21 recordings, virtually anything they wanted.

22 And through the rigorous investigation that he
23 conducted, based on their numerous visits and
24 observations, he found that Ashford's call centers do
25 not have the feel of a boiler room. That's in his
26 deposition testimony. And he told you that while there
27 may have been some isolated issues in some areas, the
28 administrator has not found a pattern or practice of

1 noncompliance with the AVC.

2 And he also testified that he did not report a
3 pattern or practice of admissions counselors making
4 misrepresentations to students and that the single most
5 effective tool for monitoring compliance has been the
6 ability to listen to calls between Ashford personnel and
7 prospective students. And Ashford's compliance group
8 did that.

9 A completely independent investigator, a
10 former federal prosecutor, came to those conclusions
11 after doing his job and trying to find out the context
12 of what everything was -- what was happening.

13 Norton Norris, the mystery shopper, a company
14 high -- let me be clear about this -- a company that was
15 hired by Ashford to mystery shop its own personnel. The
16 purpose of his hiring was to improve on noncompliance.
17 A company that hires a mystery shopper is not in the
18 business of systematically lying to students.

19 It is proof positive, it is proof positive
20 that it's at the core of their principles not to lie to
21 students because they want to identify when somebody is
22 doing noncompliant behavior, which includes not just
23 making false and misleading misrepresentations, but also
24 a whole host of other stylistic and business practices
25 and best practices.

26 And what Mr. Norris testified to was that
27 Ashford's Admissions Department was not pushy, did not
28 exhibit bad behavior, and did not coerce students to

1 enroll. And he also testified that Ashford's Admissions
2 Department was "one of the more compliant we worked
3 with."

4 Now, the Attorney General points to various
5 reports that Norton Norris produced and provided and
6 highlights various aspects of those reports. But you
7 also heard Alice Parenti testify, and she explained to
8 the Court that the reason they hired Norton Norris in
9 the first place was to try to improve compliance, but
10 the reason they stopped using Norton Norris was because
11 they couldn't verify the actual processes and results as
12 being reliable because, in the company's view, the
13 reason they weren't reliable was because Ashford was
14 unable to trace back the calls to specific admissions
15 counselors. You couldn't get into the context, and if
16 you couldn't investigate, the results are not helpful or
17 reliable. You can't really help improve unless you can
18 identify who's making these statements. That's why they
19 stopped using them.

20 But even Norton Norris will tell you that
21 their very hiring is proof positive that the company
22 wants to do the right thing and did the right thing each
23 and every time.

24 The Attorney General also used exit surveys
25 and argued to Your Honor that various individuals felt
26 pressure -- I'm going to talk about pressure in a few
27 moments -- and that various employees while they're
28 going out the door had some negative things to say.

1 Your Honor, that's not a shock in any organization. You
2 read the exit interviews for any organization --
3 corporate, public, private, public agency -- all exit
4 interviews are always of people that are dissatisfied
5 with the organization at some point and more likely to
6 have people that are unhappy.

7 The problem with citing to that in this case
8 is that they're all hearsay. They're all hearsay. They
9 cannot be relied upon as evidence. They might be able
10 to if -- to the extent that they're offering it. To
11 suggest we did nothing about it, that's been proven to
12 be 100 percent false.

13 But to suggest that the truth of what's being
14 said in those exit surveys is absolutely inadmissible as
15 evidence in this case, they haven't brought a single
16 author -- a single employee who authored anything in
17 those exit surveys to the stand. Not a single person.

18 They haven't explored a single personnel file,
19 anybody that's submitted an exit survey. They just want
20 to be able to say, "This was said and accept it as true.
21 Take our word for it," without any opportunity to
22 cross-examine, without any opportunity for Your Honor to
23 see the context of what happened to that employee,
24 without any opportunity to see the full breadth of that
25 person's experience. Inadmissible, unreliable evidence,
26 unsustainable for this evidentiary record.

27 WASC also investigated. WASC, like the
28 Perrelli group, happens on the ground as well. You

1 heard testimony from Pat Ogden and Dr. Pattenaude about
2 the visiting team comes in and does extensive evaluation
3 of the university. They conduct interviews of the
4 employees and students and faculty and the board of
5 trustees to get their understanding. They come to
6 verify that -- that an institution is doing what they
7 say they're doing. So it's a very, very thorough
8 process. That's Pat Ogden's testimony on December 7th.

9 Dr. Pattenaude testified that they put
10 together an outside independent team, reads the report,
11 comes and visits, crawls through all your materials and
12 your papers, write a report to the commission, which is
13 made up of peers, 20 peers, and then that commission
14 decides whether or not to award you with accreditation.

15 A critical, critical prerequisite to operating
16 this kind of business.

17 And WASC had conference calls with Ashford,
18 conducted 30 meetings with more than 140 students,
19 faculty, staff, administrative leaders, and reviewed
20 student, faculty, staff and alumni e-mail responses
21 submitted to a confidential WSCUC e-mail account.
22 That's Exhibit 7539. And the evaluation process used
23 for the special visit was extensive and involved
24 multiple stages.

25 So ongoing, in-depth, boots-on-the-ground
26 investigation by WASC determined that the claims in this
27 case, which would have easily been discovered by them,
28 are absolutely untrue.

1 In addition, you have an expert witness
2 conduct his own investigation. Remember, Dr. Wind was
3 skeptical -- skeptical of even coming into this case,
4 and his one condition to being a part of this case was
5 that he be allowed to design an analysis to reach the
6 truth. And you heard that word several times this
7 morning, by the Attorney General, about the truth.

8 And the truth involves not just what someone
9 says, but what happens on the other side of that
10 statement. How it's received. How it's used. How it's
11 processed. The truth to whether someone has been misled
12 depends on more than just what the person said.

13 And he designed an analysis to answer the
14 question of whether Ashford systematically deceived
15 students. We didn't tell him what to do. This was his
16 design. We didn't give him the parameters and tell him
17 what kind of result we were looking for. It was his set
18 of parameters.

19 He ran multiple studies and analyzed multiple
20 data sets to reach convergence validity to give him
21 statistical confidence that what he was asking and
22 measuring was reliable, and his analyses converged
23 around the exact same conclusion, there was no
24 systematic deception.

25 The choice architecture that's been set up by
26 the company, the process and the journey that a student
27 has to go through to make a decision is set up in such a
28 way where there's training, a student dispute center,

1 and an Ashford Promise where you can get out for no
2 consequence, and investments in those processes, all
3 create a set of processes that is proof positive there's
4 no systematic deception.

5 You wouldn't set up these kinds of processes
6 if you were trying to trick people. The company's data
7 and independent studies Dr. Wind did of the students,
8 and the recorded call and text analysis, all his design,
9 not the lawyers', all conducted by double-blind coders
10 who didn't know the purpose or the sponsor of the study
11 conducted the analysis.

12 There can be no dispute, Your Honor, that
13 Ashford's Compliance Department was effective. The
14 regulators agreed, the accreditors agreed, the monitors
15 agreed. And yet, Your Honor, the Attorney General is
16 here arguing over how many employees should have been
17 fired, whether or not certain statements should have
18 been said differently, whether or not employment
19 practice -- practices should have been different.

20 Those are not proper grievances for this
21 Court. They should have been brought before the
22 regulators, the accreditors, and the monitors to which
23 they had access, and the AG has never once initiated any
24 administrative proceeding with a single regulator, never
25 once.

26 Instead, they want to put it in the lap of
27 this Court and wrap it all up and say, "Give us an
28 injunction. Let's tell -- let's tell the company how to

1 run its business," when, in fact, the things they're
2 complaining about are not illegal.

3 It's not illegal to fire low performers. That
4 happens in every company, in every organization. If
5 you're not performing, you're probably not going to keep
6 your job anywhere. And you heard testimony as to why
7 the bottom 10 percent were terminated. It's not because
8 they weren't lying enough to students. It's because the
9 CEO was inspired by a Jack Welch book that promoted that
10 principle. And he did it once.

11 And that created fear. That's true. I can
12 see why it creates fear. But it doesn't create fear to
13 lie. Because every policy, every procedure, every edict
14 from the company is to prevent you from lying, and you
15 know that if you lie, you're going to get fired. That's
16 a surefire way to get fired.

17 There's absolutely no evidence whatsoever of
18 any corporate conduct to systematically authorize,
19 participate in, condone, or ratify any employee, in
20 admissions or elsewhere, to lie to students.

21 The evidence about the defendants' processes
22 affirmatively disprove the accusations and elements
23 necessary for establishing the exception to secondary
24 liability. That was corporate conduct.

25 Let's talk about context for a second. And
26 before we talk about context in terms of the specific
27 evidence, I want to first talk about the context of the
28 actual body of evidence, if I may. Where does the

1 evidence in this case come from? Where does it come
2 from?

3 That evidence comes from us. It comes from
4 Ashford. It comes from Zovio. It comes from their own
5 Compliance Department, our own efforts to improve the
6 organization on a business, operational and legal level.
7 It doesn't come from any other part of the company. It
8 comes from the Compliance Department. All of their
9 evidence comes from there.

10 There is no whistleblower here. There's no
11 hidden treasure trove of leaked documents. There are no
12 smoking guns. There's no executives fighting over the
13 soul of the company. It doesn't come from someone whose
14 been trying to hide this. It came from the company's
15 own efforts to prevent, detect, and remedy the very kind
16 of behavior the Attorney General says it wants to
17 prohibit. We agree.

18 And we collected data and evidence and tracked
19 it over and over and over again to ensure that the
20 company's employees weren't doing it. That's where all
21 of the evidence to which the Attorney General is bound
22 comes from.

23 The testimony in this case was uniformly
24 consistent that the company insisted on ensuring
25 students were fully informed to make the best decisions
26 for themselves, and it was in the business interest of
27 the company to do so. It is proof positive of that.
28 Proof positive is the existence of the Compliance

1 Department itself and that the sole source of their
2 evidence are documents and data collected by the
3 Compliance Department.

4 It's a simple reality, Your Honor, that people
5 make mistakes, and we know perfection is not possible in
6 an organization of human beings, but good faith is.
7 Good faith is possible.

8 I also want to talk about when this body of
9 evidence -- when does it come from? Not a grammatically
10 perfect sentence, but you understand where I'm coming
11 from. When does this body of evidence originate from?

12 This is the timeline we showed you in opening,
13 some of the key events in the history of this case.

14 And you see the Iowa AVC, it's from May of
15 2014, and the Attorney General files its complaint in
16 November of 2017 and the trial in this case started
17 November 8th.

18 Well, as you heard, the Attorney General
19 called live witnesses to the stand, students, live
20 former employees, and admitted documents with them.

21 The students that testified, either live or by
22 deposition, enrolled in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2017.
23 That's when their evidence takes place.

24 The employees that testified -- Ms. McKinley,
25 Mr. Adkins, Mr. Hallisy, Jenn Stewart, Eric Dean -- they
26 left the company in 2012, 2014, 2017. That's when the
27 evidence comes from. Their evidence to which they're
28 bound. And the documents they admitted during those

1 testimonies, the contemporaneous e-mails specifically,
2 they all come from the same period of time. Exactly the
3 same period of time.

4 The evidence is stale in terms of what they
5 claim is happening on a regular systematic basis, and of
6 course, there is no proof of any kind of pattern or
7 practice or regularity. That evidence is all from
8 nearly a decade ago.

9 Now, let's talk about the actual evidence in
10 this case, the people in this case, the students in this
11 case. You heard Dr. Wind explain to you how the choice
12 architecture created by the company requires a student
13 to go through an entire journey in order to make a
14 decision. They go through the student inquiry center,
15 then an admissions counselor who determines your fit and
16 evaluates the relationship and then acts as a tour guide
17 with certain subject matter experts available at the
18 ready: Financial service advisors for financial aid,
19 registrars available for -- for transfer credits, the
20 disclosures, the enrollment application, the checks and
21 balances, and the financial services process, the
22 students advisor that takes them from there, all of
23 them -- all of them --

24 Go back one slide.

25 -- all of them, Your Honor, who go through
26 this journey.

27 And Dr. Wind told you he wanted to hear their
28 voice because the student journey is critical to hearing

1 the voice of the customer, the consumer, to assess
2 whether any student has been lied to. Who are they?
3 who is the ordinary, reasonable Ashford consumer?

4 And he also explained to you that in a
5 situation like this, that consumers simply are not
6 naive. It's not a simple stimulus response where you
7 hear a statement and you make a decision. This is a
8 high-involvement product that is expensive. It's
9 complicated. It's going to require an investment of
10 time. It's like buying a home. It's a complicated
11 process. You don't make those decisions based upon one
12 statement.

13 The consumer behavior is different when you
14 have a product like this, and consumers seek multiple
15 sources of information and conduct more research.
16 That's why he designed a study to ask why the ordinary
17 Ashford students makes their decision going through this
18 journey. And he told you, in his testimony, "It's
19 absolutely critical in terms of my approach to hear the
20 voice of the customer." And the customer in this case
21 were the students, the alumni, and the dropouts.

22 Attending Ashford is an expensive product.
23 It's a product over time that requires major time
24 commitment. It's a product that can affect your
25 identity and future. It's a high-involvement product
26 that people pay attention to, and they go through that
27 journey. Consumers are not kind of naive who basically
28 the only source of information they get is from the

1 admissions counselors.

2 Consumers engage in research, analysis, and
3 discussions. Consumers are increasingly skeptical of
4 advertising, and they rely more on other sources of
5 information. That's why he designed the study, to ask
6 and hear their voice and to see what they go through.
7 What they go through are the people in the Admissions
8 Department.

9 And the Attorney General told you that the
10 culture in the Admissions Department was like a boiler
11 room, that the student would encounter these
12 high-pressure -- I think they called them telemarketers,
13 notwithstanding how insulting that term is, for what
14 these admissions counselors are trying to do.

15 That's simply not the case. You heard
16 testimony over and over and over from Mr. Perrelli, who
17 said that legislators and regulators focused on the
18 industry have expressed significant concern about the
19 boiler rooms at some institutions where admissions
20 counselors were trained to use, and did use,
21 high-pressure sales tactics using pain points to coerce
22 students into enrolling.

23 This was a particular concern of the Iowa
24 Attorney General. By and large, however, the settlement
25 administrator did not find the use of such coercive
26 tactics by Bridgepoint.

27 Norton Norris also reported in their testimony
28 that Ashford's Admissions Department did not operate as

1 a boiler room and did not apply pressure on prospective
2 students.

3 You also heard Dr. Pattenaude testify that
4 "The Admissions Department was a pretty energetic, go-go
5 kind of place with a fairly good vibe. I heard it
6 described as a boiler room, and I just had no idea what
7 they're talking about."

8 The Attorney General told you that the
9 defendants' witnesses had no boots on the ground.
10 Dr. Pattenaude's office was right outside the Admissions
11 Department. His door was wide open. He would walk down
12 there all the time unannounced.

13 Boots on the ground. The boots were there
14 every day.

15 Kyle Curran told you that "I would not
16 describe it as a boiler room. I wouldn't say it's a
17 high-pressure, intense environment or anything like
18 that -- anything like that, that I would associate with
19 a boiler room."

20 Alice Parenti said that -- when asked if the
21 admissions floor was like a boiler room, she said, "Not
22 at all. It was a team environment. It was very vibrant
23 and very energetic."

24 And Matt Hallisy also told you that "I presume
25 when you say 'boiler room,' it's kind of something where
26 it's unenjoyable, you know, just taskmaster-type
27 environment. But really no, it was a lot of fun. Yeah,
28 no, absolutely it was not a boiler room."

1 I want to make a point here. Some people are
2 fit for a job. Some people are not.

3 You heard testimony from various witnesses.
4 Jeanie -- Jeanne Chappell told you she worked in the
5 Admissions Department for some time and she went into
6 compliance because admissions -- being an admissions
7 counselor wasn't a fit for her personality.

8 There's a pressure that goes with every job.
9 If there's anybody in this room that doesn't feel
10 pressure on the job, please raise your hand. I can't
11 think of a single person, quite frankly. Pressure is
12 part of professionalism. How you view that pressure is
13 up to the individual.

14 And if you're a fit for the job that you're
15 doing, you're going to view that pressure as inspiring,
16 as exciting, as -- as Ms. Parenti described it, "as
17 vibrant, energetic."

18 But if you're not a fit for a job, if it
19 doesn't suit your personality, you're going to view that
20 pressure very differently, and your viewpoint of that
21 pressure is a function of yourself, not necessarily the
22 organization.

23 And I'll give you an illustration of that.

24 Molly McKinley is someone that the Attorney
25 General identified as someone who said she personally
26 was subjected to pressure to mislead students, but she
27 admitted she was not a fit for the admissions counselor
28 position. She was there for nine months. Clearly not a

1 fit. And remember, she told you that she had her own
2 personal health and financial issues which pushed her
3 into taking this job, and she was afraid she would lose
4 her health benefits because of her health condition if
5 she couldn't get her performance up? That's her
6 personal pressure, her own personal financial and health
7 care pressures. She was afraid of losing her benefits,
8 and that was what incentivized her to do anything to
9 perform.

10 And what she heard in terms of her
11 instructions, she interpreted to mean "Do whatever you
12 can at any cost," even though she admitted to you,
13 Your Honor, that she was trained not to lie, she was
14 trained not to mislead, she was trained not to deceive.

15 And while she sat on the stand and testified
16 that she misled students and feels terrible about it,
17 she violated every single principle that the company set
18 out for her.

19 And even worse, when she was disciplined at
20 least three times for misadvising students and received
21 five coachings in a three-week stretch, she admitted to
22 you she never told a single compliance person or
23 admissions manager that she felt compelled to lie to
24 students, that she felt like it was the order of the
25 company to do so.

26 She had an opportunity to do so at least eight
27 times, and the Compliance Department was never given an
28 opportunity to investigate that, if that was how she was

1 actually feeling.

2 So if there's a failure there, Your Honor,
3 it's not in the company, it's not in the Compliance
4 Department, it's in Ms. McKinley. I'm not blaming her,
5 but she has responsibility for her own pressures, and
6 the way she saw that job was through a prism in which
7 she clearly understood was not a fit.

8 So that testimony is not reliable evidence of
9 pattern or practice or systematic or authorized behavior
10 of the company. In fact, it is emblematic of the
11 opposite of what they're trying to prevent, what they're
12 trying to detect, what they're trying to remedy. That
13 testimony is a shining example of what not to do.

14 And if she had admitted at any time that she
15 was lying to students, she probably would have lost her
16 job. And if she had told compliance that she was being
17 pressured by management to do it, you know from the
18 testimony of every single Ashford witness and Zovio
19 witness, it would have been investigated right away and
20 rooted out right away. But she didn't give the company
21 an opportunity to do so.

22 Quotas. Attorney General sitting there
23 complaining that there were quotas as well that created
24 pressure on people to lie to students. But when asked
25 about that, Matt Hallisy said, quote, "No, the last
26 quota I ever had in my life was in banking." There were
27 no quotas in the Enrollment Department.

28 Alice Parenti was asked: "Did Ashford, to

1 your knowledge, ever have student enrollment quotas as a
2 requirement for its admissions counselors?

3 "ANSWER: No."

4 Dr. Pattenauade stated on the stand, "You asked
5 about do we have quotas, absolutely not, and we -- and
6 you tell people over and over again, that is illegal."

7 Jim Smith was asked:

8 "QUESTION: Was that enrollment target, that
9 sliver of the budgeting process, ever translated to a
10 quota of students that had to be enrolled every year?

11 "ANSWER: To my knowledge, no."

12 The Attorney General was trying to take the
13 budgeting process, trying to evaluate forecasts for head
14 count and then turn that on its head to use that as
15 evidence of quotas. It's not. They are bound to the
16 evidence in this case. They cannot turn it on its head,
17 and they have no evidence of quotas.

18 And the admissions counselors that the
19 students would encounter, you heard multiple sources of
20 testimony that told you that the philosophy of the
21 Admissions Department was to put students first always,
22 Ashford second, and you last.

23 So if there's any pressure, there was a
24 pressure to make sure that the students were fit. That
25 was the pressure, is to find a relationship and find
26 people that you vet to be a fit for the company.
27 Students, Ashford, and you. That philosophy played
28 itself out not just in a sort of subjective philosophy,

1 it was taught in a classroom.

2 You heard about the number of classroom
3 trainings that everybody had to go through, not just as
4 a new hire, but on a regular basis. People had to be
5 retrained, and they were retrained not only in the
6 classroom, but they were also trained on the job.

7 You heard Matt Hallisy tell you about that,
8 Alice Parenti tell you about that, Jeanne Chappell tell
9 you about that. They also had written examples in their
10 training of how to speak to students so that they
11 weren't misled.

12 You saw these exhibits admitted,
13 Exhibit 74830, the Say This Not That on cost of
14 attendance. Exhibit 7480 at page 3, on cost of
15 attendance, Say This Not That. Say This Not That
16 training on financial aid, Exhibit 1328. Exhibit 1323,
17 another Say This Not That on financial aid. Very
18 explicit descriptions of what you should say and what
19 you shouldn't say. Say This Not That on transfer
20 credits, Exhibit 1332. Say This Not That on career
21 goals, Exhibit 1040.

22 Every single subject alleged by the Attorney
23 General in this case is the subject of express written
24 training by the company to avoid. That is proof
25 positive there's no systematic, authorized, or ratified
26 conduct in contravention of those standards.

27 which takes us to informed decisions. Now, I
28 believe Jeanne Chappell testified that it was the goal

1 of the Compliance Department to ensure that the students
2 were fully informed to make the best decisions for
3 themselves. That was the philosophy. And not only were
4 the -- were the admissions counselors trained what to
5 say verbally on the calls, the company provided other
6 types of information to help the student make their
7 decisions.

8 Disclosures. And I'm going to pause right
9 here for a moment, Your Honor. I want to be really
10 clear. We're about to go through several disclosures to
11 which the Attorney General has referred to as "fine
12 print," fine print, and how fine print doesn't get cured
13 later. It doesn't get -- get to cure a misstatement
14 earlier.

15 Every single disclosure that we've shown you
16 in this case is express, it's explicit, it's in front of
17 them, just like every disclosure you have to read when
18 you buy a house, when you buy a car. You don't get out
19 of those just because somebody misspoke to you. They
20 have meaning. A lot of work went into them. A lot of
21 regulations require them. They're not fine print.
22 They're disclosures.

23 And I'm going to walk you through some of
24 them.

25 Disclosures on program costs, Exhibit 7740 at
26 page 23524-25. An explicit disclosure on what your
27 education is going to cost.

28 Exhibit 7740, also on the website, the Ashford

1 net price calculator, an actual tool, interactive tool,
2 that you can use to inform yourself, that is made
3 available to the students. At page 27075.

4 The enrollment agreement. The enrollment
5 agreement that every single student went through with
6 every single admissions counselor gives a clear and
7 unmistakable disclosure about cost of attendance.
8 Exhibit 1122 at page 13.

9 The academic catalog on online undergraduate
10 programs gives express, explicit disclosure on what's
11 involved in cost of attendance. And while, yeah, there
12 are a lot of pages in the academic catalog, that's what
13 a catalog does. But it is available, and you heard
14 testimony from multiple witnesses that the catalog is
15 made available to students when they go through their
16 journey.

17 And, yes, maybe some admissions counselors
18 said, "Don't download it." But "Don't download it"
19 doesn't mean "Don't review it," "Don't look at it,"
20 "Ignore it," "You never have to take it into
21 consideration," "Anything in there doesn't bind you to
22 anything."

23 There's never been one single piece of
24 testimony in this case where an admissions counselor
25 said, "You're not bound to anything other than what I
26 say." These disclosures have meaning.

27 On the website, Exhibit 7740 at 30020,
28 financial aid disclosures on the website, explicit, in

1 writing.

2 Financial aid application disclosures,
3 explicit, in writing, Exhibit 7825.

4 Financial aid academic catalog, multiple
5 portions of that catalog at Exhibit 9037, page 91
6 talking about the financial aid plan, the median loan
7 debt, the federal student aid eligibility, could not be
8 more specific.

9 Don't forget the EFIP, a mandated Electronic
10 Financial Impact Platform, a tool required by the CFPB.
11 And you heard Jim Smith explain what that tool was, how
12 it works, and what the student has to go through. And,
13 yes, if a student puts inaccurate information into the
14 tool, he or she is going to get inaccurate information
15 out of the tool. But the tool is made available, and
16 it's part of the disclosure process to help them make an
17 informed decision.

18 It is not the company's responsibility to
19 ensure that the student is truthful about the
20 information they put in or accurate about the
21 information. There's only so much that a company can
22 do.

23 We are entitled to rely on the disclosures
24 that are given to the students.

25 Jim Smith explained to you how the EFIP was a
26 core financial aid document. It's designed and mandated
27 disclosure that Ashford required every single student
28 using federal financial aid to complete the EFIP before

1 enrolling, and it provides a big picture of your
2 out-of-pocket costs, as well as any contributions,
3 again, cash or amounts that you're taking before a loan,
4 and then your debt to basically come up with an
5 out-of-pocket balance that would be remaining.

6 And he said what it attempts to do is, again,
7 summarize for the prospective student the loans of their
8 first year based on the program length that they picked
9 at the first page, does the mathematics to say, "This is
10 your loans for your program based on what you selected,"
11 and then it applies interest, fees, and other to get to
12 your total cost of repayment. That was the testimony on
13 the record in this case.

14 Let's not forget the enrollment agreement
15 disclosures. You saw them over and over and over again.

16 Exhibit 1122 at page 15. Exhibit 1122 at
17 page 29 on transferability of credits. The academic
18 catalog on transfer credits. Exhibit 9037 at 219 and
19 221.

20 Licensure and career goals, disclosures on the
21 website, specific admonishments that "An online degree
22 from Ashford University does not lead to immediate
23 teacher licensure in any state," Exhibit 1047 at 2.
24 Could not be more express disclosure.

25 In the enrollment agreement. Again, on
26 licensure and career goals. "The University does not
27 guarantee employment to any applicant as a result of
28 their application, acceptance, attendance, completion,

1 or graduation from any course or in any program,"
2 Exhibit 1122 at page 20 and 23.

3 The academic catalog also on licensure and
4 career goals.

5 I'm sorry, Your Honor, there's a lot of them.
6 I just want to get through them for the record.

7 Exhibit 9037, 262 and 263. Licensure and
8 career goals.

9 Reminder -- it's not just on the website.
10 It's not just in the enrollment agreement. It's not
11 just in the EFIP.

12 There are e-mails that then get sent later as
13 reminders, "Hey, don't forget, you have to go through
14 these steps to verify that what you're going to get is
15 what you think you're going to get." Exhibits 175, 176,
16 177. Those reminders are sent at the 30, 60 and 90
17 credits level.

18 Time to complete a degree, clearly stated on
19 the website. Exhibit 1047 at 3 through 5.

20 In the enrollment agreement, expressly stated.
21 Exhibit 1122 at 19, Exhibit 1122 at 21.

22 In the academic catalog, time to complete a
23 degree, over and over and over again. Exhibit 9037 at
24 158, at 212, at 263.

25 Each and every student that testified in this
26 case admitted to you that they certified and
27 acknowledged every one of those disclosures, that they
28 had the opportunity to read and understand them, and

1 that they took responsibility for not doing so.

2 Your Honor, that's not fine print. It's not a
3 tiny piece of font at the bottom of some document.
4 Those are stacks of written disclosures that the company
5 is entitled to rely on, the certification of these
6 individuals who said they read them, they understood
7 them. And, in fact, they did.

8 You heard testimony from Ms. Perez, for
9 example, Roberta Perez. She told you she certified that
10 she read and understood them. She told you she had the
11 opportunity to do it.

12 And we're not blaming her for her
13 misunderstanding, but she also admitted to you that she
14 took responsibility for it. She said to you on the
15 stand she didn't want her kids -- she didn't want to
16 admit to her kids that her mom screwed up.

17 Every one of these students that testified
18 admit responsibility for reading and understanding them.
19 Whether they did or they didn't, I'm not here to dispute
20 that. I take them at their word, their experience. I
21 trust that they misunderstood.

22 And my heart goes out to them. And I'm
23 telling you, Your Honor, the hearts of every single
24 Ashford employee and Zovio employee goes out to them.
25 They don't want that for any of these students, but we
26 are entitled to rely on the process we've set out, and
27 we're entitled to rely on the acknowledgment that they
28 read and understood.

1 Another witness, Ms. Tomko, I believe was
2 referred to in the Attorney General's comments.

3 Charles, can we toggle over to her notes.

4 Attorney General showed you these notes that
5 she took and how she testified that, "well, you know, I
6 got some misinformation from -- from my admissions
7 counselor about GPA, tests, interstate agreements and
8 somehow I could be certified to become a public school
9 teacher."

10 As you know, the disclosures in the enrollment
11 agreement and everywhere else tell her she needs to
12 check with her local accrediting licensing body. And
13 what she told you on the stand was she took detailed
14 notes of that conversation. Detailed notes of that
15 conversation. She even took down the phone number of
16 the Department of Education and certification.

17 But her testimony is that the admissions
18 counselor told her not to call for four years? That's
19 just simply not credible. She took detailed notes on
20 everything, but she didn't write down, "Don't call until
21 the end of your education"? Not credible, Your Honor.

22 She had the information. She had the phone
23 number. She had the ability. She had the intellectual
24 capability to understand. And she chose not to do it.
25 And she took -- took responsibility for not making that
26 call, and she regrets not having done so.

27 Thank you, Charles.

28 These kinds of services, processes put into

1 place, ensured from a corporate perspective, as best as
2 the corporation could do, as much disclosure -- not just
3 disclosure, Your Honor, but communication of as much
4 information as possible to have the student fully
5 informed to make their decisions.

6 And don't forget the Ashford Promise. If they
7 didn't really understand it, they're going to find out
8 pretty fast if they didn't. They have three weeks to
9 change their mind. And if it's past the three weeks,
10 there's the student dispute center to raise an issue.

11 None of these students raised an issue while
12 they were at Ashford. None of them. That process
13 demonstrates proof positive, there's no systematic,
14 authorized behavior on behalf of the company to mislead
15 students.

16 And the admissions counselors who testified
17 that they were -- they were actually misleading
18 students, they were actually disciplined. They actually
19 testified that there was constant improvement.

20 A similar process existed for the employees as
21 well. If they felt they were being pressured to do
22 something illegal, they had options as well.

23 There was a tipline. They knew the Compliance
24 Department was listening. They could go to the
25 Compliance Department at any time. Yet none of these
26 employee witnesses ever did. Eric Dean, Ms. McKinley,
27 Mr. Adkins all had corrective actions and never once
28 told a compliance officer that they were either lying to

1 people, misleading people, or being pressured to do so.
2 Because if they did, you can sure bet something would
3 have been done because this process was set up to root
4 that out.

5 Now, perhaps the most important part of this
6 lawsuit -- it hasn't been talked about by the Attorney
7 General very much -- and that is the student body.
8 we've heard from a few, but there are 695,000 students
9 during this relevant time period of 12 years that
10 attended Ashford. 695,000 students. And the law
11 requires the Court to look at who is affected.

12 Dr. Wind told you that examining the context
13 requires that students must be considered in the
14 analysis.

15 So let's explore who are these students.

16 Ashford's student body is a nontraditional
17 student body. The average age is between, I believe, 35
18 to 37, but certainly older than 25. They're not your
19 average high school graduate who comes out of living at
20 home and doesn't really know the way of the world yet.
21 Most of them, over 70 percent, work full time during
22 school.

23 This is from Exhibit 7558.

24 And most of them, as Dr. Pattenau described
25 to you, have difficult life circumstances. 94 percent
26 of them have no family financial support. They're
27 raising families. They have full-time jobs. They have
28 historically faced obstacles that, quite frankly, many

1 of us in this room have the luxury of not having had to
2 face, and they are struggling to educate themselves and
3 improve themselves and overcome those obstacles for
4 their own personal pride, for their own personal
5 confidence, to set an example for their children.

6 Every single Ashford student that enrolls has
7 overcome some obstacle and enrollment is a personal
8 success for them because they don't have the luxury of
9 being able to enroll at a traditional university. It's
10 not a fit for them. It's not the right fit for them.

11 They're all different stories. They all have
12 different reasons. Even the Attorney General's own
13 student witnesses all have very different stories and
14 different pathways to get to where they are and where
15 they're going.

16 The student satisfaction survey -- before I go
17 to student satisfaction. What does "nontraditional"
18 mean? Nontraditional students, you heard Dr. Pattenaude
19 describe them as at risk for not completing their
20 degree, okay? And they're at risk for a few reasons,
21 okay? They're not at risk because they're not
22 intelligent enough.

23 Dr. Pattenaude told you, "I found Ashford
24 students -- and I'm teaching a course that's about a
25 year in, and is that -- consistently very good students,
26 well informed, good writers by the time they reach me.
27 So, no, I would not say that these are low-intelligence
28 students. These are students who have had tough lives.

1 That's different."

2 Having a tough life is much different than not
3 being able to understand, not being able to read, not
4 being able to comprehend. The average Ashford student
5 has already been very successful in life to even get to
6 this point, and Ashford offers them an opportunity to
7 improve themselves through education.

8 And Ashford tries to assess whether those
9 students who have accomplished at least that first level
10 of success in enrolling, whether they are satisfied with
11 the experience. And you heard Mr. Nettles describe to
12 you the Net Promoter Score and the results of our own
13 tracking of student experience as being very high.
14 These are high rates, particularly in comparison to
15 other educational institutions. That's Mr. Nettles'
16 testimony about Exhibit 7330.

17 Now, the Attorney General might discount that
18 by saying, "Oh, well, it doesn't measure satisfaction in
19 enrollment." These people enrolled. They're satisfied
20 with the enrollment.

21 Are they satisfied with the education? The
22 answer is absolutely "yes." It is not a sham. The
23 university is not a sham. This Compliance Department is
24 not a sham.

25 So of 695,000 potential students, they brought
26 in a handful to testify about various complaints. They
27 invited all 695,000, in 2017, to file a complaint. Only
28 614 out of 695,000 actually submitted a PIU or a

1 declaration, less than one-tenth of one percent.

2 The Attorney General never wants to talk about
3 those that are happy with their experience, those
4 success stories. And, Your Honor, personally that
5 bothers me. My personal feelings are really irrelevant
6 to this, but it really does upset me quite a bit because
7 all of these students who've enrolled, all of these
8 graduates have succeeded in getting their education,
9 they have succeeded.

10 And the only people in their life that told
11 them they're a failure is the Attorney General of
12 California. They held this press conference in 2017 and
13 said, "If you went to Ashford, your education is
14 valueless. Valueless. You didn't succeed. You
15 failed."

16 Every one of these student witnesses, that is
17 offensive. And in order to support that proposition,
18 not only does the Attorney General do it in a press
19 conference and in their complaint and in this trial,
20 they hire an expert.

21 Dr. Cellini, who's testified that their
22 education at Ashford has no value, but, Your Honor,
23 Dr. Cellini's testimony is not evidence and should be
24 given zero weight because she fails to consider that
25 students are, in fact, human beings. They are not wage
26 earners. They are not just wage earners. She reduces
27 every single student to a statistical earner and values
28 them only for their ability to earn.

1 That is offensive. Absolutely offensive. To
2 justify the conclusion that an Ashford education -- by
3 the way, only at the College of Education -- has no
4 value, they get her to testify that they're all
5 failures.

6 But, Your Honor, even the Attorney General's
7 own student witnesses told you that they received value,
8 they received tangible benefit, that an Ashford degree
9 was the first step to further educational goals, it was
10 the first step to licensure requirements, that they were
11 earning more now than before they started.

12 They also told you about the intangible
13 benefit, the pride it brought them, the role model they
14 could be to their children, the confidence it gave them.

15 And, Your Honor, that's consistent with the
16 common experience of every single person in this room,
17 whether they've gone to college or not. That's the
18 value of education. You can't quantify that, and you
19 can't dismiss a person because they don't earn more than
20 the cost of what they paid for that education. In fact,
21 those are the true success stories, people who don't
22 earn more, and they did it for the value of the
23 education.

24 And while they want to dismiss the value of
25 friendship, mentoring, and networking, just think about
26 the value that plays in our own lives. That's what I
27 tell my son to focus on in his education, my daughter to
28 focus on in her education, what relationships are you

1 developing, what kind of networks are you developing,
2 what are you learning about life in your education?
3 That's the value of education. It's offensive to reduce
4 it to a wage.

5 But the Attorney General has convinced their
6 testifying student witnesses that their education
7 journeys, like that of 695,000 students during the
8 relevant time period, was of no value.

9 They didn't care when this lawsuit was filed
10 or as they prosecuted it that their desired destruction
11 of Ashford would eliminate educational access and
12 opportunity to millions of underserved, nontraditional
13 students across the country.

14 They reduced them to a dollar figure. They
15 reduced their stories to a dollar figure. They reduced
16 their stories to costs of their education and valued
17 napping in that cost and told them they're failures.

18 Your Honor, shame on them. Shame on them.
19 They're here to protect consumers. They're treating --
20 they're treating consumers and students as if they have
21 no intellectual capability whatsoever to fend for
22 themselves, to read, to understand, and to grow.

23 Shame on them. It's offensive to them. It's
24 offensive to every student, every graduate. It's
25 offensive to every faculty member. It's offensive to
26 every Ashford employee and Zovio employee who spent
27 their professional careers at these companies working
28 sincerely to change people's lives and the hundreds of

1 thousands of graduates. Shame on them for telling them
2 they're failures.

3 I want to talk about the evidence. To prove
4 their case, the Attorney General has asked you to look
5 at the evidence that they're bound by in a way that has
6 never been sanctioned before in a court of law. It
7 looks like it's been sanctioned before in a court of
8 law, but it never has.

9 And I'm going to go into a bit of detail on
10 this subject because I consider myself a student of that
11 process of proof of the evidence, much like everybody
12 else in this room.

13 But let's first start with the manner of
14 proof, okay? The manner of proof in this case, they
15 told you they were going to prove that there were lies.
16 They told you this morning they were going to prove
17 lies. Lies are deliberate and voluntarily -- they
18 deliberately and voluntarily framed this case around
19 lies, intentional misrepresentations that the admissions
20 counselors thought they were making to students.

21 Then they hired Dr. Lucido to give you his
22 professional opinion. He didn't look for the lies.
23 what he told you was he looked for false, misleading, or
24 deceptive statements that might be perceived from the
25 student's perspective. He looked only for statements he
26 personally considered would be false, misleading, or
27 deceptive to a student.

28 And then they hired the expert, Mr. Regan,

1 comments -- who looked only -- I'm sorry -- who looked
2 only at noncompliant calls. He's looking at it from the
3 Compliance Department's perspective.

4 So which is it? Are we here to look at
5 evidence of lies? Are we here to look at evidence of
6 false, missing leading, or deceptive statements? Are we
7 here to regulate and punish noncompliant statements?
8 which one is it? It's a constant moving target.

9 The manner of proof in this case comes in two
10 alternative forms. It comes in two alternative forms.
11 And I want to be very clear about that.

12 The first form is live witness testimony, the
13 testimony of former students and former employees. All
14 right?

15 And the second comes in the form of data
16 sampling of recorded calls, transcripts, scorecards, and
17 then extrapolation. And the scope of that
18 extrapolation, as you see, you call five live student
19 witnesses.

20 They have 614 that responded to the press
21 conference, and there's 692,000 or so enrolled students.
22 That's the data set of live -- of live testimony.
23 That's the denominator of the people they asked.

24 The scope of extrapolation, live adverse
25 employees, two, maybe three -- it depends on how you
26 consider the designations -- out of 74,000 employees
27 over the relevant time period that they want to
28 extrapolate from.

1 And I want to take a moment here to talk about
2 that kind of anecdotal evidence, because Your Honor --
3 Your Honor has seen anecdotal evidence before at trial,
4 right?

5 And the reason they rely on anecdotal evidence
6 is because there's no direct evidence, right? There's
7 no direct smoking gun policy that people lie to
8 students. There's no testimony that people should lie
9 to students. There's no order from management or from
10 executives to lie to students.

11 So there's no direct evidence, and they know
12 that. So they want to prove it circumstantially through
13 anecdotal evidence. But anecdotal evidence is not
14 reliable in this way, and there's oftentimes when
15 anecdotal evidence cannot be relied on at all.

16 I'll give you an example. For example, if I
17 said, "My grandfather smoked his entire life and lived
18 to be 95; therefore, smoking isn't harmful to people."

19 we all know that is not an appropriate
20 anecdotal conclusion to extrapolate, to take the
21 anecdote and extrapolate because the farther away you
22 get from the subject of the anecdote, the less reliable
23 is the conclusion and inference, right? This would not
24 be an appropriate thing for us to draw from my example
25 because it's too far removed from the actual subject
26 itself.

27 And most importantly, Your Honor, there is no
28 other data to link the anecdote to the inference or

1 projection. There's no link between my grandfather
2 smoking, living to 95, to it being healthy for the
3 general population. Pretty simple to understand.

4 The anecdote may be appropriate to draw an
5 inference about my grandfather's health. It would not
6 be appropriate to draw a conclusion about the general
7 population from the experience of a single individual.
8 All right?

9 Now, I want to draw your attention to this
10 slide, because when I said the word "alternative," that
11 is probably one of the most important words in this
12 case, the word "or." Their manner of proof is either
13 live witness testimony or data sampling. It is not
14 both. It is not a combination of the two. And let me
15 explain what I mean by that.

16 The people that testified have not shown any
17 evidentiary link to a policy, procedure, or any kind of
18 systematic behavior of the company to the general
19 population as a whole of 75,000 employees, for example,
20 or that the few live student witnesses are
21 representative of all the witnesses.

22 There's no evidentiary link there. There's
23 also no evidentiary link between the small data set to
24 the larger population they're trying to extrapolate to.
25 And I'll explain what I mean by that.

26 First, there is no link between any of the
27 live witnesses the AG called and any of the data
28 sampling they rely on to demonstrate the false,

1 misleading, or deceptive statements. I'll be very clear
2 about that. The former students and the former
3 employees that testified were never evaluated by
4 Mr. Lucido. None of the former students were evaluated
5 by Mr. Lucido in any of his calls. They don't appear on
6 his calls. None of the former employees that testified
7 were evaluated by Mr. Regan in his scorecard analysis.
8 There's no evidentiary link between them and the data
9 sampling analysis the experts do. None.

10 So you have to look at them in that
11 disciplined fashion. The live witness testimonies stand
12 on their own. They cannot be projected to the entire
13 population without some evidentiary link that they are
14 representative of the 74,000 employees or the 692,000
15 students.

16 And proof positive of all the efforts of the
17 Compliance Department, everything that I just
18 articulated before we got to this point, there's no
19 systematic behavior of the company for these experiences
20 that testified. They are isolated incidents that the
21 Attorney General has brought.

22 And remember, we are not litigating individual
23 student claims in this case. We're not litigating
24 individual employment lawsuits in this case. We're
25 litigating a pattern or practice of a systematic and
26 authorized pattern of deception, and you can't use the
27 live witness testimony as evidence upon which to make
28 that conclusion because there's no evidentiary link. On

1 the data sampling, equally there's no evidentiary link.

2 The small data sets -- and we'll go through
3 this in great detail. The small data sets are not
4 appropriate to be extrapolated the way it's being
5 extrapolated.

6 First of all, the small data sets are not
7 reliable evidence anyways. And I'll explain why that is
8 for a variety of process reasons and substantive
9 analysis reasons. But they certainly cannot be
10 extrapolated by simple math without some evidentiary
11 link of a systematic pattern or practice.

12 You cannot say because there's this number
13 that we multiplied, that is evidence of a pattern or
14 practice. You can't create the evidentiary link ipso
15 facto through the math. It's got to be the other way.
16 There's got to be a link between the sample and the
17 evidence to project it. You can't just do math to
18 create that evidentiary inference. It's never been
19 accepted. It's never been accepted.

20 On the live witness testimony, all of those
21 witnesses agree they were given the appropriate
22 disclosures, acknowledged they read and understood them,
23 never reported a problem with their understanding, and
24 ultimately accepted responsibility.

25 On the data sampling, we're going to
26 demonstrate how there is absolutely confirmation bias,
27 selection bias, and design bias. Neither -- neither
28 bucket -- neither bucket of anecdotes can be

1 extrapolated for the evidentiary purposes for which
2 they're being offered in this case. The most important
3 word there is "or." It's "or."

4 Now let's talk about the data sampling.
5 Dr. Bernard Siskin. So being unable to rely on the
6 specific anecdotal illustrations themselves, the
7 Attorney General instead hires a statistician to create
8 a method to prove their claim that defendants lied to
9 students on a systematic basis.

10 And in order to do that, Dr. Siskin picked a
11 small sample of Ashford's 11 million calls and then
12 shrunk that down to about 2,236 calls, which was then
13 further shrank down to 568 calls through a relevance
14 process that was wholly controlled and managed by the
15 Attorney General, not by Dr. Siskin. There was no
16 assurance that the relevant work that was done through
17 Dr. Siskin's sampling process was not biased.

18 In fact, the testimony was just to the
19 contrary. It was unapologetic that it was controlled by
20 the Attorney General. In fact, Dr. Siskin admitted to
21 you that he had no involvement in the training of the
22 Epiq coders, that he -- he and the Epiq coders knew the
23 sponsor of the study, that they knew the purpose of the
24 sampling. That's baking in selection bias right there.

25 The evidence showed that Epiq and Dr. Siskin
26 also made mistakes and, very important, Your Honor, that
27 Dr. Siskin relied on the Attorney General's direction
28 that 20 to 25 percent of calls would be deceptive. That

1 was their instruction to him, "that's what you should
2 look for." And lo and behold, that's what he found, and
3 that's what the other experts found. It's not a
4 shocker.

5 This is a process controlled by the Attorney
6 General's Office, a process managed by them for the
7 specific purpose of reaching a conclusion. It is not
8 the pursuit of truth. It is the pursuit of a
9 conclusion.

10 After going through his process, those 568
11 calls were then handed off to a subject matter expert,
12 Dr. Lucido. And Dr. Lucido and his assistant reviewed
13 the selection of calls hand-selected by the Attorney
14 General's consulting firm.

15 Neither Dr. Lucido nor his assistant was an
16 objective coder. They knew the sponsor and knew the
17 purpose of the study.

18 And Dr. Wind described for you the inherent
19 danger in having that done. Dr. Wind even told you in
20 his study he recused himself from that process because
21 he knew who the sponsor was, even though we told him,
22 "You design it. You do it."

23 So in this case, Dr. Lucido absolutely knew
24 who the sponsor and purpose of the study was. He had
25 the complaint. He knew what they were after, and he
26 found that the percent of deceptive calls -- the AG told
27 Siskin to expect. He found the exact same ratio.
28 That's a shocker. Or maybe it's not.

1 He provided his personal opinion on best
2 practices with no evidence of what a reasonable consumer
3 would do. He couldn't distinguish between express
4 misrepresentations, implied misrepresentations, or
5 omissions.

6 Remember, you were told this morning that the
7 Attorney General had proved lies, lies, lies, lies. And
8 every example they brought to you this morning showed
9 that there was a statement, and the Attorney General
10 then said, "what the admissions counselor didn't say was
11 the following" or that "The admissions counselor
12 downplayed another fact."

13 Those are not lies, Your Honor. Those are
14 implied results from a statement that could possibly
15 lead to deception, but those are not lies. Those are
16 implied misrepresentations that Dr. Lucido could not on
17 the stand identify for you what was misleading about
18 that. He couldn't even identify what was deceptive
19 about calls without referring to his own notes.

20 He ignored context -- he ignored context, even
21 though he said it was critical, even though he said
22 context matters. What was said or shown before, during,
23 or after the call didn't matter to him. He wouldn't
24 look at it. It was outside the scope of his assignment.

25 How many times did he say that during his
26 examination, "Outside the scope of my assignment"? He
27 didn't know if any of the 126 prospective students
28 actually enrolled and didn't know if any of the 126

1 prospective students made any payments to Ashford or
2 received value from Ashford. He just can't support
3 restitution clearly.

4 So to the extent they cite to him for
5 restitution, there is no evidentiary link between his
6 expertise and restitution because he specifically carved
7 that out and said he's -- he's not testifying about
8 value or restitution.

9 He never examined what happened before the
10 call or after the call. He didn't listen to the actual
11 calls like the compliance officers do. He didn't look
12 at the visual portions of the call, which the compliance
13 officers actually do.

14 when the admissions counselors are on the
15 phone with a student, they're having a verbal
16 communication. But that communication, not just verbal,
17 it's also visual because the admissions counselor will
18 take a student through an online tour of various things
19 including the EFIP, the website, the campus. The
20 compliance officers do the same thing when they listen
21 to a call. Dr. Lucido did not. It was outside the
22 scope of his assignment.

23 And while the Attorney General says he showed
24 his work, he absolutely could not show his work. We
25 asked him to show his work on the stand, and he told
26 you, "I -- I can't tell you why I reached this
27 conclusion. Even though I cited to a specific
28 statement, I can't tell you why I concluded that to be

1 deceptive unless I looked at my notes."

2 He couldn't show his work perhaps because he
3 didn't do the work, Your Honor. This is a process
4 controlled from start to finish, to reach a result and a
5 conclusion that the Attorney General wanted. He spent
6 hours reviewing call transcripts, drafting the report.
7 I don't know how he possibly could have done the work,
8 but the work isn't there and it's not shown and he can't
9 explain it.

10 Context matters. He believes context matters.
11 He told you that, whether it was stated overtly or
12 implied, the notion of a misrepresentation would be
13 dependent upon the context of the conversation and the
14 call and the discussion being made. He told you that at
15 trial November 15th.

16 Everybody agrees that is true. It is not
17 possible to assess whether a statement is misleading
18 without context.

19 Jeanne Chappell told you that to determine
20 whether a call is misleading, "we" -- "If they go to a
21 website, we do that. If they" -- and she's talking
22 about compliance officers reviewing calls -- "If they
23 talk about numbers, we pull up the resources. If they
24 talk about classroom or program details, we go to the
25 website and look that up as well. Everything they say,
26 we -- we will actively find the document that would go
27 with that."

28 Alice Parenti told you that "I would have to

1 have the additional context on the call" to determine if
2 the statement was misleading to a student.

3 Matt Hallisy told you that "To determine
4 whether a student was misled, I would look at the
5 context, and I believe my -- my team would look at the
6 context as well, and we would look at the questions that
7 were being asked, we would look at how the student
8 responded."

9 Jeanne Chappell also told you that compliance
10 listens to the calls with students, quote, "because in
11 order to get the context, you have to hear the tone, you
12 have to hear the pauses, you have -- you have to listen
13 to the conversation."

14 And Dr. Wind told you, quote, "You have to
15 understand the context of the journey before you can
16 conclude is there deception or not with respect to one
17 single source."

18 This is not a shocking concept, Your Honor.
19 This is not a shocking concept to require context to
20 understand whether or not something has happened. In
21 fact, context is an essential element of justice. You
22 have to have it. And Dr. Lucido put blinders onto it.

23 Equally important are the examples that he
24 pointed out. Dr. Lucido claimed that quoting costs less
25 than what are published is deceptive. But in the
26 example that Mr. Hummel examined him about on the stand,
27 all he said was that the admissions counselor used the
28 phrase "ballpark." That was the deceptive statement.

1 "Ballpark" was the deceptive statement.

2 And when asked why is that deceptive, he
3 couldn't answer without going to his notes. The
4 admissions counselor was wrong about the number of
5 credits, but that was a mistake, not a violation of law.
6 But to use the word "ballpark," that's a deceptive
7 statement? That's Exhibit 2399.

8 Dr. Lucido claimed that credits will be
9 accepted by Ashford or the admissions counselor makes
10 clear that transfer credits are not guaranteed. There
11 was absolutely nothing misleading about not offering
12 pre-evaluations.

13 In fact, it says, "It depends on your previous
14 classes." And the admissions counselor also says in the
15 call, "I'll send you an e-mail so you have all the
16 information about the program. And then, you know, if
17 you have any questions, feel free to e-mail me or call."

18 Dr. Lucido expressly and affirmatively did not
19 ask for any e-mails about this caller. He absolutely --
20 he actually ignored the most important context that's
21 actually in the call, a reference to a further
22 communication.

23 The next example, downplaying debt. In this
24 example, Exhibit 2 -- 2350, the counselor did not
25 actually downplay the debt. The prospective student
26 said he would be able to afford debt payment. Also not
27 an example of an express misstatement. Something that's
28 implied or something that's omitted is what Dr. Lucido

1 has been talking about.

2 But he can't tell you how many of these or how
3 many of his 126 calls are actually implied omissions,
4 how many are express misstatements. How many, he has to
5 go to his notes for. How many Your Honor has to look at
6 to determine which ones are actually deceptive. You
7 just have to take his word for it.

8 And, Your Honor, we've demonstrated his word
9 is unreliable in this case because the integrity of the
10 process was corrupted from the start, and the
11 substantive standard he applied to it is not supportable
12 in any way, shape, or form.

13 None of these 126 calls that he's identified
14 are -- are reliable evidence that can be relied upon to
15 demonstrate a false, misleading, deceptive statement was
16 made. Not a one of them. Not a one of them. There's
17 no basis upon which the Attorney General can say there's
18 a sample from which to extrapolate. That's step one.

19 Furthermore, before we get to the next step,
20 these are the areas that Dr. Lucido affirmatively told
21 you he was not offering an opinion about. He told you
22 it was outside the scope of his assignment to render any
23 opinion about the organization, its management, its
24 policies and procedures, its training, its disclosures,
25 its compliance, its discipline, its student outreach.

26 He also told you it was outside the scope of
27 his assignment and he wasn't rendering any opinion about
28 the admissions counselors and their training, the

1 adequacy of their training, the admissions counselors'
2 prior calls or follow-up calls or e-mails that were
3 sent, or the visual part of their calls, or the
4 corrective outreach, or the student outreach.

5 He also told you that it was outside the scope
6 of his opinion to opine about the students and their
7 journey, their payment, their value. It was also
8 outside of the scope of his assignment to talk about
9 other subject matter experts like financial aid,
10 registrar, and student advisors. That's what he is not
11 offering an opinion about.

12 So when the Attorney General tells you that
13 there's been a systematic pattern and practice of
14 misrepresentations and they base it on these 126 calls,
15 there is absolutely no evidentiary link between that
16 conclusion and this data set. It is simply his personal
17 review of a curated set of data in which he renders his
18 personal judgment, which he can't support or identify or
19 break out in terms of what is actually false,
20 misleading, or deceptive.

21 It is unreliable evidence. It is an
22 unsustainable evidentiary record upon which any
23 liability can be based, or any remedy as well.

24 Now, this is how the Attorney General based
25 its case. It's taken 11 million calls. The defendants
26 agreed to 1.57 million as a sample. There's actually a
27 typo in that next circle. It's actually, I believe,
28 35,000, not 335,000, which was then shrank to 2,234 by

1 Dr. Lucido, which then resulted in his sub-sample
2 delivered to -- Lucido, 126 calls. Okay. That's the --
3 that's the context of this data that he had. 11 million
4 down to 126.

5 And then Dr. Siskin wants to then do something
6 with that 126. And I want to make an observation here
7 that it's -- it's axiomatic that extrapolations are only
8 as good as the data being extrapolated. They are
9 limited to the same limitations as the data, okay?

10 And as we've just discussed, Dr. Lucido
11 expressly limited his opinions to his personal judgment
12 that those 126 calls were generally false, misleading,
13 or deceptive without being able to explain and having
14 any evidentiary basis to explain why, what kind, or
15 describe the reasons such -- such statements are likely
16 to deceive.

17 Not only should Lucido's opinion be given no
18 weight and the Attorney General should be deemed to have
19 offered no evidence of any actual false, misleading, or
20 deceptive statement, but this extrapolation cannot be
21 allowed because there is simply no evidentiary link to
22 do so, even if -- even if you accepted 126 calls as
23 being false, misleading, or deceptive, which there's no
24 evidentiary basis to do so.

25 The evidence is clear and unequivocal that the
26 defendants' corporate incentives were aligned to
27 prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive statements. It
28 runs counter to the business model, student retention,

1 profitability, accreditation standards, and other
2 regulatory obligations, the existence of a robust
3 Compliance Department to prevent, detect, and remedy not
4 just false, misleading, deceptive statements, but also a
5 much broader swath of statements, including best
6 practices, stylistic, professionalism standards, as
7 proof positive that anomalous and isolated mistakes by
8 individuals were not authorized, approved, or ratified
9 by the company.

10 And therefore, these isolated incidents cannot
11 be, from an evidentiary perspective, extrapolated to --
12 to a degree that, quite frankly, Your Honor, shocks the
13 conscience. It shocks the conscience.

14 If there's no evidentiary link to expand this,
15 it is shocking to see what they think it represents. In
16 other words, this data set, this small, this flawed in
17 selection and its content, are just simple anecdotal
18 examples that cannot be argued to be representative of
19 the population as a whole, particularly with
20 indisputable evidence that the company expressly trains
21 or prohibits its employees from making such mistakes.

22 The process integrity failures in the
23 selection and picking efforts of the experts prohibits
24 any of the data from being considered in the first
25 instance or extrapolated in the second.

26 But nevertheless, here's what they do. They
27 take 126 and they add that multiplier. They take that
28 multiplier to make it 88,742, and they tell Your Honor

1 in this court, there's 126 false and misleading calls.
2 That means, from the sample -- we'll do the math --
3 there's 88,000 calls in California. That is shocking.
4 What's more shocking is what they do next.

5 They tell you nationwide is 816. Just
6 multiply again. They don't say, Your Honor, look at the
7 evidence. They're doing it backwards. They're doing
8 the math and telling you that the math is the evidence.
9 And the math is not the evidence. The evidence is the
10 evidence. The evidence to which the Attorney General is
11 bound is the evidence. The math is not.

12 And this kind of manner of proof has never
13 been authorized in a single case in California, nor
14 should it ever as a matter of fairness, as a matter of
15 due process, as a matter of justice.

16 They don't just stop there. It's not just
17 Dr. Siskin. They try to do a belts-and-suspenders and
18 they hired Mr. Regan to do an analysis as well.
19 Dr. Siskin found 20 percent because the Attorney General
20 told him that's what he should find. Dr. Lucido found
21 20 percent because that's what he was told he should
22 find.

23 And Dr. Regan is then hired to review
24 compliance scorecards from the Compliance Department.
25 And the Attorney General attempts to use his accounting
26 analysis of the compliance scorecards as evidence.

27 This is an even more egregious manner of
28 proof, Your Honor, because Regan analyzed the company's

1 database of noncompliant scorecards, data that wouldn't
2 exist if Zovio didn't maintain a robust and
3 industry-leading compliance operation. It wouldn't
4 exist.

5 Nevertheless, they take that data, and he
6 tries to conduct an analysis and reach some conclusions
7 about it, conclusions that the Attorney General told him
8 that's what they were looking for.

9 Now, as a preliminary matter -- this is really
10 important -- he conceded to you on the stand that he was
11 not assessing whether any Ashford employee made any
12 statement that was false, misleading, or deceptive, even
13 though he is a certified fraud examiner.

14 He's a certified fraud examiner, and the
15 Attorney General didn't ask him to look at fraud. They
16 just asked him to count how many noncompliant scorecards
17 there are. They gave him a counting function. Not an
18 accounting function, but a counting function.

19 This concession that he didn't look at
20 anything relating to false, misleading, or deceptive
21 statements renders his entire opinion completely
22 irrelevant to this case. Completely irrelevant to this
23 case. It is not admissible evidence in any way, shape,
24 or form and bars, as a matter of law, any of his
25 conclusions from being used as a basis to calculate
26 penalties or restitution.

27 Do you remember the exercise that Mr. Lake did
28 here with -- with Mr. Regan on the stand and he asked

1 him, "Well, how many -- how many scorecards is that?"
2 "Okay, what's that times \$5,000?" That shocks the
3 conscience, Your Honor, when Mr. Regan has testified
4 already he didn't evaluate anything that is illegal.

5 So now, are we here to penalize a company for
6 monitoring its own employees to try and improve them so
7 they can help protect consumers? That's what we're here
8 to do? That is crazy.

9 The scope of compliance standards is broad, as
10 you know. We've talked about that and encompasses best
11 practices on the one hand and illegal activity on the
12 other. But not all best practices are required by law
13 or have any legal significance relative to this case.

14 Furthermore, the process that Mr. Regan used
15 was controlled by the Attorney General from start to
16 finish and deliberately skewed to increase his findings.
17 Not only was he looking at irrelevant information, he
18 used the wrong data set, which explains the vast
19 majority of his noncompliant scorecards.

20 He told you that he looked at the Excel and
21 SQL databases, the two different databases, one that
22 included incomplete scorecards and one that the company
23 relies on, which has complete information for its daily
24 operations. He combined the two and created his own
25 data set.

26 And he admitted to you on the stand that the
27 reason that he did that was so that he could increase
28 the count of scorecards, to increase the count, so you

1 have more from which to pick, so he can increase both
2 the numerator and the denominator.

3 And you heard Jeanne Chappell describe for you
4 how that is the wrong thing to do, how the Excel data
5 has incomplete information. And Dr. Wind acknowledged
6 that for you as well.

7 He also excluded 70,000 scorecards from the
8 denominator by not including other scorecards that would
9 have had a relevant topic. As -- as we've described and
10 as Jeanne Chappell testified, scorecards do not measure
11 compliance. They're trying to find noncompliance.

12 And so if there's a compliant statement in a
13 scorecard on a relevant topic, it's not going to be
14 picked up in the scorecard necessarily. You would have
15 to look at the scorecard and then look at the call and
16 then listen to the call to determine all of the
17 different areas of relevant compliance statements.

18 That's just not something that the Compliance
19 Department tracks because that's not its function. Its
20 function is to find mistakes and make it better. Its
21 function is not to find compliant behavior and then hand
22 out gold stars to everybody. That's not its function.

23 So by excluding the other scorecards, he
24 excluded 70,000. He manipulated the denominator. He
25 had the wrong denominator.

26 Additionally, he used the AG's created
27 relevance standard on the compliance verbiages to
28 increase the count of noncompliant scorecards. "I

1 didn't attempt to figure out whether a noncompliant
2 statement was a false, deceptive, or misleading
3 statement." He just took the AG's word as to what was
4 relevant to the case. "My analysis was compliant versus
5 noncompliant," he said, "and I did not see a description
6 on the scorecard containing a false, misleading
7 statement."

8 So if he's not looking for that, he's trusting
9 the word of the Attorney General that the relevance
10 standard is accurate, appropriate, and is relevant to
11 the actual issues in the case. But as we demonstrated
12 to Your Honor, there are a lot of areas in those
13 verbiages. There are over 900 verbiages just even in
14 the Attorney General's count that are covered in the
15 scorecards. Mr. Regan used 840. Nevertheless, that's
16 still a lot.

17 But you remember the actual spreadsheet that
18 Mr. Regan used to count all of the scorecards, right?
19 And the spreadsheet he used came from that combined data
20 set that he used. He excluded compliant scorecards.

21 Now I want to talk about what he did with the
22 compliance verbiages. So he has too small of a
23 denominator. We've already talked about that.

24 Let's talk about the numerator. By looking at
25 scorecards with relevant topics that have nothing
26 related to the issues in this case, he could pick a
27 larger number for the numerator. He has more to choose
28 from to pick the numerator, okay? And he used relevance

1 topics like encouraging the student to use a third-party
2 website for transference of financial documents,
3 representative offered student an unapproved gift
4 incentive or promotion, representative referred to the
5 university as a company, AC recommended password for the
6 student to use.

7 All of these issues have no germane
8 relationship to any issue in this case, yet that was the
9 relevant standard given to Mr. Regan by the Attorney
10 General. He trusted that they were accurate and
11 appropriate for this case.

12 But, Your Honor, you have that exhibit,
13 Exhibit 3727. And if you go into that Excel spreadsheet
14 on the verbiage tab and you plug in the word "false" to
15 find verbiages related to false, there's three of them.
16 If you plug in the word "misleading" or "misled" on that
17 spreadsheet, you find 22 of them. If you plug the word
18 "misrepresented" on there, you'd find 14 of them.

19 So instead of 840 relevant verbiages that
20 would result in a large number of noncompliant
21 scorecards, you would only have a universe as small as
22 this. And it's actually smaller. We've taken the best
23 case scenario for those -- for those statements.

24 If you did that yourself, you would see how
25 out of 840, only these handful might be relevant for the
26 case. And the only way you can tell if they're actually
27 relevant is then you would actually have to go to the
28 call and listen to the call and hear the context and

1 listen to what's being said and visually see what the
2 student is going through to determine if they were
3 actually -- if they were likely to be deceived. That's
4 what you would have to do. Mr. Regan did none of that.

5 So in other words, Your Honor, this -- this
6 method of proving pattern and practice is simply not
7 appropriate and turns the process on its head. A
8 statistical analysis in pattern and practice cases like
9 disparate impact cases, they analyze the impact on the
10 protected class. They analyze the impact on the
11 protected class.

12 Mr. Regan only analyzed the behavior of the
13 company. Mr. Lucido only analyzed what was said by the
14 company. None of them -- and Dr. Siskin did none of
15 that. None of them looked at the impact on the
16 protected class.

17 The AG didn't survey a single student. They
18 didn't look at student account files. They didn't want
19 to hear the student's voices. And they haven't done so
20 here, and they refuse to do so because statistical
21 evidence cannot be used in this manner, particularly
22 without an independent evidentiary basis to support it.
23 It violates every principle of due process, and the
24 consequences of this form of proof violate every notion
25 of fair play and justice.

26 Now, Your Honor, I'm about to conclude on the
27 remedies. Perhaps we want to take a five-minute break
28 for the court reporter.

1 THE COURT: That would be a nice idea, I would
2 think.

3 Ms. Court Reporter, five or ten?

4 THE REPORTER: Ten, please.

5 THE COURT: It will be ten. This is straight
6 reporting. Ten minutes.

7 (Recess.)

8 THE COURT: Shall we continue, Counsel?

9 MR. YEH: Yes, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Thank you.

11 MR. YEH: One note I did want to bring to the
12 Court's attention, in terms of Regan's use of verbiages,
13 when Dr. Wind used Regan's verbiages but with the
14 correct data set, he found less than 5 percent
15 noncompliant. 5 percent noncompliant, not 20.5 percent.

16 So let's get to remedies, Your Honor, and I'll
17 be brief with these because you've heard so much
18 argument on it already.

19 But the question is, "What does the Attorney
20 General want here?" And I submit to you that the
21 Attorney General and the defendants want the same thing.
22 We both want students to get accurate information and to
23 be fully informed. We both want students to succeed.
24 The injunctive terms are already in place for the issues
25 that have been raised by the Attorney General. An
26 injunction is only appropriate to prohibit ongoing
27 conduct. It's not equitable when allegedly deceptive
28 conduct has ceased.

1 And in this case, Your Honor, the Iowa AVC
2 measures already moot the request for injunction.
3 Paragraph 21 of the AVC addresses specifically the AG's
4 request today for an order to prohibit the defendants
5 from engaging in any misleading statements in four
6 areas. It's already in paragraph 21.

7 You heard Mark Johnson's testimony about the
8 measures implemented that were already in place and
9 implemented to further address that. It's moot. Every
10 single area of their requested injunction has already
11 been covered.

12 I just want to make another note. They
13 requested on the injunction today a retention of calls
14 for five years. This is the first time we've heard that
15 request. We had an argument with Your Honor on the
16 motions in limine on October 14th, and we had a big
17 argument over what do they want? And they brought out
18 this big set of discovery responses, said, "It's in
19 there," but it's not really in there because it doesn't
20 identify the right defendants. And they promised to
21 amend that to give us an idea so we knew how to try the
22 case of what they wanted, and they still didn't amend
23 it. And today, they still haven't amended it.

24 This is a new request. And they've proposed
25 to Your Honor a post-trial briefing? It's too late.
26 This is the close of evidence today. This is the close
27 of the case. They don't know what they want because
28 everything's already moot. We're already doing

1 everything that should be done, everything that they've
2 requested.

3 Ashford is no longer in operation, Zovio has a
4 limited role, and there is no evidence of current
5 conduct. All of the AG's evidence is absolutely dated.

6 And this one piece of evidence, this e-mail
7 from Emiko Abe in 2021 expressing concern over somebody
8 who said there was pressure in the sales -- in the -- in
9 the Admissions Department, Ms. Abe evaluated exit
10 interviews over an approximately six-month period and
11 found one exit interview mentioning feeling pressure.

12 That's in her deposition. She raised this
13 with her supervisor and requested a review. The review
14 found that the employee's manager was no longer in a
15 managerial role, and the company was unsuccessful in
16 several attempts to reach out to the author of the exit
17 survey.

18 The purpose of her e-mail was to really ask HR
19 to be very diligent in its investigation of that one
20 particular exit survey and to not leave any stone
21 unturned. That is exactly what she should have been
22 doing when hearing somebody say that. And that person
23 isn't there. It couldn't be verified. This is what the
24 Compliance Department does. It doesn't mean that a
25 conduct is ongoing. It just means that a company is
26 continually vigilant about monitoring for anything that
27 would put anybody in a position to do something
28 inappropriate. There's no evidence of ongoing conduct.

1 So ask yourself, "If behavior isn't what
2 they're after, what do they want?" If they wanted to
3 hurt the company, they already have. This four-year
4 campaign has been devastating to the company's
5 reputation, it's had its desired effect on the finances,
6 the reputations, and the personal lives of the company
7 and the thousands of jobs that have left to Arizona.

8 This case, Your Honor, I submit to you, is not
9 about behavior. This case is about money. This case is
10 a fund-raiser for the Attorney General's Office, and the
11 Attorney General is trying to pioneer a new way to raise
12 money that will be the legacy of what they want to leave
13 behind for their office, that they can have a court
14 judicially -- judicially regulate a company where
15 primary jurisdiction is elsewhere so they can come into
16 any company, find one or two isolated incidents, and
17 then extrapolate that into a companywide penalty.

18 It is -- it is prosecutorial taxation,
19 Your Honor, and that, Your Honor, is inappropriate.
20 We've briefed this extensively. This should not be
21 allowed, quite frankly.

22 And let's talk about the money for a second.
23 Restitution. You heard a lot of argument on this
24 already. I won't go into great detail on it.
25 Mr. Hummel addressed it with you yesterday. But here,
26 there's no evidentiary basis for restitution whatsoever.
27 There's been no expert calculation by Dr. Lucido or
28 Mr. Regan that can form the evidentiary basis for

1 restitution. There's no fact witness for that
2 calculation. That number is not based upon the number
3 of students harmed, nor is it based on an amount paid by
4 any student individually or in the aggregate. It is
5 literally picked out of thin air.

6 The Attorney General only identified 601
7 individuals in interrogatory responses who were
8 supposedly injured, Special Interrogatory 16 through 29.
9 But the \$25 million demand has no connection to those
10 individuals.

11 You can't have a claims process take place
12 post trial. The law is clear in California, you have to
13 have evidence of the restitution number in evidence in
14 the trial before the close of trial. It has to be
15 objective. It has to be in the record who was harmed,
16 by how much, what their value was, what's left over,
17 what's the actual number, and what's the objective
18 standard. They haven't done that. They're proposing a
19 claims process where somebody has to retry the merits of
20 these subjective claims.

21 It's simply not allowed under California law
22 under Kraus vs. Trinity Management, and the Attorney
23 General has already gone through their claims process.
24 They filed this lawsuit and held a press conference.
25 They got 614 claims. But they've provided no
26 substantial evidence, which is their burden, as to what
27 those 614 individuals suffered, why they suffered, how
28 much they suffered, what the amount is. None. There's

1 no specific amount found owing for any of those 614
2 individuals. They've gone through their claims process.
3 They've had their day in court. There is no evidence to
4 support it.

5 The standard for restitution, as you know, is
6 the price paid minus the value received. You've seen
7 this discussion many times. I won't belabor the point,
8 but you know the law on that.

9 In this case, there's no evidence of that.
10 Lucido's 126 calls didn't address restitution
11 whatsoever. He affirmatively denied that it was
12 anywhere near any of his opinions.

13 The same is true for Regan, except he also
14 concedes that he didn't even identify deceptive calls,
15 only noncompliant calls. You don't get restitution for
16 noncompliant calls.

17 Professor Cellini provides no basis for
18 restitution either. She looked at a maximum of 30
19 students, and there's no evidence on any of those
20 students as to what they paid or the value they
21 received. Every single witness testified to value.
22 There's no evidentiary record for restitution
23 whatsoever. It is an unsustainable evidentiary record
24 for restitution.

25 And there's no basis to calculate restitution
26 for testifying witnesses. Every one of the testifying
27 witnesses testified about the value they received.
28 Ms. Tomko, Ms. Roberts, Ms. Perez, Ms. Evans, Ms. Embry,

1 all in their -- all in their testimony testified that
2 they received value, got jobs, that they got a degree
3 that was a first step in their educational process,
4 obtained a job in the psychology field, on and on and
5 on. They got value.

6 Jessica Ohland, Renee Winot, Joseph Ybarra,
7 Jasmine Cox, all testified the same. They graduated
8 with a degree. They got the value of flexibility. They
9 needed online school as a single mom with four kids.
10 They got that flexibility and ability to get an
11 education, over and over and over.

12 And the evidence is clear that Ashford did not
13 accept the benefit of any alleged misstatement. In
14 fact, Craig Swenson described for you yesterday in this
15 e-mail, Exhibit -- I can't read it -- 1255, how "We have
16 as a good faith measure adjusted a student's account."

17 when it's discovered that a student was
18 somehow misled or misunderstood something or there was a
19 problem with their account, you saw how the university
20 reacted and sought to remedy it.

21 You also heard from Dr. Pattenaude how he
22 approved a waiver of a balance owing on an account as
23 well. That happens on a routine basis.

24 There's simply an unsustainable evidentiary
25 record for any amount of restitution.

26 Finally, civil penalties. You've heard all of
27 the civil penalty factors, the nature and seriousness of
28 the misconduct, the number of violations, persistence of

1 misconduct, length of time, willfulness, defendants'
2 assets and liabilities.

3 with respect to the nature and seriousness of
4 the misconduct, there's no proof how many calls that
5 Dr. Lucido evaluated were literally untrue, impliedly
6 misleading. The worst statement that they were able to
7 identify was that somebody said a figure was ball
8 parked. That is not the kind of seriousness that's
9 contemplated in the law for this type of penalty. It
10 simply has not been established. Nature and seriousness
11 has not been established.

12 The number of calls has not been established.
13 we've talked about how Dr. Lucido's evaluation of 126 is
14 faulty in its process and its substance and how there's
15 no evidentiary link for extrapolation by Dr. Siskin.
16 The number of violations has not been established.

17 The persistence of the conduct, all you've
18 seen are isolated incidents that take place over time.
19 That's all you've seen. That does not demonstrate a
20 pattern or practice. That demonstrates what you would
21 normally expect in every single organization in the
22 world. There are going to be mistakes. You've not seen
23 persistence of misconduct. That's not established.

24 And the length of time over which the
25 misconduct occurred, it's 12 years only by -- by
26 agreement that we look at that relevant time period, but
27 there's been no systematic behavior over those 12 years.

28 The Attorney General has shown no systematic

1 behavior, no authorization, no -- no ratification, no
2 approval during any of that time period, only
3 unauthorized isolated incidents.

4 The willfulness of the misconduct. That's an
5 easy one. I've spent all day talking about that. No
6 systematic. Not established.

7 And finally, the defendants' assets and
8 liabilities and net worth in this case. The Attorney
9 General talked about cash available. They didn't talk
10 about liabilities. It's really not relevant,
11 Your Honor, in that respect.

12 The defendants' assets, liabilities, and net
13 worth in this case, as you heard from Jim Smith, are in
14 such a condition that if a judgment in the amount
15 requested by the Attorney General were rendered in this
16 case, it would realistically ruin this company.

17 The liabilities of the company are greater
18 than their unrestricted cash. That's what's in
19 evidence. If they get this kind of judgment, the
20 company will be ruined. The impact will be on thousands
21 of employees who've been forced to move to Arizona
22 because of this kind of prosecution, and it would
23 eliminate the industry-leading provider of compliance
24 expertise and technology in this country.

25 The incentives it would create are perverse.
26 Think about the incentive this case creates for
27 corporate America. If a judgment is rendered in this
28 case against a Compliance Department that is one of

1 the -- that is world-class and has done an effective job
2 at rooting out not just illegal behavior, false and
3 deceptive statements, but also noncompliant behavior,
4 and that evidence from its own Compliance Department is
5 used to punish it in a way that it ruins the company,
6 the incentive for corporate America is to stop
7 monitoring compliance.

8 That is not, that is not the purpose of this
9 law. That is not the purpose of justice. That is not
10 the purpose of what should be happening in this case.
11 And the incentive for prosecutors to prosecute to raise
12 money is not justice. This simply, Your Honor, is not
13 justice at all.

14 If you look at the number of calls -- and I
15 want to address that question specifically for Your
16 Honor because you asked it. The number of actual calls
17 evaluated by Dr. Lucido in the pre-AVC period are 29,
18 the AVC period is 71, the post-AVC is 26.

19 we've also broken it down for you by year. In
20 2013, the Lucido calls can be broken down to 21 in 2013,
21 24 in 2014. The AVC was signed on May 15, 2014. 28 in
22 2015, 26 in 2016, 6 in 2017, 9 in 2018, 8 in 2019, and 4
23 in 2020.

24 That's also proof positive that there's not
25 ongoing misconduct. In fact, you can see the trend is
26 that it shrinks over time, even if you accept
27 Dr. Lucido's premise, which is faulty on its face.

28 More importantly, Your Honor, the law

1 recognizes -- pardon me. Let's talk about debt
2 collection first for a moment. The Attorney General
3 identified debt collection as an element of its
4 penalties request. It is not requesting penalties for
5 debt collection.

6 The AG does not seek any remedy based upon
7 debt collection itself, and the Attorney General has no
8 evidence of an actual legal violation. If you read the
9 stipulation, it does not concede liability.

10 Not a single student testified that they paid
11 in response to an allegedly unlawful debt collection
12 letter. The collection was a pass-through, and Ashford
13 earned no profit on the fee. Ashford voluntarily
14 stopped the debt collection practices in 2013.

15 So to the extent the Attorney General wants to
16 consider in terms of seriousness and misconduct, that
17 practice ended in 2013. So debt collection provides
18 absolutely no basis for a remedy.

19 Now, the law recognizes that what the Attorney
20 General is seeking here is not justice and, in fact,
21 grants Your Honor discretion in this case. Joe Lake
22 asked Mr. Regan to multiply times \$5,000, 2500 for UCL
23 and 2500 for FAL. But the actual text of the statute
24 says the penalties, to the extent Your Honor believes
25 they are mandatory, shall not exceed \$5,000. So the
26 penalty can be between \$1 to \$5,000.

27 And I submit, Your Honor, if there is a
28 penalty, which there shouldn't be, a \$1 penalty is just

1 where the circumstances support it, where the violations
2 are de minimus, where the company did everything it
3 could have.

4 The law also further -- goes even further, the
5 good faith defense. California law is clear that good
6 faith is an absolute defense to civil penalties. Good
7 faith defense -- good faith, bad faith is relevant to
8 the evaluation of the fine assessed against the
9 defendant. Equitable considerations may guide the Court
10 in fashioning the appropriate remedy in a UCL action.

11 I submit, Your Honor, given extensive history
12 of the facts and the evidence in this case about
13 corporate conduct and what the corporation has done to
14 try and root out the very kind of behavior being sought
15 to be prohibited here, good faith is absolutely
16 established on this evidentiary record. No penalties
17 are justified because we absolutely acted in good faith.

18 Ashford never authorized misrepresentations.
19 There's no circumstantial evidence of authorization
20 through pattern, practice, or culture. Ashford always
21 looked for affirmative steps to prevent
22 misrepresentations. And there's no reliable evidence
23 from which the number of violations or amount of
24 restitution can be estimated. There's no proof of
25 actual ongoing misconduct or threat of misconduct.

26 Your Honor, I want to thank you for your time.

27 And in closing, I want to say that this case
28 should have never been brought to trial, much less filed

1 in the first instance.

2 If the Attorney General doesn't like the
3 specific way these companies are trying to prevent,
4 detect, and remedy false statements that might lead to
5 prospective students being misled, this is the wrong
6 forum for that. They cannot and must not be allowed to
7 regulate industries through the courts.

8 The case law is clear, when a corporate
9 defendant has done everything in its power to prevent
10 the kind of misconduct being alleged, it is not subject
11 to secondary liability under the UCL or False
12 Advertising Law.

13 I ask, what more could Zovio do? What more
14 could Ashford do? This is the exact case the California
15 Supreme Court contemplated when articulating the
16 exception to corporate liability in Ford Dealers.

17 It is the perfect case for this court and the
18 Court of Appeal to affirm the factors articulated in
19 Ford Dealers. This is not a case to split or
20 compromise. It is an unsustainable evidentiary record
21 upon which to do so, and doing so would be unjust.

22 Let's be crystal clear here. There are no
23 facts. There's no law that supports the Attorney
24 General's efforts to take credit for an unprecedented,
25 unlawful, and constitutional restitution class of yet
26 unnamed students. And the Attorney General's effort to
27 raise tens of millions of dollars in penalties for the
28 general fund in this way is completely inappropriate.

1 Doing so would only victimize the hundreds of
2 thousands of graduates and students whose educations at
3 Ashford are meaningful and valuable to them personally
4 and professionally. It would victimize the prospective
5 nontraditional students that need this kind of
6 educational access and opportunity from an organization
7 that is world-class in its efforts to protect them.

8 It would victimize the tens of thousands of
9 faculty and employees that have spent their careers
10 trying to do the right thing and would create an
11 entirely new class of corporate targets for this kind of
12 unconscionable effort to punish those who are doing the
13 right thing.

14 This is not justice, Your Honor. It simply is
15 not. This is opportunism at its worst. Judgment should
16 be rendered in favor of the defendants.

17 And I thank you for your time.

18 THE COURT: Mr. Yeh, thank you for your
19 arguments. Both you and the Attorney General have
20 represented your respective parties very well.

21 Can I assume you've got over -- you can do
22 this in less than an hour?

23 MS. KALANITHI: Absolutely, Your Honor.

24 THE COURT: Okay. Here's what we're going to
25 do. We're going to take another 12-minute break for
26 Madam Reporter. You'll be done by 4:30 at the latest?

27 MS. KALANITHI: At the latest. I think more
28 like a half hour.

1 THE COURT: Thank you. Perfect. 12 more
2 minutes for Madam Reporter.

3 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: You're welcome.

5 (Recess.)

6 THE COURT: Whenever you're ready. We shall
7 now have rebuttal by the People.

8 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you, Your Honor. Emily
9 Kalanithi, again, for the People.

10 If I could please have slide 49, I will try to
11 not go over anything I went over earlier, just
12 responding to a few points from defendants' closing.

13 THE COURT: Sure.

14 MS. KALANITHI: And I think I'd like to start
15 where defendants left off, and that was the Ford Dealers
16 case. Actually, if we could go to slide 50, please.

17 So defendants rely very heavily on what is
18 indicta in a footnote in the Ford Dealers case. That
19 footnote seems to be doing a lot of heavy lifting here.
20 And defendants argue that they should be excused for
21 their misrepresentations based on that exception, and
22 that's an exception to the general rule.

23 And to be clear, under Ford Dealers, three
24 elements must be shown, and the burden of proof lies
25 with defendants. And even in that case, it's still not
26 clear from that footnote that that would be enough, the
27 court says. It may be possible to not have liability if
28 all three of these things are shown.

1 Defendants must show that they made every
2 effort to discourage misrepresentations, and here,
3 defendants cannot do so considering their employees'
4 deceptive statements, but continued for over a decade
5 unabated.

6 That includes statements by employees who, as
7 defendants' counsel characterized, were not a fit or not
8 a good fit. Even then, defendants are liable for those
9 employees' misstatements.

10 Defendants can also not -- also cannot show
11 that they have no knowledge of their employees'
12 misrepresentations. So that's the second element under
13 Ford Dealers.

14 And here, defendants had such knowledge
15 through their own compliance data, their mystery shopper
16 reports, and the ombudsman reports, among the other
17 evidence that we've reviewed today.

18 And finally, defendants have not and cannot
19 show that they refused to accept the benefits of the
20 misrepresentation. That's the third element.

21 Instead, defendants took the tuition dollars
22 from deceived students and are fighting to this day to
23 hold on to those ill-gotten gains.

24 Defendants pointed to one exhibit that
25 Mr. Swenson was on, and that is one instance where they
26 learned of a student complaint and gave a refund or a
27 partial refund. But that one single instance cannot
28 satisfy the third element of Ford Dealers. It's

1 defendants' burden to show they refused to accept the
2 benefits of the misrepresentations.

3 They were notified of misrepresentations, as I
4 said, in the ombuds report, in their own compliance
5 data, and in the Norton Norris reports, and in none of
6 those instances did they refuse to accept the benefits
7 of those students' tuition.

8 If I could please have slide 5.

9 Just very briefly. Defendants said at the
10 beginning that this was a case about omissions, but, in
11 fact, this is a case about false statements and
12 misleading half-truths.

13 When Ms. Tomko's counselor said Ashford was a
14 part of an interstate agreement that allowed her to
15 begin student teaching right after graduation, that is a
16 false statement. And whether it's a false statement or
17 a misleading half-truth, the same standard applies,
18 which is defendants are liable if the statement is
19 likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

20 So just to be clear, we're not in a world of
21 omissions, we're in a world of false statements as shown
22 by the testimony and evidence in this case.

23 I'd like to talk a little bit about
24 compliance.

25 And if I could have slide 66, please.

26 Defendants said their compliance program was
27 designed to prevent, detect, and remedy, but
28 Ms. Chappell testified earlier this week that detecting

1 was actually the bulk of the compliance work, not
2 preventing or remedying.

3 Now, worse still, defendants hollowed out
4 their compliance structure over time. They left
5 multiple management positions permanently unfilled as
6 they deemed compliance executives like Mark Johnson, who
7 testified yesterday, redundant.

8 And defendants reduced the number of
9 operations compliance specialists, and those are the
10 employees who actually did the detecting of
11 misrepresentations. They reduced their number fivefold.

12 Defendants also switched their speech
13 analytics software simply to save \$5 million.

14 And finally defendants ended all mystery
15 shopping.

16 And as to focused monitoring, defendants gave
17 admissions counselors a heads-up before placing them on
18 focused monitoring.

19 And talking about the detection, as to the
20 small percentage of calls that were monitored,
21 defendants' shrinking compliance staff detected tens of
22 thousands of noncompliant calls.

23 In fact, as we went over before, defendants
24 detected noncompliant statements in more than 20 percent
25 of calls. Those are relevant noncompliant statements.
26 Yet defendants did very little to remedy this extensive
27 noncompliance.

28 In particular, as Mr. Regan found nearly a

1 thousand admissions counselors had at least 10
2 noncompliant statements. And as Mark Johnson testified
3 to yesterday, from 2017 through September 2019,
4 defendants only terminated four representatives, even
5 though their compliance staff detected 3,289
6 noncompliant calls. So instead of remedying, defendants
7 let admissions counselors continue to make noncompliant
8 statements for years.

9 And, for example, Ms. Chappell testified
10 earlier this week that she decided to only issue a
11 written warning to an admissions counselor, Ralph
12 Mastraccio, even though she knew that he had already
13 made 50 noncompliant statements to students.

14 So while defendants may detect noncompliance
15 by admissions counselors, the evidence establishes that
16 they've continued to cut compliance resources while
17 failing to prevent or remedy noncompliance and leaving
18 defendants' students to pay the price.

19 while we're on the topic of compliance, I'd
20 like to discuss some statements that defendant made
21 about the expert Mr. Regan.

22 If I could have slide 65, please.

23 Defendants' attempt to poke holes in
24 Mr. Regan's testimony using -- because he used their own
25 compliance data, and what he found was that there's been
26 extensive misconduct by the admissions counselors. But
27 defendants' attacks fall flat.

28 First, they argue that Mr. Regan should not

1 have used defendants' Excel compliant scorecards. Those
2 were in use from 2010 to 2018. So first, it's a bit
3 confusing that defendants raise questions about their
4 own compliance data and what that might imply about the
5 efficacy of their compliance program.

6 But in any event, if Mr. Regan uses either his
7 consolidated data set or only the SQL data, in either
8 case he finds at least one noncompliant statement in
9 20 percent of relevant calls and 25 percent of all
10 calls. That's a fact that defendants have not
11 challenged.

12 Also, Mr. Regan made extensive efforts to
13 remove any duplicates from the Excel scorecards before
14 consolidating them with the SQL data. That's another
15 fact the defendants have not challenged.

16 Defendants' second argument as to Mr. Regan is
17 that his list of relevant statements by admissions
18 counselors is overinclusive, yet defendants ignore that
19 the percent of calls with at least one noncompliant
20 statement actually goes up when looking at all calls
21 versus only those containing relevant statements.

22 Defendants also argue that Mr. Regan's
23 analysis is flawed because there are not many statements
24 included in his analysis that contain the words "false"
25 or "misleading" or "misrepresentation," those exact
26 words. But Mr. Regan included many statements that are
27 misleading, even if the -- they don't include the word
28 "misleading," whether or not they contain that word, and

1 those include the admissions counselors, quote,
2 "Guaranteed students' credits will transfer into their
3 program" or "Admissions counselor advised that financial
4 aid will cover the student's entire cost of tuition."

5 So not only were those statements misleading,
6 they were made on over 200 calls each, so it's no
7 surprise that defendants attempt to undercut Mr. Regan's
8 analysis.

9 But these critiques are only around the
10 margins and fail to rebut his findings that defendants'
11 made relevant noncompliant statements in over one out of
12 five calls leading to 750,000 students nationwide
13 receiving misrepresentations from defendants.

14 If I could please have slide 97.

15 I'd like to briefly discuss defendants'
16 expert, Dr. Wind, and in particular the student survey
17 that he conducted.

18 Dr. Wind's student survey should be given no
19 weight just as the court in United States v. Dentsply
20 gave another survey by Dr. Wind no weight due to its low
21 response rate, plus his failure to study nonrespondents
22 to dispel the possibility of nonresponse bias.

23 Here, Dr. Wind's student survey had a
24 .4 percent response rate. Dr. Wind also deliberately
25 excluded students who are aware of litigation against
26 defendants, students on defendants' Do Not Call list,
27 and associate's degree and graduate degree students.

28 Dr. Wind set out to conduct a survey that

1 would reflect the views of Ashford's entire student
2 body, but his low response rate and affirmative
3 exclusions of important subgroups of Ashford students
4 defeated that goal.

5 Next slide, please.

6 And even if Dr. Wind's survey could be taken
7 seriously, it doesn't help defendants' theories.
8 Dr. Wind purposefully avoided key questions about
9 whether students read the catalogs or enrollment
10 agreements, and even among the few surveys that Dr. Wind
11 did analyze, 24.1 percent of them showed that an
12 advisor's promise was key to the student's decision to
13 attend Ashford.

14 The Court can rely on Dr. Wind's -- cannot
15 rely on Dr. Wind's flawed consumer survey to hear, as
16 counsel put it, the voice of the consumer. Instead, the
17 People would urge the Court to rely on the experiences
18 of the real live students who sat on the stand and
19 explained how they did exactly what defendants claim
20 never happens, rely on the promises of their counselors
21 when deciding to enroll.

22 Slide 94, please.

23 Just briefly on the issue of WASC.

24 Defendants rely heavily --

25 This is the accreditor.

26 THE COURT: I know who it is.

27 MS. KALANITHI: Thank you.

28 -- on the fact that Ashford was accredited by

1 WASC, and it's notable that while defendants wish to use
2 the WASC accreditation as some sort of third-party
3 approval of their Admissions Department, they, in fact,
4 called no witness from WASC to testify during this
5 trial, no witness to testify about what their
6 impressions are of Ashford's Admissions Department, what
7 information they received, what conclusions they drew,
8 and why they continued accrediting Ashford.

9 So what is in the record is that Ashford
10 provided no admissions calls to WASC during the period
11 of accreditation which Ashford first applied for in
12 2011, no call recordings, that is, until 2019, at which
13 point WASC reviewed 50 call recordings. We have no
14 evidence about how those 50 were chosen or what standard
15 WASC used to review them.

16 We also have evidence that despite issuing
17 notices of concern about Ashford's low retention and
18 graduation rate year after year, including a notice to
19 UAGC this year, WASC continues to accredit the
20 university. So the fact that the university is
21 accredited is by no means evidence that WASC approved of
22 its entire operations or its Admissions Department.

23 I'd like to talk a little bit about Dr. Lucido
24 and Dr. Siskin.

25 Defendants say Dr. Lucido did not determine if
26 any student who heard a misrepresentation actually
27 enrolled, so restitution, they say, can't be based on
28 his analysis. But for restitution purposes, that issue

1 will be addressed because the People's claims process
2 will require that a student actually enrolls.

3 Dr. Lucido's analysis just shows the scope of
4 harm in this case, and as to penalty purposes, whether
5 the student actually enrolled is irrelevant because the
6 misrepresentation becomes actual -- actionable the
7 moment it's spoken.

8 Defendants also say that Dr. Lucido failed to
9 identify any actual lies, only omissions or implied
10 misrepresentations, but that's a distinction without a
11 difference given the UCL and FAL covering anything
12 that's likely to deceive.

13 Defendants say that Dr. Lucido ignored other
14 calls and written disclosures, the context, but first,
15 that's legally irrelevant because even if other truthful
16 information exists, it can't cure a misrepresentation in
17 one of the calls that Dr. Lucido identified.

18 And further, as I explained earlier, there's
19 significant evidence in the record that Ashford
20 counselors actually discouraged students from reading
21 the catalog and rushed them through the applications.

22 Defendants say that Dr. Lucido did not apply a
23 reasonable student standard and that he applied his own
24 personal opinion about good practice, but what
25 Dr. Lucido actually did was he used his 40 years of
26 experience leading Admissions Departments, advising
27 students and families about college decision-making, and
28 setting standards in the entire profession for how

1 counselors should speak to students. Based on all that
2 experience, he's clearly qualified to offer an opinion
3 about what is likely to deceive a student.

4 And this substantive specific experience is
5 actually what sets him apart from Dr. Wind and
6 Dr. Wind's call review. Dr. Wind's general marketing
7 knowledge did not help him identify clear
8 misrepresentations in the calls he reviewed.

9 Defendants say that Dr. Lucido could not
10 identify certain misrepresentations when he was pressed
11 to do so on the stand. During his analysis, Dr. Lucido
12 reviewed 4,000 pages of transcripts. The fact that he
13 did not recall the details of every misrepresentation
14 without the benefits of his notes is not surprising or
15 not particularly remarkable.

16 He easily testified to each call once he was
17 provided the notes, and these memory tests aside,
18 defendants did not actually show that Dr. Lucido wrongly
19 identified any misrepresentation.

20 Defendants say that Dr. Lucido was biased
21 because he knew the sponsor of his study, but as
22 Dr. Lucido explained, he considered himself an
23 independent researcher when carrying out the study and
24 he clearly set out his work. Defendants were free to
25 show how this supposed bias caused him to wrongly
26 identify a call as deceptive, and they could not.

27 This was a task that required someone with
28 Dr. Lucido's experience in admissions, financial aid,

1 and transfer credits. It was not possible to use blind
2 data coders. And as the People showed, defendants'
3 attorney coders missed critical misrepresentations
4 because they didn't have the expertise to identify them.

5 Finally, defendants say Dr. Lucido should have
6 listened to the calls instead of reading the transcript.
7 Dr. Lucido used court-reported transcripts of the calls,
8 which allowed him to carefully read and reread the
9 calls. This is another argument that defendants can
10 make in the abstract, but in practice, they did not show
11 a single call where the audio would have made a
12 difference to whether or not the call was deceptive.

13 As to Dr. Siskin, defendants criticize his
14 reliance on the data firm Epiq, which they know was
15 hired and trained by the Attorney General's Office.
16 They argue that Epiq was biased or made mistakes which
17 undermined Dr. Siskin's results.

18 But first, there's no evidence of bias. Epiq
19 was simply coding basic objective data, like what
20 department the speaker stated they were calling from.
21 There's no evidence that Epiq knew what the purpose of
22 the study was. They didn't.

23 Further, this process was necessary in part
24 because defendants did not retain any metadata for their
25 own calls, a fact which is in evidence, which would have
26 allowed for filtering by department. This case is about
27 admissions calls, so it was necessary to separate those
28 calls from the entire universe of calls from defendants.

1 with respect to errors, Dr. Siskin clearly
2 testified that any errors in Epiq's process would
3 actually work in defendants' favor; that is, correcting
4 any error could only keep the number of deceptive calls
5 the same or make it higher. This is not a valid
6 critique of Dr. Siskin's analysis.

7 Defendants point out that counsel for the
8 People provided Dr. Siskin certain estimates about the
9 rate of relevant calls and deceptive calls at the outset
10 of his review. As Dr. Siskin testified, the only
11 purpose of this was to provide some datapoints from
12 which he could estimate the necessary sample size to
13 achieve his desired accuracy.

14 As he explained, those estimates did not
15 influence his actual results in any way. Whatever
16 Dr. Lucido found is what Dr. Siskin reported and used to
17 estimate the deception in the full population,
18 completely independent from any estimates used to inform
19 the initial sample-size selection.

20 Defendants say that no expert opined that
21 defendants authorized misrepresentations. They have a
22 number of statements they made about certain things that
23 experts didn't opine about, but this was not these
24 experts' tasks, specifically Dr. Siskin and Dr. Lucido.

25 And whether -- it's irrelevant because the
26 People separately provided evidence that defendants were
27 aware of the deception and that they had the right to
28 control the admissions representatives.

1 Defendants also say that no expert critiqued
2 defendants' Compliance Department, and again, that was
3 not the task of these experts and there was no need for
4 an expert to critique defendants' Compliance Department
5 when the paper trail from that department speaks for
6 itself.

7 what Dr. Siskin did say, though, is if there
8 are a large number of misrepresentations being made in
9 the calls, quote, "It would mean if the training and
10 compliance is to eliminate those, it's not effective."

11 Very briefly on debt collection.

12 Defendants -- just a number of points to
13 respond to what defendants said on debt collection.

14 First to clarify, the People are, in fact,
15 seeking remedies for debt collection violations, both
16 penalties and restitution, and --

17 Can I have one moment, Your Honor? Thank you.
18 (Attorneys confer.)

19 MS. KALANITHI: Sorry, Your Honor. I will say
20 that again.

21 The People seek remedies for debt collection
22 violations, penalties, restitution of fees paid, and an
23 injunction.

24 Second, the evidence of the legal violation is
25 not only the stipulation, the fact stipulation that the
26 parties entered into, but also the testimony of Scott
27 Moore, the deposition expert -- excerpts that were
28 entered into evidence and the exhibits to that

1 deposition.

2 Third, defendants say they did not profit from
3 the fee, but to the contrary, defendants passed the cost
4 of their -- the collection agency commissions to
5 students. They did not have to absorb the cost
6 themselves, so that means more money for defendants.
7 They never repaid that money, and that is the violation.
8 That is the profit from the fee.

9 Very briefly on defendants' net worth.

10 Zovio is a publicly-traded company. Its SEC
11 filings speak for themselves. Defendants have presented
12 no evidence beyond that, even though it would be their
13 burden to present any evidence on the penalty factor
14 related to assets and net worth if they assert that it
15 should be taken into account in their favor.

16 There's no evidence in the record to show that
17 defendants' financial picture is anything other than
18 what's in their SEC filings. That picture shows tens of
19 millions of dollars in cash, millions of dollars of
20 additional assets, and a lucrative future contract with
21 UAGC. There's no basis for limiting penalties due to
22 defendants' assets and net worth.

23 The People further should not be penalized for
24 the choices the company made to transfer over
25 \$54 million to the University of Arizona Global Campus
26 within the last year.

27 Just a couple points on restitution.

28 Defendants said that the People's restitution

1 request was untethered to the evidence and that the
2 proposal is a fluid recovery fund that's not allowed.

3 So just to address that briefly, neither of
4 those is true. The People's restitution request is
5 supported by the scale of deception as the expert
6 analyses showed and by the exemplar experiences of the
7 student witnesses who were so harmed by the
8 misrepresentations they were told.

9 Also, this is not a fluid recovery fund. The
10 case law says that a fluid recovery fund is similar to a
11 Cy Pre Fund, a pool of money that does not even go to
12 the victims directly harmed by the challenged conduct,
13 and that's the opposite of what we are proposing here
14 with the claims process.

15 In fact, in the Kraus case -- that's the case
16 defendants cite for the fluid recovery fund
17 proposition -- the Court specifically said what is
18 allowed -- where a fluid recovery fund is not allowed,
19 what is allowed is a court-ordered process by which
20 victims are identified, located, and given the
21 opportunity to submit a claim for relief, which is
22 exactly what the People are proposing happen here with
23 the claims administrator.

24 Defendants also say that there's no
25 nonclass-action case that has used this sort of claims
26 process. But, again, that ignores the clear examples
27 that the People have cited in multiple briefs to the
28 Court on this issue. That's the Sarpas case and the

1 Fremont Life case. The fact that defendants ignore that
2 case law does not mean it doesn't exist.

3 Thank you, Your Honor.

4 The final point I'll leave this Court with is
5 the concept of willfulness, one of the penalty factors.
6 So -- that's one of the penalty factors under the UCL
7 and FAL, as Your Honor knows.

8 As you heard in Mr. Yeh's statements, as
9 defendants see it, Ms. Perez screwed up -- that's the
10 language used in the closing -- that Ms. Tomko screwed
11 up, that other students who testified apparently also
12 screwed up.

13 Defendants' corporate representatives,
14 including Dr. Pattenau and Dr. Swenson, sat through
15 most of this six-week trial, yet not once have their
16 witnesses expressed an ounce of remorse for what these
17 students experienced, the students who testified live,
18 the students who testified via deposition, the hundreds
19 of students defendants identified today who submitted
20 claims to the Attorney General's office public inquiry
21 unit, the students identified in the Norton Norris
22 reports and in the ombudsman reports, the students who
23 are implicated by all the misrepresentations that were
24 identified there.

25 The People request that this Court use the
26 full scope of remedies available under the law to
27 penalize defendants for their wrongs, remedy the harms
28 they have caused, and to stop their willful misconduct

1 from continuing.

2 Thank you, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

4 The Court would like the statements of
5 decisions. For the record, I use them, so let's talk
6 about timing, and then I'll tell you the process that
7 I've done, that I always go through. This case will be
8 no exception.

9 what type of time frame are you look -- we
10 only do one. I don't -- you have one shot here. Maybe
11 that's not the right -- one statement of decision, one
12 statement of decision, and you're done. There's no
13 cross coming back or anything like that. Everybody
14 understand that?

15 MR. HUMMEL: Yes, Your Honor.

16 MS. KALANITHI: Yes, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Thank you.

18 Let's talk about time frames.

19 People, how much time do you think you need to
20 do a statement of decision? Realizing that in two
21 weeks, I'm off -- well, just tell me your time frame.

22 MS. WANG: We had suggested January 18th to
23 defendants.

24 THE COURT: Wow. And notice I said, "wow."
25 That's pretty quick.

26 MR. HUMMEL: Yeah, I think that's too quick.
27 We'd request the 20 -- either the 28th of January or
28 February 4th. I understand the Court has 90 days from

1 submission today, so whatever the Court wants, we will
2 meet, but that's -- given the holidays and a trial I
3 have, that would be good.

4 THE COURT: It depends how I structure that
5 90 days. If I continue it --

6 MR. HUMMEL: I get it.

7 THE COURT: Just so you know, so -- but you
8 know that. But now I have to think. What was your --
9 you said that January when?

10 MR. HUMMEL: 28th, 28th or February 4th.

11 Can we go off the record for a minute,
12 Your Honor?

13 THE COURT: Sure.

14 (A discussion was held off the record.)

15 THE COURT: Proposed statement of decisions,
16 January 28th. It will take me a month to do what I'm
17 going to do. Easily a month. And then what I do, which
18 I always do, I'll make my final decisions, I put it away
19 for two weeks. I've always done this. Forget about it.
20 And then I go back and read it again to make sure that
21 I'm comfortable. And if I'm comfortable with that two
22 weeks, out it goes.

23 So I'm trying to figure what time frame does
24 that get me in. So let's say I get it done by
25 March 1st -- oh, no. That's within the 90 days, isn't
26 it?

27 MR. HUMMEL: Well, it depends on when you deem
28 it submitted.

1 THE COURT: well, thank you, Judge Sturgeon.
2 How about that? No, that will work fine. Because that
3 gives me the months -- and there's some holidays in
4 there, so it gives me plenty of time to get it done,
5 okay? So let's do that. Just put down it will be done
6 by January 28th.

7 MR. HUMMEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: Anything else from the People?

9 MS. WANG: Can we reach an agreement on page
10 limits? The People suggest 50 pages.

11 MR. HUMMEL: Fine with us.

12 THE COURT: That's a good number. 50 pages.

13 MR. HUMMEL: would you like it in word too?

14 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you for reminding me.
15 Send it in word, okay?

16 MR. HUMMEL: To your -- we'll make
17 arrangements, yes.

18 THE COURT: Right here. Right here.

19 MR. HUMMEL: Perfect.

20 THE COURT: Send it to Steph. Do you have
21 Stephanie's --

22 MR. HUMMEL: Yes.

23 THE COURT: That's who I want it sent to.
24 People? Anything else.

25 MS. WANG: There is one more final
26 housekeeping matter --

27 THE COURT: Take your time.

28 MS. WANG: -- Your Honor.

1 There are about 15 exhibits that we would ask
2 the Court for permission -- admitted exhibits we would
3 ask the Court if we can not submit paper versions of
4 them because they're extremely burdensome to even format
5 for printing, and then once they're printed, it's going
6 to run into the hundreds of thousands of pages. We've
7 provided the list to defendants.

8 THE COURT: So I assume you want to do it on a
9 thumb drive?

10 MS. WANG: Yes, they've already been provided
11 on a thumb drive.

12 THE COURT: Haven't we already done one --
13 we've already admitted one like that, haven't we?

14 MR. HUMMEL: Yes, Your Honor, the website.

15 THE COURT: Yes. First of all, I don't have
16 any objection.

17 MR. HUMMEL: We have no objection.

18 THE COURT: And if the appellate court wants
19 to do something, they'll let you know. But I think they
20 should be fine with that, I would think.

21 MS. WANG: And would the Court like the
22 specific exhibit numbers that that would apply to, or
23 should we do a stipulation?

24 THE COURT: Do a stipulation.

25 People, anything else?

26 MS. WANG: One other thing, which is, the
27 parties had submitted a stipulation regarding all the
28 different exhibits that had been substituted in for

1 because of the PII, the personally identifying
2 information.

3 I think I see on the docket that Your Honor
4 already signed the proposed order that went with it. If
5 I could confirm, or if we don't need it, I just --

6 THE COURT: Confirmed.

7 MS. WANG: Okay. Perfect.

8 THE COURT: I would assume that all of you, or
9 at least one from each side, will determine the list and
10 agreed upon all admitted exhibits. I would like that
11 done. We've been doing it as we go along, so I don't
12 think it's going to be that big of an issue. But that's
13 very important, if you could do that for the Court.

14 MR. HUMMEL: We'll do that.

15 THE COURT: Thank you.

16 MR. LAKE: Yes, Your Honor.

17 MS. WANG: Yes, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Anything else?

19 MR. HUMMEL: Yes, Your Honor. On the defense
20 side, there are -- there's a thumb drive of the pages
21 from the website, Exhibit 7740, that the Court had
22 requested that were referenced, and we can provide that
23 to Your Honor or make it part of the record.

24 And we too have to replace four exhibits that
25 eliminate PII. And I'll read those for the record now,
26 and we'll do that by stipulation as well. But they are
27 Exhibit 666.

28 THE COURT: Slow down.

1 Mr. Clerk, are you marking it with me?

2 THE CLERK: Yes. Can you give me that first
3 one, Your Honor?

4 (The Court and the clerk confer off the
5 record.)

6 THE COURT: And these are the following
7 exhibits.

8 Nice and slow, Counsel.

9 MR. HUMMEL: The exhibits that we're replacing
10 with PII redacted versions are 666, 1255, 1281, 3780.

11 And, Your Honor, what was on the thumb drive
12 are the website pages referenced per the parties'
13 stipulation on Exhibit 7740. And we've agreed to this
14 with the People.

15 THE COURT: And is that all going to be on one
16 thumb drive?

17 MR. HUMMEL: Yes, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: People clearly understood?

19 MS. WANG: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: Agree?

21 MS WANG: No objection, yes.

22 THE COURT: And put it in a -- we've got --
23 see those little yellow -- make sure it goes into one of
24 these.

25 MR. HUMMEL: We will.

26 THE COURT: We've got about 40 of them over
27 there --

28 MR. HUMMEL: Okay.

1 THE COURT: -- for the record, okay?

2 MR. HUMMEL: Nothing further from the defense.

3 THE COURT: Anything else?

4 MS. WANG: Nothing further from the People.

5 THE COURT: Just a few comments from the
6 bench.

7 I appreciate -- I've done a number of what I
8 call not only complex cases, but major complex cases.
9 The -- and I really mean this. I've done it all.

10 The efficiency that your team (indicating) and
11 your team (indicating) have done, admirable. You did
12 not waste one minute of this Court's time, and you all
13 know how busy I am, and I can't -- I mean, it's a big
14 deal, people. It is a big deal. I'm telling you, this
15 could have went on for months.

16 But because of your efficiency, the Court is
17 really pleased. This is the way to do a complex
18 litigation case. And you know I get a lot of requests
19 for speeches. Well, I'm going to be talking about you
20 all -- not about the case -- just how efficient you
21 were, and I mean it.

22 And the other thing is the lawyering. A lot
23 of smart people in this room, but you're professional,
24 you know what you're doing, you deal with me. I've got
25 that. Trust me, I clearly -- but I'm just -- you know,
26 this is -- this is what it's all about. You're all very
27 good. And your clients should be very proud of you.

28 All right. Do your work. Thank you.

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SIMULTANEOUS SPEAKERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Proceedings adjourned at 4:07 p.m.)

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1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2) SS.
3 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)
4

5 I, Christina Lothar, CSR No. 8624, Official
6 Reporter Pro Tempore for the Superior Court of the State
7 of California, in and for the County of San Diego, do
8 hereby certify:

9 That as such reporter, I reported in machine
10 shorthand the proceedings held in the foregoing case;

11 That my notes were transcribed into
12 typewriting under my direction and the proceedings held
13 on December 15, 2021 contained within pages 1 through
14 197, are a true and correct transcription.

15 Dated this 16th day of December, 2021.
16
17

18 

19
20 (DIGITALLY SIGNED)

21 Christina Lothar, CSR No. 8624
22 Official Reporter Pro Tempore
23 San Diego Superior Court

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